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Cover
The Naval War College complex on
Coasters Harbor Island, in a photograph
taken about 2000, looking roughly
northeast. In the center foreground is
Luce Hall, with Pringle Hall to its left
and Mahan Hall hidden behind it;
behind them, to the left, are Spruance,
Conolly, and Hewitt halls. In the center,
partly obscured by Conolly Hall, is
McCarty Little Hall. On the extreme
right in the foreground is Founders Hall,
in which the College was established. In
recent years the College has expanded
into parts of several buildings of the Sur-
face Warfare Officers School Command,
on the northern part of the island. In the
middle distance are facilities of Naval
Station Newport (the decommissioned
aircraft carriers ex-Forrestal and ex-
Saratoga are visible at Pier 1) and, be-
yond that, of the Naval Undersea War-
fare Center. In the far distance can be
seen parts of the towns of Portsmouth and
Tiverton, Rhode Island.
Photograph © 2008 by Onne van der Wal
Photography, Inc.
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Foreword
At the end of the decades-long Cold War, the United States displayed its military
capability in a positive manner by responding to a severe humanitarian crisis in
Somalia. The goal of providing assistance amid starvation and chaos appealed to the
better natures of the American people and their leaders. Highly influenced by media
coverage of starvation and privation, most Americans happily embraced a series of
operations conducted by their government to alleviate the suffering that appeared
pervasive throughout that African nation. Regrettably, the best of intentions could
not prevent a continuing drift toward disorder, and the American relief effort
devolved into conflict and bloodshed. Although the operations were not entirely
without success, the violence and casualties incurred during these actions left a bitter
impression that influenced American foreign policy and military thinking for some
time thereafter. In Somalia . . . From the Sea, Professor Gary J. Ohls has written an
account of those experiences and their subsequent impact on the policies of the
United States. Despite the fact that American incursions into Somalia entailed the joint
effort of all U.S. services, naval expeditionary forces provided the preponderance of
force during much of the involvement. Professor Ohls illustrates this, while analyzing
the operational and strategic aspects of these events.
Professor Ohls undertook this research and writing project in naval operational history
while serving as a faculty member in the Maritime History Department of the Naval
War College between August 2007 and December 2008. The tradition of studying both
recent and long-past historical events was firmly established at the foundation of the
Naval War College in 1884 with the contributions of the College’s founder, Stephen B.
Luce, and his immediate successor, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Historical research
and analysis has continued as a recognized element of the academic life of the institu-
tion for the past 125 years. Nowhere is there a more logical requirement for a corpus of
relevant source material and for an academic research department devoted to new
research on naval history. Building on a tradition of publishing timely analyses, the
Naval War College initiated the book-length series of works known as the Newport
Papers. In his study of American involvement in Somalia during the immediate post–
Cold War period, Professor Ohls has participated in the Newport Papers tradition by
making an original contribution to naval operational history that provides insight
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and understanding that can inform future decisions and actions in the uncertain
world that lies ahead.
J O H N B . H A T T E N D O R F , D . P H I L .
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History
Chairman, Maritime History Department
vi T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Introduction
From January 1991 through March 1995, the United States conducted numerous incur-
sions into Somalia, undertaking a variety of missions and objectives. All of the actions
had humanitarian elements, yet the operations that made up this mosaic of American
involvement ranged from benign to aggressive—from purely humanitarian to clearly
combative. Somalia . . . From the Sea is an account that attempts to explain and analyze
these actions and place them within the overarching strategic and operational concepts
developing in the first years following the end of the Cold War. During this period, the
sea services sought to redefine their roles in a rapidly changing defense environment, as
well as the new world order of President George H. W. Bush and the assertive multi-
lateralism of President William J. Clinton. In the minds of many leaders, these were
times of both relief and uncertainty. The world had gotten through the Cold War with-
out a nuclear exchange or a major conventional confrontation between the world’s
great superpowers, and that was a good thing. But the lack of clarity about this new
world order created angst in the minds of many military leaders.
Political leaders and many American citizens saw this as a time of great opportunity. It
would be possible to reduce defense costs and reallocate those expenditures to every-
thing from social programs to tax reductions. Even the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the
subsequent war to reestablish Kuwaiti independence did not dampen the enthusiasm of
the times, since most leaders viewed Saddam Hussein and his aggression as an anomaly
in the new world order. Yet for many military and naval officers and a few political
leaders there remained uncertainty in the defense environment, uncertainty that they
could ignore only at great risk. Within that context numerous operational and strategic
concept papers were developed and published. But despite the thought and profession-
alism invested in this material, the impact of these concepts on the armed forces of the
United States proved inconsistent and tentative.
The first chapter of this study (“Operational and Strategic Context”) identifies the
most significant of these new ideas and attempts to analyze their impact on the
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thinking and operations of the sea services during this period. In contrasting the new
concepts with the major warfighting theories of the Cold War era—such as the Mari-
time Strategy of the 1980s—it becomes clear how the situation had changed and how
that shift influenced the operational nature of the Navy and Marine Corps. Although
this chapter addresses a number of papers from the period, such as “The Way Ahead”
and The Navy Policy Book, the focus is on three closely related concept documents that
typify this period: . . . From the Sea, Forward . . . From the Sea, and Operational Maneu-
ver from the Sea. Not only did these have a great impact during the 1990s, but they
remain important influences in the operational and strategic environments today.
Among the more interesting aspects of these concepts is the concurrent nature of their
development and implementation. Thinkers in Washington and other centers of study
developed these ideas and innovative thoughts at the same time that operators in the
field conducted the actions that gave them definition. We will find this interaction
between concept development and operational implementation throughout as we
attempt to understand American involvement in Somalia within the operational and
strategic concepts of that period.
The initial military action in Somalia—Operation EASTERN EXIT—occurred from 5 to
7 January 1991 and involved naval forces committed to DESERT SHIELD. EASTERN EXIT
amounted to a noncombatant evacuation operation sent to rescue Americans and citi-
zens of other nations from the war-torn and crime-infested city of Mogadishu. It was a
humanitarian operation in that it rescued people and saved lives. More accurately, how-
ever, it was an armed incursion, conducted without the permission of the local govern-
ment and authorized to accomplish its mission by force of arms if necessary. The
chapter on EASTERN EXIT and its effects makes it clear how aptly the operation fits into
the concepts of . . . From the Sea. It also demonstrates how the larger operations of
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM—involving some of the same forces that executed
EASTERN EXIT—contributed to both evacuation at Mogadishu and development of the
operational and strategic concepts of the period.
The chapter that addresses Operation PROVIDE RELIEF deals with the overarching con-
cepts of this study somewhat less perfectly than is the case elsewhere in this work.
PROVIDE RELIEF amounted to a relatively small air-delivery operation commanded by a
Marine officer and operating through a joint staff. Its primary mission involved flying
emergency food aid from Mombasa, Kenya, into remote sites of Somalia ravished by
severe famine. Yet this episode is very important to our study, because it constituted
America’s entry into Somalia as a humanitarian force. Unlike EASTERN EXIT, PROVIDE
RELIEF implied an American commitment to Somalia and served as a precursor for the
much larger and more complex involvements that followed. Familiarity with PROVIDE
2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:12:16 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
RELIEF is fundamental to comprehending the American commitments to Somalia, all
of them closely intertwined with . . . From the Sea and other concepts from that period.
It is not possible to appreciate America’s involvement in Somalia without a clear under-
standing of PROVIDE RELIEF.
In addition to the air-delivery element of PROVIDE RELIEF, a small but important naval
expeditionary action also occurred. The insertion of a group of Pakistani United Nations
peacekeepers into Mogadishu promised to be a tricky proposition, because of the insta-
bility within that city and the negative view of the UN held by the leader of a major fac-
tion and subclan within the city. U.S. naval expeditionary forces in the form of an
amphibious ready group facilitated that operation, ensuring its safe accomplishment. The
PROVIDE RELIEF chapter also describes the events that created such chaotic conditions
within Somalia and led to the enormous humanitarian relief response from many nations
of the world. This background provides insight into the operational environment Ameri-
can forces faced while deployed to that part of the world. It also addresses Somali clan
relationships, the political factions at play within that environment, and the leaders
who contributed to the chaotic and confused society of Somalia in the 1990s. Without
this knowledge, it is difficult to appreciate the factors that affected American thinking
and actions before and during our larger involvements on the Horn of Africa.
Operation RESTORE HOPE exemplifies the application of . . . From the Sea and the use
of naval expeditionary forces in a complex and disordered environment. The first of
two chapters on RESTORE HOPE (“Operation RESTORE HOPE: Prelude and Lodgment”)
addresses the growth of the crisis, the U.S. decision-making process for responding to
the situation, the planning and organization of the operation, and the initial incursion
into Somalia for humanitarian relief. The second (“Operation RESTORE HOPE: Opera-
tions and Transition”) deals with the problems of overcoming the friction and resis-
tance (whether subtle or overt) that resulted from an effort to change the status quo
within the Somali nation. It addresses political and diplomatic efforts, organizational
activities, stabilization operations, and in some cases combat actions. Finally, this chap-
ter deals with the problems of transferring control of the Somalia mission from a U.S.
operation to one under UN leadership, during Operation CONTINUE HOPE.
CONTINUE HOPE is also addressed in two chapters, beginning with “Operation
CONTINUE HOPE: Operations and Conflict.” This chapter completes the transition pro-
cess from RESTORE HOPE and describes the political, social, and military environment
that existed within Somalia from May to October 1993. It explains how the humanitar-
ian relief operation morphed into a full-blown combat situation, with the CONTINUE
HOPE/United Nations Operations in Somalia [UNOSOM] II force becoming embroiled
in Somalia’s internecine fighting in the streets of Mogadishu. The chapter describes and
S O M A L I A . . . F R O M T H E S E A 3
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analyzes the pattern of this change, the factors contributing to its development, and its
impact on the mission and subsequent operations. It includes the factors leading up to
the Battle of Mogadishu (also called the “Black Hawk Down” incident), the impact of
that encounter, and a brief description of the fighting.
The second chapter on this subject (“Operation CONTINUE HOPE: Reinforcement and
Withdrawal”) discusses the impact of the Battle of Mogadishu on American and coali-
tion commitment to Somalia and other humanitarian activities. The shock effect of
unexpected American casualties, coupled with the desecration of the body of a U.S. sol-
dier in the streets, caused a revulsion among Americans and had a great impact on this
undertaking as well as future deployments. We assess the subsequent decision to rein-
force American troops while limiting use of the units arriving in Somalia as part of
Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia. The schizophrenic nature of this period, wherein the
U.S. president proclaimed that America would remain involved while announcing a
withdrawal date only six months in the future, will also be addressed. The role of Army
and naval forces during this period and the complex yet efficient withdrawal of U.S.
forces during March 1994 is discussed and analyzed.
One year after the amphibious withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia, the United
Nations conducted a similar evacuation, known as Operation UNITED SHIELD, under
the command of a U.S. naval expeditionary force. Although an efficient tactical and
operational action, this undertaking exposed the failure of policy and strategy for sav-
ing Somalia from chaos and anarchy. A study of this operation is followed by a chapter
entitled “Operational and Strategic Observations,” which concludes the narrative and
analytic elements of this work. Various appendices follow, including a chronology of
events, a list of abbreviations and acronyms, and other relevant information, as well as
a complete bibliography. The reader is encouraged to review all the appendices before
beginning the text, as this will greatly enhance understanding of the unique aspects of
this historic set of events.
Research for this study was conducted primarily in original sources. The most impor-
tant element comprised original interviews by the author of many high-level leaders
involved in the decision-making, planning, or execution phases of these actions. A
second important resource involved the Operational Archives at the Navy Yard in
Washington, D.C., and the Marine Corps archives in Quantico, Virginia. In addition
to numerous chronologies, histories, messages, and other such material, these
archives contain various interviews conducted at the time of the events under study.
Memoirs in the forms of books and journal articles also contributed to this research
and proved particularly valuable when used in conjunction with personal interviews.
4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Of course, secondary sources by competent researchers, writers, analysts, and academ-
ics were also used.
Three aspects of this study make it unique among the literature of America’s incursions
into Somalia. The most basic of these is the effort to address all the military actions of
the period—from EASTERN EXIT through UNITED SHIELD. Many excellent accounts
have covered one or several aspects of the Somalia experience, but no major study has
addressed the entire series of American actions or attempted to describe and analyze
their interrelated nature. The events most extensively covered in the existing literature
are the December 1992 landing in Mogadishu to initiate RESTORE HOPE and the Battle
of Mogadishu during CONTINUE HOPE. These events are, of course, addressed in this
study, but as elements of the larger commitment rather than as isolated episodes.
A second unique element of this study is its inclusion of the U.S. Navy’s contribution to
America’s Somalia involvement. The naval contribution has generally been left out of
accounts, whereas other aspects—Army, Marine Corps, humanitarian, diplomatic,
political, and United Nations—have been thoroughly covered. This work is not a naval
history of U.S. involvement in Somalia; it is not possible to segment the roles of ser-
vices in any way that would permit a meaningful account. But it does include the naval
role as an integral part of the larger activity and characterizes the value of naval forces
in an expeditionary environment.
The third unique aspect of this study is its intention to connect the Somalia incursions
and the operational and strategic concepts of the time. This element of the subject is
particularly fascinating, since the two activities, operations and concept development,
occurred simultaneously and interactively. Through this analysis we not only under-
stand the activity of the early 1990s but gain a broad insight as to how concepts are
influenced by action. By including the conceptual aspect of naval thinking throughout
this study, we also understand how policy and strategy interact with operations and
tactics—at least within an expeditionary environment.
Note
The epigraph is a commonly quoted Somali proverb that served as a backdrop for American involve-
ment in Somalia during the 1990s. Reproduced in U.S. Army Dept., United States Forces, Somalia After
Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994 (Washington,
D.C.: Center of Military History, 2003), p. 55.
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Me and Somalia against the world,
Me and my clan against Somalia,
Me and my family against my clan,
Me and my brother against my family,
Me against my brother.
Somali proverb
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Operational and Strategic Context
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps spent consider-
able time and energy attempting to define their roles in the new security environment
created by the end of the Cold War. The decline of Soviet power, marked by large cut-
backs in military spending and a withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, left the
United States without a peer competitor—politically, diplomatically, or militarily—on
the world scene.1 The aftermath of this climactic event created pressure in the U.S.
Congress for a “peace dividend,” in the form of deep reductions in the defense budget.
By 1990, President George H. W. Bush recognized the security environment had
changed but also felt that it remained somewhat uncertain. The Soviet Union, Amer-
ica’s Cold War adversary, was less hostile, but it had not yet imploded (as it soon
would) into numerous successor states, and it continued to possess residual military
strength, especially large quantities of nuclear weapons.
The president and his advisers wanted to avoid a haphazard disarmament—such as
occurred after most wars in American history—and therefore chose to limit defense
reductions to 25 percent over a five-year period.2 They also called for a revised security
strategy that reflected new realities in the post–Cold War world. This would permit
restructuring America’s armed forces to fit new requirements and avoid simple across-
the-board reductions that would leave the United States with a hollow version of its
Cold War military force.3 This reassessment of national security resulted from thought-
ful and professional analysis, and offered substantial force reductions, but many leaders
believed it did not go far enough. In the political environment of 1990, opponents of
the administration viewed the decision to reduce no more than 25 percent as inade-
quate and essentially a victory for supporters of the Pentagon.4
During the defense buildup of the 1980s, naval leaders advocated constructing a six-
hundred-ship force. They never fully attained that goal, but to defense planners at the
time it seemed reasonable, because the Soviet Union possessed a strong and growing
navy with deployment patterns that threatened American interests.5 Additionally,
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simple geography and numerous treaty obligations (more than forty treaties that
required naval involvement) underscored in the minds of most analysts the ongoing
importance of a large naval force.6 But under the reduced-threat scenario of the 1990s,
strategic thinking focused on addressing regional contingencies rather than worldwide
warfare against the Soviet Union. In response to that focus, defense leaders developed a
“Base Force” concept designed to provide a minimal yet stable defense capability that
could adequately protect the nation’s interests in the post–Cold War era. The notion of
a 25 percent reduction in U.S. military forces, in a manner closely tied to the revised
security strategy, resulted from the Base Force planning process. For the Navy, match-
ing the Base Force structure to the new security strategy presaged a reduction from 526
to 450 ships, with associated cuts in manpower and budget.7 The Marine Corps also
faced a decrease from its Cold War force level of 197,000 to 170,600; planners had ini-
tially considered a force as low as 150,000 Marines.8
Faced with new geopolitical realities and reduced combat capabilities, defense officials
and naval analysts of the early 1990s created a series of strategic concepts that rede-
fined the mission of the sea services. The catchword of the period became “expedition-
ary,” and for the Navy this implied a shift from a strategy of large-scale power
projection, antisubmarine warfare, and sea control based on the Soviet threat toward
concepts focused on the world’s littorals. This contrasted with the last important Cold
War strategy document—known as the “Maritime Strategy”—which had embodied the
Navy’s role and mission of that era. Published by the U.S. Naval Institute in January
1986 as a special supplement of its Proceedings magazine, the unclassified version of the
Maritime Strategy consisted of four white papers.9 The 1986 Maritime Strategy resulted
from a substantial effort conducted by numerous strategic thinkers over a fairly long
period.10 In fact, the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy constituted a comprehensive pol-
icy, one that addressed more than just the Soviet threat. Even so, it did not fit the secu-
rity environment of the 1990s. The development of a new strategy as the basis for
reductions and restructuring was fundamental to the Base Force model.11 Over the next
several years, as ideas and concepts churned through the Department of Defense, the
Navy and Marine Corps issued a series of strategic and operational papers that defined
the new security environment and with it the roles and missions of the sea services.
The Navy Department issued the most relevant of these documents during the first half
of the 1990s. Yet even as naval thinkers codified in their policy papers the concepts of
littoral-focused expeditionary warfare and sea-based forward presence, the Navy and
Marine Corps team were embodying those concepts in numerous incursions in
Somalia, on the Horn of Africa.
In April 1991, the Naval Institute Proceedings and the Marine Corps Gazette simulta-
neously published an article entitled “The Way Ahead.” Like the “Maritime Strategy”
1 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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before it, “The Way Ahead” bore the names of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of
Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.12 But this time the three
leaders endorsed a single document rather than issuing separate papers, as they had for
the 1986 Maritime Strategy. “The Way Ahead” clearly signaled the move away from the
Maritime Strategy’s focus on global warfighting and deterrence and toward a new strat-
egy based on multiple regional contingencies where American interests were threat-
ened. Naval thinkers had recognized the need for a new vision as early as 1989, when
they first noticed a weakening in Soviet resolve and the prospect of an end to the Cold
War.13 Realizing that a new strategic environment would require new strategic thinking,
the drafters of “The Way Ahead” emphasized the need for the Navy to focus on opera-
tions ashore rather than a hostile navy at sea.14 This implied, in addition to forward
presence, involvement in humanitarian assistance, nation building, peacekeeping,
counternarcotics, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and crisis response.15
“The Way Ahead” constituted the first major effort by leaders within the Navy Depart-
ment to convey this policy shift to members of the sea services. It also communicated
the uncertainty about the future threat environment, particularly the possibility of a
resurgent Soviet navy.16 The ideas expressed in “The Way Ahead” proved prescient, but
its ultimate value lay in the awareness it generated among professionals within the
Department of the Navy. Most naval officers realized their operating environment had
changed, but few could grasp what that meant for themselves or their service. “The
Way Ahead” did not answer all their questions, but it did provide insight and augured
changes in deployment patterns, task force composition, and mission focus. Though
thoughtful and well articulated, “The Way Ahead” never served as a lodestar for plan-
ning or operations, because larger events distracted from its message. But it constituted
the first important effort to communicate a radically new direction in strategic think-
ing; assimilating a message of that significance requires some time.17
Perhaps the most important paper to address post–Cold War security concerns was the
September 1992 publication entitled . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for
the 21st Century. This concept document clearly stated a new direction for the naval
services and defined a combined vision for the Navy and Marine Corps.18 Unlike “The
Way Ahead,” the . . . From the Sea document became widely influential within the naval
services and throughout the Department of Defense.19 Just four months prior to the
publication of . . . From the Sea, the Navy had issued a document entitled The Navy Pol-
icy Book. Although it alluded to the Navy and Marine Corps team on various occasions,
The Navy Policy Book was essentially an internal document intended for parochial use
within that service.20 But . . . From the Sea expressed the expeditionary nature of the
post–Cold War mission for both the Navy and Marine Corps while capturing the stra-
tegic temper of the time.21 It also reiterated the uncertainty within the operational
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environment, first addressed in “The Way Ahead.”22 But if uncertainty existed at the
operational and strategic levels in the minds of some, . . . From the Sea clarified the
direction for the sea services at that time and for the near-term future. It unequivocally
directed the Navy and Marine Corps team to provide the nation with “Naval Expedi-
tionary Forces—Shaped for Joint Operations—Operating Forward from the Sea—Tai-
lored for National Needs.” Its strategic message emphasized the shift “away from open-
ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations from the sea.”23 The word “from”
was the key term in this new naval concept statement, elevating the role of the U.S.
Marine Corps within the larger naval mission of the time.24 An important assumption
underlying . . . From the Sea held that no peer threat—such as a resurgent Russia or
China—would threaten U.S. dominance for the next twenty years. Opinion differed on
the long-range threat, but an important concept (expressed in the “Manthorpe Curve,”
named for Captain William Manthorpe of the naval intelligence community)—sug-
gested that the aggregate threat during that twenty-year window (roughly 1990–2010)
would be comparatively low.25
. . . From the Sea and the subsequent documents that built on its concepts (Forward . . .
From the Sea and Operational Maneuver from the Sea) provided insight and direction to
the sea services, with an impact not realized since the publication of the 1986 Maritime
Strategy.26 Among other things, . . . From the Sea emphasized the importance of unob-
trusive forward presence—as opposed to the forward-defense concept of the Cold
War—and the flexibility of sea-based forces. That meant that naval expeditionary
forces not only come from and return to the sea, they are also sustained from the sea.
Sea-based expeditionary forces can project either power or assistance ashore yet do not
encroach upon the sovereignty of nations while at sea.27 Once ashore, naval expedition-
ary forces present a relatively small “footprint,” because they are supported by sea,
thereby reducing exposure, vulnerability, and host-nation resentment.28 By concentrat-
ing on the littoral regions of the world and recognizing the importance of power pro-
jection and maneuver from the sea, . . . From the Sea reinforced the importance of the
Navy and Marine Corps team as, collectively, an integrated element of sea power.29
If . . . From the Sea constituted a new direction in strategy and structure in contrast to the
Cold War focus, in many ways it validated the historical and traditional role of the sea
services. As early as 1776, with the capture of New Providence in the Bahamas, and in the
1805 conquest of Derna, Tripoli, the Navy and Marine Corps team conducted joint expe-
ditionary missions of crucial importance to the nation. Throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries there occurred numerous expeditionary operations in the Caribbean,
Central America, and the Pacific Basin by U.S. naval forces.30 The subjugation of Califor-
nia during 1846–47 resulted primarily from a series of amphibious landings along the
Pacific coastline spearheaded by the Navy and Marine Corps team. Such prominent Army
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officers as Stephen W. Kearny and John C. Frémont served primarily under Navy com-
manders (Commodores John D. Sloat and Robert F. Stockton) as adjuncts to the naval
campaign that ultimately defeated the local Californios.31 Even during the Cold War,
when both services had larger roles, oriented to the Soviet threat, they retained contingency
missions, as exemplified by the 1958 landing in Lebanon and the 1965 incursion into the
Dominican Republic.32 Throughout American history, the Navy and Marine Corps worked as
a team, establishing a model for joint operations in an expeditionary environment.33
By the time . . . From the Sea and subsequent documents relating to it appeared, the
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 had made the concept of
“jointness” an object of high devotion among many leaders within the Defense Depart-
ment.34 Technically, the Navy and Marine Corps team constitutes a joint force, and its
expeditionary incursions qualify as joint operations. But in reality the Navy and Marine
Corps team is something else—in fact, something much better—and for obvious rea-
sons. The two services have roots in a close and integrated tradition built over two cen-
turies of operating together, making them essentially two integral elements of a single
naval force.35 This connection goes far beyond simply working together in planning and
operations. It includes such key elements as combined staffs, common doctrine, fre-
quent exercises and operations, and a sense of shared experiences, all of which contrib-
ute to a common institutional culture in the field of expeditionary warfare. The fact
that both services reside within the Department of the Navy is also important, but even
that does not adequately explain the symbiotic nature of their relationship. That is
more correctly found in the history and traditions of the two branches. As Lieutenant
Commander Terry O’Brien stated in a 1993 Marine Corps Command and Staff College
thesis paper, “[. . .] From the Sea has not discovered a new form of warfare—it has
rediscovered the capabilities of the Navy/Marine Corps team.”36
Although disagreement and discord often exist between the Navy and Marine Corps on
important issues, their disputes are typically of the productive type that results in
better policy, doctrine, plans, and operations through the interchange and vetting of
ideas and concepts. Ultimately, this process contributes to improved war preparation
and to success in combat. Perhaps the most notable example of this process involved
the World War II relationship between two giants of that era, Richmond Kelly Turner
and Holland M. Smith. Of course, the Second World War in no way parallels the expe-
ditionary environment of the 1990s. But the effectiveness of the amphibious forces of
the Fifth Fleet illustrates the practice that made the Navy and Marine Corps team of
that period exceptional—well beyond the level conceived even in joint operational doc-
trine. As a rear admiral during the Central Pacific campaign of 1943–45, Turner served
as commander of the Navy’s amphibious forces, while Smith, holding the rank of major
general, commanded the Marines.37 Both men were highly intelligent, strong willed,
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and totally dedicated to the honor and success of their services. They often clashed;
some of their confrontations became legendary throughout the Pacific. Yet each valued
the role of the other’s branch, and the disagreements always focused on how best to
accomplish their mission. The result was often compromise, but only after all compet-
ing options received due consideration, under the strongest possible sponsorship. As
Smith characterized their relationship after the war, “Kelly Turner and I were to be
team mates in all my operations. He commanded Fifth Amphibious Force while I com-
manded the expeditionary troops that went along with the Navy and our partnership,
though stormy, spelled hell in big red letters to the Japanese.”38 It might be difficult to
determine which of these two powerhouses won more arguments. But the true winners
were clearly the United States and the U.S. naval service.
In light of this traditional relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps, it is only
natural that the concepts of . . . From the Sea were quickly amalgamated by the two ser-
vices. In 1994, two years after its publication, a refinement and expansion of its ideas
appeared, under the appropriate title Forward . . . From the Sea.39 Like most strategic
concepts issued by the Navy Department during this period, Forward . . . From the Sea
bore the signatures of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps.40 If . . . From the Sea enhanced the role of the
Marine Corps in the expeditionary environment of 1992, Forward . . . From the Sea
tended to restore the Navy to its senior status by addressing its broader mission—
beyond the purview of littoral warfare.41 Although this concept paper maintained con-
tinuity with . . . From the Sea, it also upheld the importance of the Navy’s role in fight-
ing and winning America’s wars at all levels while emphasizing the need to “be engaged
in forward areas, with the objective of preventing conflicts and controlling crises.”42
Forward . . . From the Sea underscored the point that forward-deployed naval forces
provide the linkage between peacetime operations and the initial responses to a crisis or
major regional contingency.43 Additionally, it places the aircraft carrier battle group on
equal standing with the amphibious ready group as the “building blocks” of forward-
deployed presence.44 Forward . . . From the Sea argues the importance of joint and com-
bined operations while specifically affirming the traditional relationship between the
Navy and Marine Corps.45 Its drafters summarize the document’s main thrust in this
way: “Naval forces have five fundamental and enduring roles in support of the National
Security Strategy: projection of power from sea to land, sea control and maritime
supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward naval presence.”46 Of
these five, only two—power projection and forward presence—are directly associated
with the expeditionary warfare concepts of . . . From the Sea. This caused some concern
within the Marine Corps that perhaps the Navy was seeking a return to a blue-water
focus at the expense of expeditionary warfare as conceived in . . . From the Sea.47
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Forward . . . From the Sea makes numerous references to . . . From the Sea and is clearly
intended to augment, not replace, the latter’s precepts. By including such traditional
naval missions as sea control, warfighting, and deterrence (coupled with the forward-
presence and power-projection missions of . . . From the Sea) this strategy supported
Navy efforts to resist further force reductions and budget cuts.48 In short, the more
roles and missions the Navy claimed, the more ships it would need to support them.49
Forward . . . From the Sea also reflected—and was influenced by—the various events
occurring throughout the world during that period, such as operations in Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq.50 (Either of these two capstone documents [. . . From the Sea
and Forward . . . From the Sea] would be a suitable basis for discussion of the Somalia
incursions of the 1990s. But since Forward . . . From the Sea includes material and stra-
tegic ideas beyond the expeditionary mission, the earlier publication seems more
appropriate for the purpose.)
In January 1996, the Marine Corps issued a document that augmented . . . From the
Sea, outlining the concept of “Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” or as it became
known, simply OMFTS. Published after the last American incursion into Somalia, the
ideas and concepts of OMFTS were greatly influenced by those operations on the Horn
of Africa, as well as by other actions occurring in the early 1990s.51
Although many officers within the Navy and Marine Corps contributed to the develop-
ment of these various concepts after the end of the Cold War, one of the earliest inputs
to OMFTS emerged from the experiences of Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., dur-
ing DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and the evacuation of the American embassy in
Mogadishu, Somalia (Operation EASTERN EXIT). In a 1991 memorandum to the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps, Jenkins emphasized that future operations, either com-
bat or humanitarian, should involve very rapid, long-range insertions along the
coastline at points where gaps in coastal defenses would permit the avoidance of enemy
strength. This would be accomplished primarily by the use of Landing Craft, Air
Cushion (LCAC) vehicles loaded with Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) and helicopters
or V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. The key elements of Jenkins’s concept were high speed,
maneuverability, and long range (perhaps from amphibious ships at sea as far as fifty
miles over the horizon). He suggested it be named “Maneuver from the Sea,” or per-
haps “Maneuver War from the Sea.”52 Five years later, the OMFTS concept paper would
include all of Jenkins’s ideas.
In many ways, the OMFTS concept paper constitutes an intellectual exercise as much as
a policy statement. Its clearly stated purpose is to begin a process of “proposal, debate,
and experimentation” while providing near-term vision for naval forces operating in
the expeditionary environment. Among other things, OMFTS addresses two major
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changes in the operational environment—worsening chaos in much of the world’s
littorals and the enhanced combat capability of American forces—and suggests that
these factors will greatly influence where, against whom, and how U.S. forces fight in
future operations. Implied is the question of whether or not conventional military
capability (even enhanced capability) is suitable for the challenges in areas likely to
require intervention by America’s expeditionary forces. Conceived as an adjunct docu-
ment that builds on . . . From the Sea and Forward . . . From the Sea, OMFTS is essen-
tially an operational concept, intended to create “forces capable of winning decisive
victories in littoral areas.”53 The essence of OMFTS is a “marriage between maneuver
warfare and naval warfare based on sea-borne maneuver, sea-based sustainability, and
rapid execution.”54 Despite the cerebral nature of the concept paper and the fact that it
addresses new dynamics in the expeditionary environment, the OMFTS terminology
and the tactical ideas behind it had been in play within the Department of the Navy
even before the issuance of . . . From the Sea.55
Historically, amphibious operations—especially large-scale landings—required a
buildup ashore after establishing the initial beachhead. Perhaps the most important
distinction between OMFTS and traditional amphibious warfare lies in the avoidance
of that operational phase. By inserting a landing element directly against enemy centers
of gravity, the OMFTS model offers a sea-based version of “maneuver warfare” (then a
prominent concept among land-warfare thinkers and planners), one executed by naval
expeditionary forces.56 As stated in the OMFTS document, “Landing forces will move
directly from the ship to their objectives, whether those objectives are located on the
shoreline or far inland.”57 Elimination of the traditional need to establish a lodgment
ashore is made possible by greater use of sea-based logistics, improved long-range fire
support from naval ships (including precision-guided air munitions), and more effi-
cient use of fuel and supplies ashore.58
By using the sea as maneuver space, ship-based expeditionary forces can create multiple
avenues of approach—to an extent that land maneuver warfare cannot match—and
project power from over the horizon or even farther away.59 By striking rapidly at criti-
cal objectives using modern Navy and Marine Corps transport systems (LHA, LHD, V-
22, LCAC, AAAV, LAV, etc.), amphibious forces create an intensively rapid operational
tempo, thereby acting “inside” the enemy’s decision-making process—that is, posing
challenges more rapidly than it can respond.60 With possession and use of the initiative,
an inherent advantage of sea services in expeditionary warfare, landing forces can
attack objectives at times and locations of their choosing, thereby pitting friendly
strength against enemy weakness. These concepts, based on . . . From the Sea and
OMFTS, apply equally to wartime situations and operations other than war.61
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Although written for an expeditionary environment, the concepts expressed in
. . . From the Sea and OMFTS have application across the entire spectrum of conflict. In
fact, they were not radically new thoughts; the prominent status they achieved during
the 1990s resulted from an evolutionary process at various levels of warfare.62 For
instance, the 1950 landing at Inchon, Korea, and the subsequent capture of Seoul is a
classic example of OMFTS within a conventional war setting.63 Often thought of as a
World War II–style amphibious landing, the Inchon operation actually had several
interesting differences. The maneuver started in southern California and progressed
through Japan and the Pusan Perimeter, gaining in force at each stage, and then on to
the landing at Inchon and the key objectives inland, principally Kimpo Airfield and the
capital city, Seoul.64 By passing through the Inchon site and immediately capturing the
inland objectives, the landing force cut off all support to the North Korean army
around the Pusan Perimeter, resulting in its destruction. The selection of Inchon as a
landing site was in itself an astute application of maneuver warfare, in that the enemy,
thinking an amphibious incursion impossible at Inchon, had left it lightly defended.
The concept of attacking with American strength against North Korean weakness and
moving directly inland to key objectives resulted in an operational victory with strate-
gic implications.65 Had American forces struck a more “logical” place, such as Kunsan
or Posun-Myong, as some planners urged, and then established a supply buildup
ashore before attacking centers of gravity, the best they could have hoped for would
have been a hard fight and in the end little more than tactical success.66
The Somalia incursions of the 1990s demonstrate an entirely different application of
the concepts associated with . . . From the Sea and OMFTS. In those various operations,
we see these expeditionary principles at work in the post–Cold War environment, for
which they were crafted. The examples of Korea and Somalia illustrate the wide variety
of missions that naval expeditionary forces can execute using these concepts. The
Inchon landing occurred in a conventional war, as a purely combat operation, whereas
the Somalia incursions fit in the category of “military operations other than war”
(MOOTW), though some fighting did take place. Expeditionary forces must always be
ready to fight once ashore, but that was not the primary intent in most of the incur-
sions in Somalia during the 1990s. This study explores the various Somalia operations
in the context of . . . From the Sea and OMFTS, using those frameworks to explain and
analyze operational and strategic implications. It also demonstrates how the Somalia
experience contributed to the subsequent development of concepts, doctrine, and
equipment.67 That culminated in the publication of the concept document entitled
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver and the introduction of improved assault craft that can
support the rapid maneuver from ships directly to objectives ashore uninterrupted by
topography or hydrography.68
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The operational and strategic concepts relating to expeditionary warfare discussed in
this chapter, particularly . . . From the Sea and OMFTS, are the cornerstones for
explaining and evaluating the Somalia incursions of the 1990s. The initial action dis-
cussed in this study involved an emergency evacuation of the American embassy in
Mogadishu, Somalia, which occurred in January 1991—before the publication of any
of these documents. Known as EASTERN EXIT, this operation illustrates the inherent effi-
cacy of the Navy and Marine Corps team prior to the creation of the concept papers
issued in the aftermath of the Cold War. The evacuation at Mogadishu occurred
because of a collapse in social and political order throughout Somalia. This disastrous
situation also led to subsequent American involvement for the purpose—at least ini-
tially—of providing humanitarian relief, which is one of the missions envisioned by
MOOTW.69 From April 1992, when UN Security Council Resolution 751 created the
organization known as United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), until
March 1995, when American forces evacuated all UN personnel from Mogadishu, the
United States conducted numerous actions to assist the people of that nation. These
actions embodied and exemplified the expeditionary concepts of that time, particularly
those of . . . From the Sea and OMFTS.70 The EASTERN EXIT operation, coupled with
experiences in the Persian Gulf region during DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT
STORM, solidified the concepts later codified by the Navy in the naval doctrine publica-
tion Naval Warfare and by the Marine Corps in Operational Maneuver from the Sea.71
The ability to create theory and publish concepts while simultaneously conducting tra-
ditional and innovative operations was a distinctive characteristic of the expeditionary
environment during the first half of the 1990s.
Notes
1. National Security Strategy of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: White House, March
1990); National Security Strategy of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: White
House, August 1991); Michael Klare, “The
Rise and Fall of the ‘Rogue Doctrine’: The
Pentagon’s Quest for a Post–Cold War Mili-
tary Strategy,” Middle East Report (Autumn
1998), pp. 12–15, 47.
2. Although numerous individuals—both mili-
tary and civilian—contributed to policy de-
velopment during this period, the key
advisers involved in force planning and strat-
egy development included Gen. Colin L.
Powell, Lt. Gen. Paul Lee Butler, and Under
Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz. See
George H. W. Bush, In Defense of Defense
(speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium, 2
August 1990), available at bushlibrary.tamu
.edu; Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the
Base Force, 1989–1992 (Washington, D.C.:
Joint History Office, Joint Staff, July 1993);
Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin
Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade of
Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-
Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Re-
view (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Project
Air Force, 2001), p. 10.
3. Bush, In Defense of Defense; Jaffe, Develop-
ment of the Base Force, pp. 28, 33–34, 42.
4. Maureen Dowd, “Backing Pentagon, Bush
Says Military Can Be Cut 25% in 5 Years,”
New York Times, 3 August 1990.
2 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:12:18 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
5. John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S.
Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, New-
port Paper 19 (Newport: Naval War College
Press, 2004), p. 88; Soviet Naval Strategy and
Programs through the 1990s: National Intelli-
gence Estimate, NIE 11-15/82D (Washington,
D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Novem-
ber 1982), reprinted in Hattendorf, Newport
Paper 19, pp. 101–81.
6. Hattendorf, Newport Paper 19, pp. 49–51,
88; John F. Lehman, Jr., “The 600-Ship
Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Sup-
plement, January 1986), pp. 32–33.
7. John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy
in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport
Paper 27 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College
Press, 2006), pp. 11–12; Larson, Orletsky,
and Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade
of Change, pp. xiv, xv, 5, 9.
8. Jaffe, Development of the Base Force, pp. 21,
34, 38, 41, 44.
9. These papers include “The Maritime Strat-
egy,” by Adm. James D. Watkins, Chief of
Naval Operations; “The Amphibious Warfare
Strategy,” by Gen. Paul X. Kelley, Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps; “The 600-Ship
Navy,” by John F. Lehman, Jr., Secretary of
the Navy; and “Contemporary U.S. Naval
Strategy: A Bibliography,” by Capt. Peter M.
Swartz, USN.
10. Hattendorf, Newport Paper 19, pp. 54–91.
11. Bush, In Defense of Defense; Jaffe, Develop-
ment of the Base Force, pp. 36, 48–50.
12. The authors include H. Lawrence Garrett III,
Secretary of the Navy; Adm. Frank B. Kelso
II, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen. A.
M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
See “The Way Ahead,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (April 1991), pp. 36–47;
Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 23–
37.
13. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 7–10.
14. Ibid., pp. 12, 23–24.
15. Garrett, Kelso, and Gray, “Way Ahead,” p. 41.
16. Ibid., pp. 37–38; Hattendorf, ed., Newport
Paper 27, pp. 11–12.
17. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 12,
23–24.
18. U.S. Navy Dept., . . . From the Sea: Preparing
the Naval Service for the 21st Century, Navy
and Marine Corps White Paper (Washing-
ton, D.C.: September 1992) [hereafter . . .
From the Sea], signature page (unnumbered)
reprinted in Newport Paper 27, ed.
Hattendorf, pp. 87–99; Thomas P. M.
Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and
Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York:
G. P. Putnam, 2004), pp. 77–78.
19. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 14,
87–88.
20. Ibid., pp. 12–13, 86.
21. The term expeditionary is subject to various
interpretations, but for purposes of this pa-
per it “implies a mind set, a culture, and a
commitment to forces that are designed to
operate forward and to respond swiftly. . . .
Naval Expeditionary Forces provide unob-
trusive forward presence which may be in-
tensified or withdrawn as required on short
notice.” See . . . From the Sea, p. 3.
22. Ibid., p. 1.
23. Ibid., pp. 2–7.
24. E. T. O’Brien, From the Sea—to Where?
(Quantico, Va.: U.S. Marine Corps Com-
mand and Staff College, 1993), p. 6.
25. Barnett, Pentagon’s New Map, pp. 63–70.
26. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, p. 14.
27. Norman E. Ehlert, “Naval Expeditionary
Forces and Crisis Response,” in Naval For-
ward Presence and the National Military
Strategy, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgriff, Jr., and
Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Annapolis, Md.: Na-
val Institute Press, 1993), pp. 211–12.
28. Gary I. Wilson, Chris Yunker, and Franklin
C. Spinney, “OMFTS: Innovation, Deep Ma-
neuver, and Aviation,” Marine Corps Gazette
(December 1997), p. 21.
29. . . . From the Sea, pp. 5, 9–10.
30. Leighton W. Smith, Jr., “. . . From the Sea: A
New Direction for Naval Forces,” in Naval
Forward Presence and the National Military
Strategy, ed. Pfaltzgriff and Shultz, p. 232.
31. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea:
The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1962), pp. 6, 14–16, 53–56, 111–90, 596–98.
And see Gary J. Ohls, “Roots of Tradition:
Amphibious Warfare in Early America”
(PhD dissertation, Texas Christian Univer-
sity, 2008), pp. 55, 137–80, 233–68.
32. Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History
of the United States Marine Corps (New York:
Free Press, 1980), pp. 540–41, 557–59.
S O M A L I A . . . F R O M T H E S E A 2 1
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:12:18 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
33. Ehlert, “Naval Expeditionary Forces and Cri-
sis Response,” p. 203.
34. The term joint “connotes activities, opera-
tions, organizations, etc., in which elements
of two or more Military Departments partic-
ipate.” Jointness is a slightly pejorative refer-
ence to an obsessive dedication to the
concept of some officers within the military
services. See U.S. Defense Dept., Department
of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associ-
ated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Joint Staff, 12 April 2001, as
amended through 14 September 2007).
35. Rear Adm. Charles R. Saffell, Jr., USN (Ret.),
interview by the author, Fairfax, Virginia, 11
February 2008; Gen. Anthony C. Zinni,
USMC (Ret.), interview by the author, Falls
Church, Virginia, 10 October 2007.
36. O’Brien, “From the Sea,” p. 6.
37. Theodore Gatchel, “The Shortest Road to
Tokyo,” in The Pacific War Companion: From
Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, ed. Daniel
Marston (Oxford, U.K.: Osprey, 2005), pp.
163, 165.
38. Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral
and Brass (New York: Scribner’s, 1948), p. 109.
39. Six months prior to the publication of For-
ward . . . From the Sea, the Navy issued a new
volume in the Naval Doctrine Publication
series, Naval Warfare. Intended as “the first
in a series of six capstone documents for na-
val forces that translate the vision and strat-
egy of the white paper ‘. . . From the Sea,’” its
value was undercut, in part, by the failure to
create promised follow-on documents. See
Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 14–
15; U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Warfare, Naval
Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 28 March
1994) [hereafter NDP 1].
40. The signatories include John H. Dalton,
Secretary of the Navy; Adm. J. M. Boorda,
USN, Chief of Naval Operations; and
Gen. Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps.
41. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, pp. 15–
17.
42. U.S. Navy Dept., Forward . . . From the Sea
(Washington, D.C.: 19 September 1994), p. 1
[hereafter Forward . . . From the Sea, original
pagination], reproduced in U.S. Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings (December 1994), pp. 46–
49, and Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27,
pp. 149–58 [emphasis original].
43. Ibid., p. 2.
44. Ibid., p. 4.
45. Ibid., p. 8.
46. Ibid., p. 10.
47. Hattendorf, ed., Newport Paper 27, p. 16.
48. Ibid., p. 149.
49. Barnett, Pentagon’s New Map, pp. 72–80;
Leighton W. Smith, Jr., “. . . From the Sea: A
New Direction for Naval Forces,” in Naval
Forward Presence and the National Military
Strategy, ed. Pfaltzgriff and Shultz, pp. 230–
37.
50. Forward . . . From the Sea, pp. 1, 6.
51. Maj. Gen. Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., USMC
(Ret.), interview by the author, Chantilly,
Virginia, 11 February 2008.
52. Maj. Gen. H. W. Jenkins, Jr., memorandum
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
“The Corps and Maneuver War from the
Sea,” 16 December 1991 (copy provided to
the author by Major General Jenkins).
53. U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuver from
the Sea (Quantico, Va.: Concepts Division,
Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, 1993), p. 1.
54. Ibid., p. 14.
55. John H. Dalton, Frank B. Kelso II, and Carl
E. Mundy, Jr., “Department of the Navy
1994 Posture Statement,” Marine Corps Ga-
zette (April 1994), p. 16.
56. John B. LaPlante, “It’s Time for the ‘Gators,’”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May
1993), p. 49.
57. The Marine Corps issued a follow-on docu-
ment to OMFTS in 1997—U.S. Navy Dept.,
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (Quantico, Va.:
Marine Corps Combat Development Com-
mand, 25 July 1997)—which outlined a tac-
tical concept, “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver,”
or STOM, in support of OMFTS. STOM
would eventually be integrated into doctrine
as an adjunct to the ship-to-shore tactics of
traditional amphibious operations. See also
U.S. Navy Dept., Marine Corps Operations,
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Ma-
rine Corps, 27 September 2001) [hereafter
MCDP 1-0]; and U.S. Navy Dept., Opera-
tional Maneuver from the Sea, p. 6.
2 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:12:18 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
58. Gary W. Anderson, “Implementing OMFTS:
Infestation and Investation,” Marine Corps
Gazette (April 1995), pp. 58–59.
59. Dalton, Kelso, and Mundy, “Department of
the Navy 1994 Posture Statement,” pp. 16–17.
60. Operating inside the enemy’s decision-making
process is another way of saying that one
makes decisions faster—and acts faster on
those decisions—than one’s opponent. This
has the obvious benefit of constantly placing
the enemy in a reactive mode. Military lead-
ers often use the “OODA Loop” model (also
called the “Boyd Cycle”), a time-competitive
version of the observation, orientation, deci-
sion, and action (OODA) process. See U.S.
Navy Dept., Tactics, Marine Corps Doctrinal
Publication 1-3 (Washington, D.C.: Head-
quarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 30 July 1997),
pp. 69–71; Terry C. Pierce, “. . . From the Sea:
Not a CVN Gator,” U.S. Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings (June 1993), pp. 74–75; and Ander-
son, “Implementing OMFTS,” pp. 57, 60.
61. MCDP 1-0, pp. 2-15 to 2-17; Ehlert, “Naval
Expeditionary Forces and Crisis Response,”
pp. 212–13.
62. MCDP 1-0, p. 2-16.
63. Charles C. Krulak, “A Force-in-Readiness,”
Marine Corps Gazette (September 1995), pp.
20–21.
64. U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuver from
the Sea, p. 7.
65. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., “Inchon, 1950,” in As-
sault from the Sea: Essays on the History of
Amphibious Warfare, ed. Merrill L. Bartlett
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
1983), pp. 347–50, 352–53.
66. Ibid., p. 346.
67. U.S. Navy Dept., Operational Maneuver from
the Sea, pp. 7, 10.
68. U.S. Navy Dept., Ship-to-Objective Maneuver,
pp. II-3 to II-5.
69. NDP 1, p. 22.
70. Vice Adm. James B. Perkins III, USN (Ret.),
interview by the author, Newport, Rhode
Island, 11 September 2007 [hereafter Perkins
first interview].
71. Jenkins interview.
S O M A L I A . . . F R O M T H E S E A 2 3
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:12:18 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Operation EASTERN EXIT
During December 1990, the eyes of the world and the attention of its leaders focused
on the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. For months, the United States had been
building a strong naval and military presence throughout the region in response to
Saddam Hussein’s 2 August 1990 attack and occupation of Kuwait. Under the leader-
ship of Vice Admirals Henry H. Mauz, Jr., and Stanley R. Arthur, NAVCENT (that is,
the naval component of U.S. Central Command) created a force in excess of a hundred
ships, the largest American fleet assembled since World War II.1 The buildup had begun
under Admiral Mauz and continued with Arthur, who assumed command of
NAVCENT just six weeks before the 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwait. Despite that cutoff date, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral
Frank Kelso II, did not consider war to liberate Kuwait as imminent and chose to carry
out the already-planned change of command at NAVCENT on 1 December 1990. Gen-
eral H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of Central Command, considered
Arthur one of the most aggressive admirals he knew and interposed no objection.
Additionally, Arthur had considerable experience within this operational area, having
created the post of NAVCENT back in 1983.2
When Arthur took command in December 1990, Rear Admiral John B. “Bat” LaPlante
commanded its amphibious element, which would ultimately consist of thirty-one
ships, loaded with two Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) and one special operations–
capable Marine expeditionary unit (MEU [SOC])—roughly seventeen thousand
Marines. LaPlante’s Marine counterpart, Major General Harry W. Jenkins, Jr., com-
manded both the 4th MEB and—as senior Marine officer afloat—the overall Marine
landing force, which ultimately included 5th MEB and 13th MEU (SOC).3 In the lan-
guage of doctrine, LaPlante served as Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF),
and Jenkins as Commander, Landing Force (CLF).4 (The Marine element afloat under
Jenkins’s command should not be confused with the I Marine Expeditionary Force—
I MEF, pronounced “One MEF”—ashore under Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer;
the two had different missions and reporting structures.)5 The primary role, shared by
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LaPlante as Commander, Task Force (CTF) 156, and Jenkins as CTF 158, involved pre-
paring for an amphibious assault against Iraqi positions on the Kuwaiti coastline in the
upcoming Operation DESERT STORM. This required planning and operational rehears-
als, the capstone event being a major landing exercise in Oman during late January
1991, designated SEA SOLDIER IV. This rehearsal was to include the entire force under
LaPlante and Jenkins; it would constitute the largest amphibious landing since Exercise
STEEL PIKE in October 1964.6
The threatened landing was intended primarily as a deception, but Schwarzkopf often
impressed on Arthur the importance of convincing Iraqi commanders that an amphib-
ious landing would be part of any future war for Kuwait.7 Also, LaPlante and Jenkins
needed to prepare for an actual assault landing should the course of war so dictate.
With proper training, including large-scale rehearsals, the amphibious force would be
capable of both deception and combat.8 The importance of this exercise, coupled with
firm arrangements coordinated through Omani and U.S. State Department representa-
tives, caused both Arthur and LaPlante to consider the scheduled dates for SEA SOLDIER
IV as fixed and definite. They also believed that the entire amphibious force had to par-
ticipate in the landing, in order to achieve NAVCENT training objectives.9 The diver-
sion of ships or Marines for any cause—no matter how important—would disrupt
their planning and degrade combat readiness. This issue was to influence the thinking
of Arthur and LaPlante when conditions within Somalia necessitated an American res-
cue mission in the days just preceding DESERT STORM.10
As events eventually played out, the amphibious force under LaPlante and Jenkins did
not conduct an amphibious landing during DESERT STORM. But as a deception opera-
tion, theirs was the most successful since the Second World War.11 The major reasons
for its success include the degree to which the Navy and Marine Corps prepared for the
landing, especially the SEA SOLDIER IV rehearsal. Leaders at Central Command also
provided American news media opportunities to observe and report the amphibious
preparations. The film footage taken during the visits of the press to the fleet showed
up on television newscasts throughout the period leading up to the DESERT STORM
ground attack. Only the highest levels of command knew that the amphibious landing
was actually a ruse; even Jenkins—the senior Marine officer afloat—was not informed,
although he had suspected the truth for various reasons, including the constant press
coverage. The deception tied down five, sometimes six, divisions (depending on the
time frame) along the coast of Kuwait and drew an Iraqi reaction every time LaPlante
and Jenkins made a move in the Persian Gulf.12 The key commanders believed that the
hard training by the amphibious force during Operation DESERT SHIELD—capped by
SEA SOLDIER IV—provided the credibility that fooled Iraqi leaders.13
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Amphibious Squadron 6 (PhibRon 6), commanded by Captain Alan B. Moser, had
been among the first naval forces to sail to the Arabian Sea after Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait. Moser’s squadron consisted of five ships loaded with some 2,100 Marines from
units of Jenkins’s 4th MEB. By January 1991 they had been at sea over four months,
conducting training and preparing for the looming battle with Iraq. Prior to deploying
for DESERT SHIELD, Moser’s squadron had spent only a few weeks in port at Norfolk,
Virginia, following a routine Mediterranean deployment.14 PhibRon 6 was typical of
the Navy and Marine forces that deployed for DESERT SHIELD in that its elements
responded to the crisis on very short notice and in various stages of training.15 But dur-
ing their time at sea, the sailors and Marines of the entire amphibious task force con-
ducted a series of training exercises, including IMMINENT THUNDER and SEA SOLDIER
I–III, and achieved a high level of preparedness.16 Nevertheless, they urgently needed
to participate in SEA SOLDIER IV to ensure their ability to conduct a large-scale land-
ing if required.17 SEA SOLDIER IV was particularly critical because Jenkins’s landing
force consisted of three distinct elements (4th MEB, 5th MEB, and 13th MEU [SOC])
that did not have a common higher headquarters. It amounted to a command roughly
the size of a small Marine expeditionary force but without a MEF headquarters to
structure and direct it.18 Therefore, when LaPlante and Moser received the warning
order to prepare for an amphibious evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu, their
immediate concern involved the new operation’s impact on this critical exercise and
subsequent combat landings should such action become necessary during the impend-
ing war with Iraq.19
On 1 January 1991, as LaPlante increased the tempo of war preparation, NAVCENT
received an alert message indicating that internal clan warfare in Somalia might endan-
ger American citizens and so require a military response.20 This did not surprise Arthur,
who had been monitoring message traffic from Somalia and had noticed in it an
increasing sense of urgency.21 The following day, Ambassador James K. Bishop in
Mogadishu requested military assistance to evacuate Americans from the embassy due
to the chaotic violence occurring throughout the city.22 The Pentagon immediately
directed Central Command to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO)
to rescue American citizens from Somalia.23 Arthur tasked LaPlante with planning the
NEO and proposing a contingency task force to execute the mission. LaPlante sum-
moned Moser to a meeting on his flagship, USS Nassau (LHA 4), then in port at Dubai.
Having limited knowledge of conditions on the ground in Mogadishu, the two com-
manders envisioned a force capable of performing missions across the entire range of
amphibious operations, including both surface and air actions. (Only later in the plan-
ning process did it become obvious that a surface evacuation across the beach would
not be practicable.) In addition to identifying the necessary amphibious ships and
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Marines for the mission, they proposed
two destroyers, which could provide fire
and electronic-warfare support should
either become necessary.24
Despite the irregular nature of the
fighting in Mogadishu, amphibious
commanders had serious concerns that
sophisticated weapons systems might be
present, particularly within the govern-
ment faction. During much of the
1970s, Somalia had been a Cold War
ally of the Soviet Union and had received both modern weapons and advisers.25 That
relationship soured and the Soviets eventually withdrew their support, but American
commanders needed to consider the possibility that Cold War weapons—especially
surface-to-air missiles and electronic-warfare equipment—remained in Somali hands
and could threaten the rescue mission.26 LaPlante therefore recommended a seven-ship
response force—four amphibious ships, two destroyers, and one oiler—to conduct the
operation, under Moser’s command.27
Concurrent with LaPlante’s planning, Jenkins considered issues relating to the landing
force that would conduct the operation on the ground. He tasked Colonel James J.
Doyle, Jr., the commander of Brigade Service Support Group 4, then located on the
amphibious dock transport USS Trenton (LPD 14), to command the mission to
Mogadishu. Jenkins instructed Doyle to create a special-purpose command element—
designated 4th MEB, Detachment 1—aboard the amphibious assault ship (and helicop-
ter carrier) USS Guam (LPH 9) to plan the operation and exercise command and con-
trol during its execution. Doyle relocated from Trenton to Guam, taking several key
members of his own staff, which he integrated with officers from various headquarters
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elements to create an experienced, professional, and eager group.28 Equally important,
Guam’s commanding officer, Captain Charles R. Saffell, Jr., and the Marine commander
of troops aboard Guam, Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. McAleer, along with their staffs,
began planning for the operation even before the arrivals of Doyle and Moser. When
the two commanders reached Guam with their skeleton staffs, they found work already
advanced. The staff planning and subsequent execution thus amounted to a collabora-
tive effort among Navy and Marine officers who knew their jobs, knew their doctrines
and procedures, and in many cases knew each other personally.29
Arthur recognized the importance of rescuing Americans in Somalia, but he did not
want to send a seven-ship task force to do the job. He viewed the action as strictly an
extraction, to get people out of and away from Mogadishu. There would be no ongoing
operation ashore in Somalia or afloat within the Indian Ocean. At least, Arthur hoped
to limit the mission to that role, because he needed all his ships for DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM—as well as the critical SEA SOLDIER IV workup. Once he sent ships out
of the operational area, Arthur and his commanders knew, getting them back could be
a problem. For example, the evacuees coming out of Mogadishu would require transfer
to a safe haven. Could he bring them back to Oman, or would he have to send his ships
to Mombasa, Kenya, or the island of Diego Garcia, even farther from the main scene of
action? Additionally, commanders throughout the fleet remembered the 1990 evacua-
tion of Americans in Liberia, Operation SHARP EDGE, which had lasted five months
and ultimately involved four ships and some 2,100 Marines. Not wanting to degrade
combat readiness in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf any more than absolutely neces-
sary, Arthur decided a two-ship amphibious task force with the right mix of helicopters
and Marines could accomplish the mission in Somalia.30 Guam and Trenton, at anchor
near Masirah, Oman, not only had the necessary configuration but also were located
nearest of any possible candidates to the Horn of Africa.31 LaPlante assigned these two
ships to conduct the operation and sent Commodore Moser—whom he held in high
esteem and hated to lose—to command the amphibious task force.32
The need for this rescue mission to Somalia had resulted from the breakdown of gov-
ernmental control and the subsequent breaking out of social strife occurring through-
out that nation, especially in the capital city of Mogadishu.33 By 1989, twenty years of
dictatorial rule under President Mohamed Siad Barre had produced three substantial
clan-based rebel factions: the Somali National Movement (SNM), active in northern
Somalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), primarily in the south; and the United
Somali Congress (USC), focused in Mogadishu and central Somalia.34 Over the next
two years, political turmoil became increasingly fierce, spawning clan warfare and ram-
pant criminal activity. As Siad Barre lost grip on power in Somalia, the rebel elements
further broke down into subclan conflict, increasing the level of bloodshed and
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undercutting efforts at unification.35 In early December 1990, conditions had so deteri-
orated that Ambassador Bishop evacuated nonessential embassy personnel and called
on all American citizens to leave the country. He even sent his wife and daughter out of
Somalia, to underscore the seriousness of the situation and encourage others to
depart.36 Most foreign missions in Mogadishu took similar actions as the fighting
increased and social disintegration worsened. Although not specifically targeted by any
Somali faction, the U.S. embassy and its staff were often victimized by gunfire and
random acts of violence.37
After meeting with the Somali president and prime minister in the closing days of
December, Bishop concluded that the government had neither a plan nor the ability to
control the growing crisis. As carnage and lawlessness spread, the need to evacuate
remaining Americans increased, while the embassy’s own ability to do so decreased.
The situation constituted the kind of “chaos in the littorals” that the OMFTS concept
paper would later characterize as a war of “all against all.”38 In response, Bishop moved
Americans into relatively secure areas in and around the embassy, while Italian officials
made a fruitless effort to arrange a cease-fire among warring factions. With the failure
of this effort, the American ambassador realized that his options were narrowing, and
on 2 January he requested military assistance to evacuate the embassy. By the following
day, Bishop had perceived that conditions were so bad that only a helicopter-borne
evacuation had any chance of rescuing the remaining Americans from Mogadishu.39
His urgent request for help received immediate attention in Washington and set in
motion the planning and execution of Operation EASTERN EXIT, which was later to be
considered by many as a model for this type of action.40
In response to the Pentagon’s execution order for EASTERN EXIT, officers at Central
Command deployed two C-130 and one AC-130 aircraft to Kenya and ordered Guam
and Trenton to set sail toward Mogadishu. In reality, Central Command had already
initiated these actions in anticipation of orders from the National Command Authority
(referring, at the time, to the president and secretary of defense). After meeting with
LaPlante aboard Nassau, as described above, Moser took five members of his squadron
staff and four officers from Tactical Air Control Squadron 12 to Masirah in a P-3 Orion
and then helicoptered aboard Guam.41 Doyle had already arrived, and the two command-
ers collocated their operations center in the ship’s Supporting Arms Control Center.
Although this arrangement appears somewhat ad hoc, the creation of special-purpose
organizations for various expeditionary actions is normal for Marine and Navy officers
of the amphibious service.42 The officers assembling on Guam to plan and execute this
rescue mission had considerable experience in this type of operation, and many had
worked together before.43 The planning began immediately upon receipt of the warning
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order and continued after the two ships departed Masirah just before midnight on 2
January 1991.44
With the amphibious force in motion, officers at Central Command and NAVCENT
continued to consider alternate methods for conducting the evacuation. In fact, various
possibilities had been under consideration at all levels of command from the beginning
of the crisis, and it had not yet become clear that only one option remained viable. Ini-
tially, the preferred course of action involved sending aircraft carrying security detach-
ments into the Mogadishu airport and then flying American evacuees out of the
country. Several other foreign missions had done exactly that during the last few days
of December.45 But this required a “permissive” environment, and leaders at Central
Command came to realize from Bishop’s messages that such conditions no longer
existed.46 The embassy could not even communicate with the Mogadishu airport to
obtain permission for landing evacuation aircraft; the telephone lines were all down.
More significantly, the airport was nearly two miles from the embassy, and Bishop did
not believe Americans could any longer move safely on the city streets. Central Com-
mand also considered the use of special operation forces, going so far as to direct that
six MH-53 Pave Low helicopters with tanker support be prepared to conduct the evac-
uation.47 This option never progressed beyond the initial concept, because the Pave Low
aircraft were preparing for the imminent launching of DESERT STORM.48 Additionally,
the special operations forces were heavily committed along the Iraqi border and in the
western desert, looking for Scud missiles.49 It now became apparent that only an
amphibious evacuation by ship-based helicopters offered a prospect for success regard-
less of the situation on the ground.50
By 4 January, conditions had deteriorated so much further that Bishop requested two
platoons of paratroopers be dropped to protect Americans until the amphibious task
force could arrive.51 Colonel Doyle and other commanders considered it a bad idea,
because the space available for a landing zone was so small that the paratroopers might
be scattered outside the embassy. Such an operation would also increase the number of
people requiring evacuation.52 More important, by the time Bishop made his request,
events had outpaced the rationale: Moser’s task force was nearing a position to launch
its helicopters, sooner than Bishop had expected, and the rescue team would likely
arrive before paratroops could be delivered.53 In any case, and fortunately for all con-
cerned, Schwarzkopf refused to authorize the paratroop drop.54
Masirah, Oman, where Guam and Trenton were when they originally received orders to
sail, is in the northern Arabian Sea, approximately 1,500 miles from Mogadishu. Guam
had a top speed of twenty-four knots, whereas Trenton could manage about eighteen
knots maximum. There was no requirement to keep the ships together, and initially
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Guam steamed at near maximum speed, outpacing Trenton. Saffell, in Guam, received
orders to slow to a more fuel-efficient speed, with which he complied. But as the
gravity of the situation in Mogadishu became clear, the ship resumed its initial speed.
Neither Moser nor Saffell was concerned over fuel usage, because they had plenty on
board and could replenish in Mombasa if necessary.55 In any case, it had become essen-
tial that the ships close the distance to Somalia as fast as possible, and that trumped
fuel economy.
Planning and conducting operations had become second nature to Moser, Doyle, their
staffs, the officers of the ships, and the embarked Marines. In addition to considerable
practice, existing doctrine, standing operating procedures, and training in rapid plan-
ning techniques greatly facilitated their efforts and ensured the prompt issuance of well
conceived orders.56 When to launch the rescue force remained under discussion, but
Bishop’s anxious messages forced the issue into the forefront. While Moser and Doyle
prepared for the evacuation in Mogadishu, LaPlante and Jenkins—exhibiting high con-
fidence in their subordinates—monitored events from Nassau and continued prepara-
tion for SEA SOLDIER IV, scheduled to begin in Oman on 19 January 1991.57
In the early morning hours of 5 January, two Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion
helicopters lifted a small amphibious force from Guam’s deck and headed for
Mogadishu, 466 miles to the southwest.58 In hindsight, it was clearer than ever that only
the helicopter-borne amphibious option offered any hope for saving the Americans in
time.59 The CH-
53Es, because they
were designed to
conduct in-flight
refueling, had a
long-range inser-
tion capability.
They remain the
only U.S. heavy-lift
helicopters that can
fly into an uncer-
tain environment
from such a dis-
tance.60 Assigned to
Trenton, these two
helicopters cross-
decked to Guam to
load the evacuation
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force and then launch for Mogadishu.61 The Super Stallions carried a sixty-man force
consisting of forty-seven Marines from 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (an element of
Jenkins’s 4th MEB), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel McAleer; four Marines from
Doyle’s headquarters elements; and a nine-man Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team, under
Commander Stephen R. Louma, USN.62 McAleer’s 1st Battalion had been the helicopter-
borne assault element of Regimental Landing Team 2 (RLT-2), composed primarily of
the 2nd Marine Regiment.63 Accordingly, McAleer’s Marines had become very profi-
cient in helicopter operations from the many exercises and rehearsals they had con-
ducted at sea. Additionally, their predeployment training at Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, had included noncombatant-evacuation exercises.64
Doyle ordered McAleer to accompany his Marines on their mission to Mogadishu,
while he himself remained at sea, where communications were better and he could
keep close contact with Moser.65 In addition to assigning McAleer to command the
Marines and SEALs, Doyle appointed Lieutenant Colonel Willard D. Oates as overall
commander of the forward element.66 Oates would be the senior officer on the ground
in Mogadishu, working primarily with the ambassador after arriving at the embassy.
Major William N. Saunders would serve as the logistician for the mission, specifically
supervising the evacuation control center (ECC), which would process evacuees and
prepare them for departure.
Sending two lieutenant colonels, one Navy commander (Louma accompanied the SEAL
team), and a major in addition to the normal complement of officers and noncommis-
sioned officers seems top-heavy. But Doyle considered this “an unconventional opera-
tion with potentially extraordinary consequences” and wanted a “few guys with gray
hair” in the landing zone. Loss of American life in the embassy at Mogadishu would
distract the nation as it approached the critical point of warfare in the Persian Gulf.
Additionally, Doyle clearly remembered the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and how it had
constrained American action for 444 days. Either scenario could unhinge DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM planning, resulting in unthinkable consequences.67
Essentially, Doyle organized the NEO team in a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)
structure, as illustrated in figure 1. In Doyle’s organizational plan, Oates functioned as
the senior officer ashore, although McAleer held the same rank and commanded most
of the Marines. Fortunately, command issues never became a problem, despite the large
number of high-ranking officers ashore, because Oates and McAleer tended to be of
one mind.68 Additionally, Bishop clearly understood his role in the operation and
remained firmly in control of events throughout.69 The ambassador had been involved
in the evacuation at Monrovia, Liberia (SHARP EDGE), a few months earlier, and
EASTERN EXIT clearly benefited from his experience.70
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While evaluating alternate courses of action, Moser and Doyle considered launching
the helicopters directly from their initial positions in the northern Arabian Sea, some
1,500 miles from the target area. They again considered launching when the ships
reached a point 890 miles away, but ultimately, as noted above, they launched from a
distance of 466 nautical miles.71 In addition to Bishop’s distressed calls for help, a num-
ber of issues contributed to this decision: in-flight refueling requirements, the availabil-
ity of tanker support, the arrival time over Mogadishu, and the availability of AC-130
gunships to provide cover.72 Anticipating the issue of in-flight refueling, Arthur had
earlier contacted Air Force representatives at Central Command and learned that they
could not provide tanker support, due to other commitments. He then contacted
Major General Royal N. Moore, commanding general of 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and
arranged for Marine Corps KC-130 tankers to refuel the Super Stallions.73 This proved
challenging enough, as the 466-nautical-mile flight meant two refuelings, over open
water at night, by pilots who had not recently practiced the procedure.74 The first refu-
eling would ensure that the helicopters could arrive at Mogadishu, and it would occur
at a point that would allow the helicopters to return to Guam should the refueling
prove unsuccessful. The second refueling provided sufficient fuel for locating the
embassy and guaranteeing that the outbound flight could clear the Somali coastline.75
Yet another refueling would be required during the flight back to Guam.
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FIGURE 1
Doyle’s MAGTF Structure for Organizing the Mogadishu NEO Force
Sources: Doyle interview; Siegel, Eastern Exit, pp. 16, 18, 21.
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Aerial refueling proved difficult during the transit from Guam to the objective, for a
variety of reasons. A lack of night-vision capability in the KC-130 tankers (one pilot in
each of the CH-53Es wore night-vision goggles) made it difficult for the tanker crews
to see the helicopters once they reached the rendezvous point. It had been over a year
since the helicopter pilots had practiced refueling, not having anticipated any such
requirement during DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM. They had even taken the refuel-
ing probes off their aircraft, making it necessary to reinstall them prior to takeoff. For-
tunately, Captain Saffell, himself an aviator, was acutely attuned to the problems and
risks of nighttime refueling over an open ocean.76 He delayed the helicopter launch
until he saw the KC-130s on radar, then tracked both the tankers and Sea Stallions to
ensure a proper rendezvous.77 One helicopter experienced a fuel leak while refueling;
the crew chief repaired it in flight, but not before the Marines and SEALs received a
good dousing of gas. It appears that the air crew had not only removed the probes but
failed to service the equipment.78 The second refueling, just fifty-three nautical miles
from Mogadishu, went somewhat more smoothly; the third refueling, during the flight
back to Guam, would prove successful, though problematic.79
Navigation also caused problems during the flight to Mogadishu; the Omega naviga-
tion system on the CH-53Es could not always acquire the three land-based signals
needed to fix a position. The part of the Indian Ocean in which the task force operated
had “dead spaces,” resulting in inconsistent readings.80 As a result, the pilots relied on
dead reckoning (based on preflight calculations), pathfinding support from the KC-130
refuelers, and positive control from the ships while within radar range.81 When the
Omega systems could obtain position fixes, the pilots used those reading as backups.
Launching beyond 466 miles would multiply the problems faced by the pilots in con-
ducting this long-range insertion and extraction, due to refueling requirements and
navigational complications. Conversely, waiting for a closer departure point would very
likely have proven disastrous for the embassy personnel, as local conditions continued
to worsen. In retrospect, it seems that Moser, Doyle, and the planners of EASTERN EXIT
aboard Guam calculated the launch point just about right.82
After receiving the last refueling and a final fix on their position from the KC-130s, the
helicopter pilots began their approach into the city. If navigating across part of the
Indian Ocean had been difficult, locating the embassy proved equally vexing. The ini-
tial information available during the planning phase regarding the location and config-
uration of the compound had proved to be out of date and inaccurate.83 A Marine
warrant officer who accompanied Doyle from Trenton had served on the Marine secu-
rity guard detachment in Somalia several years earlier, and he pointed out to the plan-
ners that the embassy had moved inland from the position indicated on their maps and
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planning documents.84 Updated coordinates and an aerial photograph were received
later in the planning process and proved helpful in identifying the new embassy loca-
tion. They also eliminated any residual consideration of landing over the beach with
surface forces, because the Marines would likely have had to fight their way across
Mogadishu, and at that point American leaders wanted to avoid becoming involved in
Somalia’s civil war. Despite the updated information, the embassy compound proved
difficult to identity from the air, particularly at low altitude in the early morning light.85
The pilots spent nearly twenty minutes flying over Mogadishu and eventually made a
second approach from the sea before finally identifying their objective.86
As the Super Stallions arrived over the American embassy at approximately 0620 (that
is, 6:20 in the morning) on 5 January, the compound was receiving a large volume of
gunfire, and some 150 Somalis with ladders had gathered at one of the embassy walls.87
Flying low into the cantonment area, the helicopters scattered the assembled miscre-
ants and landed within the embassy grounds.88 The Marines disembarked and estab-
lished a perimeter to defend the compound and protect subsequent evacuations.89 The
SEAL team assumed responsibility for protecting the ambassador and reinforced the
Marine Security Guard detachment (Marines permanently stationed at the embassy, as
opposed to those arriving in helicopters) protecting the chancery building.90
The two helicopters remained on the ground for approximately one hour; an Air Force
AC-130 gunship loitered overhead to gather intelligence and offer fire support if
required. The Super Stallions departed for their return flight to Guam—now some 350
miles away—with sixty-one evacuees, including all nonofficial Americans in the com-
pound; the ambassadors of Nigeria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; and the
Omani chargé d’affaires.91 The original plan called for the CH-53Es to return to Guam
and bring a second echelon of Marines into the embassy. Oates believed he needed
another forty-four Marines to ensure security and process the evacuees efficiently and
effectively. But when the two CH-53E helicopters departed with the evacuees, it would
be a one-way trip. After another difficult refueling en route, the Sea Stallions landed on
the deck of Guam just under eight hours after leaving the ship. They would not return
to Mogadishu with reinforcements but rather fly to Trenton, where their roles in the
mission ended.92
Despite the original plan for a second wave and Oates’s request for forty-four more
Marines, Doyle did not perceive a direct threat against the evacuation force in
Mogadishu and so, in coordination with Moser, chose not to dispatch additional
Marines.93 Sending in more troops implied a longer operation and increased the num-
ber of people needing evacuation from the embassy. It was a risky call, but events once
again bore out Doyle’s judgment. Even had Doyle wanted to insert the additional
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Marines, he would not have been able to do so with the CH-53Es; their crews were
exhausted from the wearing flight in and out of Mogadishu and incapable of another
demanding mission without rest. Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters stationed
aboard Guam would carry out subsequent evacuations, once they came within range of
the embassy.94
Meanwhile, Marines and embassy employees in Mogadishu prepared for subsequent
evacuations, although the shortage of staff to operate the ECC severely hindered the
process. Security remained marginal, despite arrival of the Navy and Marine Corps
team. There had not been enough Marines on the helicopters to process evacuees effi-
ciently and to provide adequate security as well.95 It was this that had motivated Oates
to request the forty-four additional Marines. He did not want to weaken perimeter
security by using McAleer’s Marines in the ECC, but eventually he felt it necessary to
do so. The final decision not to send more troops into Mogadishu forced Bishop, Oates,
and the other hard-pressed Americans to complete their tasks with the personnel on
hand.96 Doyle, for his part, realized that Oates’s job was difficult, but absent a concerted
effort to storm the embassy, he felt that another high-risk insertion flight could not
be justified.97
After the departure of the Super Stallions, conditions worsened throughout
Mogadishu, and consular representatives from numerous nations continued to seek
refuge at and evacuation through the American embassy. Bishop at first required for-
eign nationals to make their own way to the embassy, but when the Soviet ambassador
declared that he and his remaining staff would require assistance, he agreed to escort
them with permanent embassy security personnel. To augment this force he contracted
for Somali policemen, under a Major Sayed, who agreed to support the effort for a fee.
The ambassador used a similar approach to escorting members of the British mission
into the American embassy.98 On one occasion, a team of Marines, SEALs, and embassy
security personnel ventured into Mogadishu in hardened vehicles to rescue twenty-two
people from the Office of Military Cooperation and return them safely to the embassy
grounds.99 The twenty-two included Colonel David Stanley, the chief of the office,
along with the ambassador from Kenya and members of his family and staff.100
The understaffed ECC established by Saunders on the embassy grounds worked hard to
identify and process evacuees under difficult circumstances. Since augmentation of the
evacuation force had been denied, Oates utilized not only some of McAleer’s Marines
but members of the embassy staff to provide administrative help (checking identities,
screening potential evacuees, creating manifests, etc.) as best they could. Although ulti-
mately successful, the preparation of evacuees for movement out of Mogadishu fell far
short of ideal, causing problems at the departure site and aboard the ships—particularly
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in identifying and accounting for authorized evacuees.101 As the Marines within the
embassy struggled with their problems, the officers and crews of Guam and Trenton
began addressing the needs of evacuees. This included establishing a medical triage sta-
tion, arranging berthing for both genders, addressing care for children, protecting indi-
vidual property, accounting for evacuees by nationality and status, and providing food
and clothing, while at the same time supporting operations ashore.102
As night approached on 5 January, Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters—flying in
four waves of five aircraft each—commenced evacuation operation off the deck of
Guam, now approximately thirty miles out to sea. To minimize the risk of hostile fire,
all evacuation flights conducted by the Sea Knight helicopters occurred at night, with
the embassy compound darkened. The Marine pilots and infantrymen used night-
vision devices for visibility during the operation.103 Even with such equipment, flight
operations at night in an uncertain environment can be very dangerous, but the
Marines believed they had better control of these complications than they would have
over the hostile elements freely operating during daylight.104 The evacuation started
smoothly until Major Sayed, who had earlier assisted in the transportation of foreign
consular personnel into the American embassy, suddenly returned with two trucks full
of soldiers. Carrying a radio and hand grenade, Sayed demanded that the evacuation
cease immediately—his government had not approved the flights.105 Bishop and Oates
refused to halt the operations, and the ambassador ultimately persuaded the Somali
officer not to interfere.106 Bishop accomplished this by means of skillful negotiation,
several thousand dollars, and the keys to an embassy automobile of Sayed’s choice. In
the process Bishop managed to take possession of the major’s radio, to prevent him
from calling antiaircraft fire on the departing helicopters.107
This incident with Major Sayed created some confusion in the last evacuation waves,
because Bishop insisted on remaining within the compound so as to be available to
handle such problems until the end of the evacuation. He and his security team had
been scheduled to depart in the third wave; his decision to remain to the end meant
that only four helicopters on the third wave departed as planned, leaving the fifth
behind, not yet full. Having an extra helicopter on the final wave created confusion,
causing inaccuracies in the serial manifests and the helicopter loading plan. That con-
fusion in turn resulted in a small communications team’s nearly missing the last flight
out of Mogadishu. (The crew chief on one of the Sea Knights spotted the Marines and
placed them aboard his aircraft.) Ultimately, all personnel approved or designated for
evacuation, including the entire NEO force, departed safely and arrived on board
Guam or Trenton.108 As the last helicopter departed, a large mob entered the embassy
grounds, looting and destroying everything in sight. Well before sunrise on 6 January
1991, the last Sea Knight set down on the deck of Guam, and Ambassador Bishop
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declared the evacuation complete.109 The final evacuation flight had occurred without
the support of the AC-130, because it had detected radar of the type associated with a
Soviet-built SA-2 surface-to-air missile site tracking it and had to move off station. The
presence of SA-2 missiles confirmed the commanders’ concerns about the existence of
sophisticated weapons in Somalia. The SA-2 posed a definite threat to the AC-130 air-
craft, but Doyle had not been concerned for the CH-46 helicopters, because he believed
they would fly too low to be tracked by its radars.110
The amphibious evacuation in Mogadishu ultimately extracted 281 people, including
sixty-one Americans, thirty-nine Soviet citizens, seventeen British, twenty-six Ger-
mans, and various numbers from twenty-eight other nations.111 There were twelve
heads of diplomatic missions—eight ambassadors and four chargés. Unfortunately,
Bishop determined that none of the many Somali “foreign service nationals” within the
embassy compound could be evacuated, although they remained loyal. Bishop did not
even have enough cash to pay all wages due to them. Though they faced an uncertain
future, the Somalis accepted their fate, remained on their jobs to the end, and never
attempted to rush the helicopters or create serious problems for the evacuation
effort.112
The influx of civilians on Guam and Trenton severely taxed the ships’ resources and
ability to support them, of course. But, as Saffell put it, the response of the sailors and
Marines was “awesome”; they gladly gave up berthing space and personal items to ease
the plight of the evacuees.113 Guam’s medical staff treated one evacuee with an abdomi-
nal gunshot wound and another with a knife wound.114 Also, the Sudanese ambassa-
dor’s wife gave birth to a baby boy onboard Guam. (In keeping with an old Navy
tradition, the newborn lad’s name was engraved on the inside of the ship’s bell.)115
On 11 January, Trenton and Guam off-loaded their passengers in Muscat, Oman, with-
out fanfare and resumed their duties in support of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
Bishop had wanted the evacuees transported to Mombasa, but Schwarzkopf ordered
the ships back into the area of impending conflict in the Gulf of Oman.116 Omani offi-
cials were at first reluctant to accept the refugees, but stellar work by the American
ambassador in Oman persuaded them to do so. Before taking leave of the sailors and
Marines, Ambassador Bishop praised their competence and professionalism, conclud-
ing his remarks by declaring, “Few of us would have been alive today if we had been
outside your reach. It was only due to your efforts that we made it.”117
In many ways, EASTERN EXIT provides a textbook example of how to conduct an
amphibious evacuation. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred Gray,
referred to it as a “very complex and somewhat dangerous mission.”118 Gray would have
known about complex and dangerous NEOs, since he had played a prominent role in
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the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975.119 Although Gray also called the mission
“flawless,” in fact many problems arose throughout the action. But the professional-
ism of Marines and sailors overcame those obstacles with solutions sufficient to
ensure success.120 The operation demonstrated that the amphibious capability of the
United States could respond to nearly any exigency virtually anywhere in the world,
even when distracted by larger and more important missions. Navy and Marine Corps
leaders considered EASTERN EXIT a demonstration of the excellence of the sea services
and an example of the value of amphibious capability within the expeditionary envi-
ronment. The operation also demonstrated that modern amphibious actions depend as
much on aviation assets—particularly helicopters—as on traditional surface landing
vehicles. This is not surprising, considering the U.S. Marine Corps pioneered the mili-
tary use of helicopters for a variety of applications, including vertical assault, during
the Korean War.121
As part of the complete revision of Marine Corps doctrine that occurred during the
second half of the 1990s, General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant from 1995 to 1999,
used EASTERN EXIT as a case study for understanding and implementing expeditionary
concepts in the emerging new world order.122 More important, EASTERN EXIT made
clear that the professional Navy and Marine Corps team that had matured over several
hundred years continued to provide American political and diplomatic leaders with a
range of military options unknown anywhere else in the world or at any other time in
history.123 The commitment to EASTERN EXIT had no impact on the subsequent war
with Iraq; after off-loading the evacuees in Oman, the entire task force returned to nor-
mal duty and participated fully in SEA SOLDIER IV, the important final workup for
DESERT STORM.124 As subsequent events showed, Schwarzkopf ’s air and ground war
proved sufficient to defeat Saddam Hussein’s forces—with a little help from the
amphibious feint of LaPlante and Jenkins. The ability to move seamlessly from DESERT
SHIELD to EASTERN EXIT to SEA SOLDIER IV and on to DESERT STORM clearly illustrates
the capabilities needed to implement the operational and strategic concepts espoused
in . . . From the Sea and Operational Maneuver from the Sea.
EASTERN EXIT received little press coverage, due to the larger events of DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM, but many within the Department of Defense appreciated its signif-
icance. The Marine Corps, as noted, included it as a case study in subsequent doctrinal
publications, and the Navy mentioned it in Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval War-
fare.125 Captain Moser assisted in the lessons-learned process by preparing an instruc-
tional seminar that became part of the curriculum at the Armed Forces Staff College,
in Norfolk, Virginia.126 Lieutenant Colonel McAleer also created a briefing, which he
presented to the Landing Force Training commands at the amphibious bases in Little
Creek, Virginia, and Coronado, California.127 Notably, he briefed the material to
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Captain Braden J. Phillips, Colonel Michael W. Hagee, and the 11th MEU (SOC) staff
during their predeployment training at Camp Pendleton, California. As commanders
of Amphibious Squadron 1 and 11th MEU (SOC), respectively, Phillips and Hagee
were to lead the next Navy and Marine Corps team to implement the precepts of . . .
From the Sea. In August 1992, the United States returned to Somalia to assist in human-
itarian relief during operation PROVIDE RELIEF—a precursor to RESTORE HOPE. That Sep-
tember, the PhibRon 1 and 11th MEU (SOC) team deployed to the Indian Ocean and
returned to the Horn of Africa as the United States attempted to help a nation in crisis.128
In Somalia, after the American evacuation of its embassy in Mogadishu, conditions
continued to deteriorate. To some extent, the large quantities of weapons and ammuni-
tion previously supplied by the Soviet Union and later by the United States fueled the
fighting. As rebel factions gained ground in the fighting with Siad Barre, they often
captured armories and munitions supply centers with which to arm their forces and
allies.129 By late January 1991—about two weeks after the evacuation and just as Gen-
eral Schwarzkopf began the air operations phase of DESERT STORM—forces under
Mohamed Farah Aideed drove Siad Barre from Mogadishu and, in May 1992, into exile
in Kenya and Nigeria. Although many factors contributed to the defeat of Siad Barre
and the collapse of his rule, Aideed had been largely responsible for the final victory.
He not only drove Siad Barre out of Somalia but also defeated his three subsequent
efforts to regain control. Aideed believed that this victory earned him the right to lead
the nation, but other warlords disagreed. The clans could not unite to form a new gov-
ernment; warfare continued, and chaotic conditions persisted. The extreme violence
made food distribution difficult, creating critical shortages in many parts of Somalia.
This fostered an impression of widespread starvation, causing the United Nations to
request international intervention to alleviate suffering and restore order. It was for this
reason that, a year and a half after EASTERN EXIT, American naval expeditionary forces
would return to Somalia and once again apply the concepts of . . . From the Sea.130
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Operation PROVIDE RELIEF
The final phase of the war against Siad Barre occurred throughout the south and cen-
tral parts of Somalia from January 1991 through May 1992. The combat in Mogadishu
had reached its height in December 1990 and January 1991, creating the anarchy that
led to EASTERN EXIT. On 27 January 1991, rebel factions drove Siad Barre and his forces
out of the capital, but the former dictator carried on the battle in the southern parts
of Somalia. The fighting resulted in widespread devastation of the countryside—made
worse by Siad Barre’s scorched-earth policy—particularly the area bounded by
Kismayo, Bardera, and Baidoa, which came to be known as the “Triangle of Death.”
The destruction of crops, livestock, and essential infrastructure—especially wells,
canals, water pumps, pipes, the telephone system, and other public utilities—coupled
with an ongoing drought, laid the groundwork for the famine that spread throughout
the region.1
This massive destruction was accompanied by looting, rape, and massacres, resulting
in the abandonment of the Somali agricultural heartland. Hundreds of thousands fled
to Kenya, Ethiopia, and the major cities of Kismayo, Baidoa, and Mogadishu, to find
conditions there only slightly better.2 In fact, the drought and famine were nearly as
bad in northeast Kenya, prompting the U.S. ambassador, Smith Hempstone, to
describe that area—to which many Somali refugees had flocked—as “a slice of hell.”3
Hempstone also noted that not only had refugees flocked across the border but also
guns and bands of armed Somali men who ambushed truck convoys, robbed traders,
and rustled livestock.4
The social and economic collapse that accompanied the rebellion against Siad Barre
had resulted in part from his own brutal suppression measures. Yet his downfall
complicated rather than solved the growing humanitarian crisis, by confusing the
issue of political leadership within Somalia. Even before the dictator’s final defeat and
exile, clan-based factions that had battled against the regime began to fight an interne-
cine war for supremacy in the regions and cities of southern and central Somalia.
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Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed—both important United Somali
Congress leaders who opposed Siad Barre—built strong militias during the civil war
and contested for national power and control of Mogadishu during and after Siad
Barre’s fall from power.5 Ironically, both of these warlords belonged to the Hawiye clan,
as well as to the USC. Yet beginning in 1991 Aideed’s Habr Gidr subclan and Ali
Mahdi’s Abgal subclan clashed violently in a battle for primacy, increasing and perpet-
uating the agony of their nation.6 As Aideed and Ali Mahdi battled for control of
Mogadishu, Omar Jess of the Ogaden subclan fought Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi
(Morgan)—who commanded the remnant of Siad Barre’s army—near Kismayo,
Bardera, and the Kenyan border, an area already ravaged by Morgan during 1989 and
1990. Vicious fighting in Kismayo and Bardera further devastated the region, threaten-
ing hundreds of thousands of people with starvation.7
After Siad Barre’s expulsion from Somalia, a faction consisting of 144 moderate
political leaders known as the “Manifesto Group” proclaimed Ali Mahdi—one of its
members—as the nation’s interim president. The Manifesto Group had issued a procla-
mation (or manifesto) calling for a new provisional government and national reconcili-
ation in 1990, when Siad Barre was still in control of Mogadishu.8 This courageous
action resulted in the arrest of most members, but it gained credibility for the group.
Yet despite its standing among Somalia leaders, the effort of the Manifesto Group to
establish Ali Mahdi as president did not receive general acceptance.9 A reconciliation
conference was accordingly convened by the government of Djibouti in July 1991. It
confirmed Ali Mahdi as interim president for a period of two years.10
This support of Ali Mahdi infuriated Aideed, who had not attended the reconciliation
conference and refused to recognize its dubious selection, believing himself more
deserving of the office. He had made a greater contribution to the demise of Siad Barre,
commanded stronger forces, and controlled more key locations in Mogadishu than had
Ali Mahdi.11 The Somali National Movement, consisting primarily of the Isaaq clan in
northwest Somalia, also refused to accept the decisions of the Djibouti conference. The
SNM had declared independence in May 1991 as the “Republic of Somaliland” and had
no desire to rejoin a nation ruled by either Ali Mahdi or Aideed.12 The civil war against
Siad Barre’s rule had actually begun with the Isaaq clan and its SNM faction during
1988, in the area that included the major cities of Berbera, Hargeisa, and Burao—
known as “British Somaliland” prior to independence in 1960. Siad Barre had brutally
suppressed that phase of the rebellion, killing five thousand, displacing five hundred
thousand refugees, and causing massive destruction before the violence shifted to cen-
tral and southern regions of the country.13 The self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland
had been relatively free of violence since Siad Barre moved the bulk of his army out of
the area to deal with Aideed and Ali Mahdi.14 But things remained in turmoil in central
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and southern Somalia, and several efforts at international mediation by a variety of
nations and organizations during 1991 proved ineffective. The conflict over control of
Somalia continued, and the chaos in the streets showed little sign of abating.15
Sporadic fighting between the factions occurred throughout 1991, with open combat
beginning in November of that year.16 Meantime, gangs of armed youths controlled by
neither Aideed nor Ali Mahdi roamed the streets of Mogadishu inflicting violence at
will.17 Unfortunately, atrocities by these young criminals—including rape, theft, and
murder—were not limited to Mogadishu.18 In February 1992, Aideed and Ali Mahdi
agreed to a vague cease-fire in Mogadishu while each continued to seek recognition as
the legitimate leader of Somalia.19 The cease-fire resulted from a series of negotiations
in New York under the auspices of the UN and involving envoys from the Organisation
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU), along with representatives of the Aideed and Ali Mahdi
factions.20 Special UN envoy James O. C. Jonah worked with the two factions the fol-
lowing month to create a more substantial cease-fire agreement, which the warlords
signed on 3 March 1992.21 By this time, Mogadishu had already suffered enormous
destruction from artillery fire and other ravages of war.
The cease-fire between Aideed and Ali Mahdi proved tenuous at best, and it did not
end violence, looting, or extortion by freelancing thugs who had emerged from the
political and social breakdown of Somali society. These chaotic conditions in
Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia made it difficult for humanitarian relief organi-
zations to provide services where they were needed most. The willingness of Aideed
and Ali Mahdi to restrict the access to relief workers when it served their interests also
frustrated efforts to provide aid. In the descent into anarchy, food became a weapon as
well as the only basis for a remnant economy.22 Widespread shortages in central and
southern Somalia—including Mogadishu—during 1991 and 1992 resulted from
severely reduced agricultural production, breakdown of the distribution system, and
insufficient deliveries from the humanitarian relief community. Additionally, the early
coordination effort by UN officials had been so bureaucratic and ineffective that disor-
der tended to increase as problems compounded.23 During the summer of 1992, the
relief organizations delivered less than a third of the food necessary to feed the needy,
according to the head of the World Food Program in Somalia.24 All this, combined with
distribution problems created by factional conflict and general lawlessness, clearly
meant that a major humanitarian disaster was taking shape.25
The United Nations took a major step to address the Somali crisis on 24 April 1992
with the passage of Security Council Resolution 751, which established the United
Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Among other things, Resolution 751 called
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upon the international community to implement a ninety-day surge effort to increase
humanitarian assistance, authorized the assignment of fifty unarmed observers to
monitor the precarious cease-fire between Aideed and Ali Mahdi, and sanctioned the
future deployment of five hundred peacekeepers to Somalia if conditions warranted.26
The fifty observers, with their chief military observer, Brigadier General Imtiaz
Shaheen of Pakistan, would not be in place in Mogadishu until 23 July 1992 due to
resistance from Aideed, which proved difficult to break down.27
Resolution 751 also authorized creation of a special UN representative in Somalia, a
post to which Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali assigned Algerian diplomat
Mohamed Sahnoun. Sahnoun’s energetic and sensitive labor was to bring him into con-
tact with every major figure—both domestic and foreign—having an interest in the
Somali crisis.28 But his credible efforts to create stability and reconciliation did not
stem the growing humanitarian crisis; food and medical supplies remained in short
supply.29 By the summer of 1992, approximately three hundred thousand Somalis had
died from hunger or diseases related to malnutrition. Additionally, the crisis had dis-
placed over six hundred thousand people, creating refugee camps in Somalia, Kenya,
Ethiopia, and Djibouti.30
In an effort to gain control over this problem, Boutros-Ghali proposed an emergency
airlift, which the Security Council supported by passing Resolution 767 on 27 July
1992. This UN action called for the urgent delivery of food and medical supplies to the
most critical areas, particularly in the Triangle of Death.31 It also provided the vehicle
for America’s return to Somalia; President George H. W. Bush responded by authoriz-
ing Joint Task Force/Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. Intended to transport supplies into
stricken areas of northern Kenya and rural Somalia, PROVIDE RELIEF was a relatively
small operation, having no combat component. Since it was purely humanitarian in
nature—designed principally to help Somalis and Kenyans in need—American leaders
assumed a permissive environment. The only caveat to that presumption involved the
insertion of the five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers authorized under Security Council
Resolution 751, an insertion that the United States agreed to facilitate.32
Although UN Resolution 767 supplied the mechanism for commencing PROVIDE
RELIEF, it was media coverage of the humanitarian crisis that provided the trigger that
caused President Bush to take action. A cable from Ambassador Hempstone in Kenya
describing hellish conditions in northeast Kenya also influenced the thinking of the
president and other American leaders. After making its rounds within the administra-
tion, Hempstone’s cable was published in the Washington Post, further contributing to
the public awareness of the crisis.33 On 14 August 1992, the president announced that
the United States would begin emergency relief flights using Mombasa, Kenya, as a
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base of operations. Bush also
assigned Andrew Natsios of
the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID)
as Special Coordinator for
Somali Relief and directed
that an additional 145,000
tons of American food aid be
provided.34
After the passage of UN Reso-
lution 767, the international
media descended on Somalia
in even greater numbers than
before. Their coverage of
starving children, displaced
people in refugee camps, and
the devastation wrought by war and widespread criminal activity shocked the world
and provoked its conscience.35 Powerful media images viewed daily on television and in
newsprint during the summer of 1992 stirred overwhelming American support for the
humanitarian relief efforts of President Bush. The power of the media to bring issues to
public attention and force policy decisions upon the government became particularly
noticeable during the Somalia crisis. It appeared to many that the traditional “power of
the press” had reached a new height; observers began to refer to this growing influence
as the “CNN effect.”36
On 15 August 1992, the National Command Authority issued an alert order to Central
Command (now under the leadership of General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, who had
replaced General Schwarzkopf a year earlier), followed the next day by an order to exe-
cute Operation PROVIDE RELIEF.37 Flying supplies into remote areas of Somalia had the
dual advantage of avoiding impassable roads and bandits who attacked and looted con-
voys, while bringing food directly to some of the areas most severely stricken by the
famine.38 Within two weeks, C-130 flights had delivered emergency supplies to Wajir,
Kenya, near the Somali border, and Belet Uen (also spelled Belet Weyne or Beledweyne)
within Somalia proper.39 The airlift into Wajir provided food intended for Somali refu-
gees who had crossed the border as well as for numerous Kenyan victims of drought
and refugee pressure. The 29 August 1992 flights into Belet Uen—the first PROVIDE
RELIEF flights going into Somalia—consisted of four C-130s and delivered thirty-four
tons of food supplies to an area not accessible by ground transportation due to road
conditions and bandit activity.40 This flight set the pattern of PROVIDE RELIEF staff
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working closely with
nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs) and local
clan elders to ensure secu-
rity at landing sites and an
orderly distribution of
supplies.41 The joint task
force (JTF) commander,
Brigadier General Frank
Libutti, USMC, accompa-
nied the initial flight into
Belet Uen and met with
local leaders and Somali
children while workers unloaded the cargo of beans, rice, and cooking oil from the C-
130 aircraft.42
Frank Libutti had been with Central Command only a few weeks—and a brigadier gen-
eral only slightly longer—when notified that he would command PROVIDE RELIEF. He
had been in the process of mastering his new duties at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa,
Florida, when abruptly assigned to lead a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST)
to the East African country of Kenya. Libutti’s primary duties at Central Command
involved serving as inspector general and—far more important—conducting bilateral
planning for contingency operations with various countries throughout the region.
This task was highly classified, because many representatives of these nations did not
want it known that they were involved in such a relationship with the United States.43
His mission to Africa was to assess the situation relative to humanitarian support
efforts in Kenya and Somalia and then make recommendations to Central Command
for possible American action. Libutti selected a team of thirty-four personnel from
across the directorates at Central Command and headed for Kenya on a C-141 airplane,
riding in seats rigged for paratroopers. The assessment team had been in Kenya only a
few hours when informed of the creation of JTF Provide Relief, with Libutti as com-
manding officer.44
The original mission upon departing Tampa—to assess the situation and make recom-
mendation—had been somewhat vague, owing to the very short timeline everyone was
working under.45 The creation of JTF Provide Relief expanded the task to include plan-
ning and operations. In other words, the assignment now required action as well as
observation and analysis. To get the operation up and running, Libutti needed to identify
appropriate airfields and establish a system for delivery. This involved coordinating with
the government of Kenya, through the embassy, for permission to fly U.S. aircraft into
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northern Kenya and stricken areas within Somalia. Operation PROVIDE RELIEF would
also need to cooperate with NGOs already working in those remote areas—particularly
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—in order to make an efficient and
substantive contribution. The relief effort in Somalia involved numerous people and
many organizations with similar goals; all were operating under the umbrella of UN
authority, but that did not necessarily guarantee collegial relationships.46
Upon arriving in Kenya, Libutti established his headquarters and base of operations in
an aviation facility at one end of the Mombasa airport. This hangar and its contiguous
ramp space represented one of several facilities the United States rented in Kenya for
just such contingencies.47 While his staff worked to organize and prepare this site to
support operations, General Libutti traveled to Nairobi for discussions with the Ameri-
can ambassador and his staff. Libutti, like most Marine officers, considered himself an
operator, not a politician or diplomat. But his first independent assignment as a gen-
eral officer revealed that life is not so simple for those who wear the stars. Of course, he
knew that his team would have to work with the embassy in Kenya, various government
officials, and NGOs operating in famine-stricken regions of Somalia. Libutti assumed,
however, the State Department would obtain the necessary authority from Kenyan offi-
cials to initiate PROVIDE RELIEF, leaving him free to focus on operations. After a few
days in Kenya, the new JTF commander would learn otherwise.48 The visibility of
American military personnel and aircraft in Kenya would make the media aware of his
activity, and that would spark the interest of political leaders at the highest level. This
spelled trouble, because the press hype—coupled with very short notice about the
operation—upset the Kenyan president, Daniel Moi. Some of his advisers, whether
misinformed or intentionally misrepresenting the facts, had aggravated concern by
questioning U.S. intentions.49 In either case, this created a problem for the viability of
PROVIDE RELIEF.
Daniel Toroitich arap Moi had become president of Kenya on 22 August 1978, upon
the death of Jomo Kenyatta, a national hero and the first president of postcolonial
Kenya. Although handpicked by Kenyatta as his successor, President Moi had never
enjoyed the following of his predecessor and constantly struggled to maintain public
support for his administration.50 While in Nairobi for his meeting with Ambassador
Hempstone, Libutti learned that President Moi wanted to talk with them regarding the
operation. The two American leaders rounded up some key staffers and proceeded to
the Presidential Palace, where Moi expressed considerable dissatisfaction over PROVIDE
RELIEF. The polemic newspaper headlines coupled with comments of his advisers had
piqued his attention. Not only did this crisis agitate the president, but it was also likely
affect his public image, with national elections only four months away.51
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In what appeared to Libutti as a combination of national pride and political theatre,
President Moi expressed outrage that the United States would consider operating in
Kenyan airspace without better coordination. Moi complained that he had not received
adequate notice or sufficient information about the mission. Hempstone suspected the
outrage stemmed from suggestions of certain anti-American advisers that the flights
offended Kenyan sovereignty and were intended to undercut the president’s public
standing. After a contentious discussion, in which both Hempstone and Libutti reas-
sured the president of the veracity of American declared intentions, President Moi
agreed to permit food flights into northern Kenya and Somalia. In a follow-on press
conference, Hempstone and Libutti allowed the Kenyan officials to take credit for sav-
ing the operation, while making sure that everyone of importance went on record sup-
porting PROVIDE RELIEF. Over the course of the next several days, Hempstone worked
to mollify Kenyan officials, further ensuring that Libutti’s aircraft would fly their mis-
sions as intended.52
While establishing his operational base at the Mombasa airport, Libutti noticed parked
across the airfield a C-130 airplane that he believed to be involved in relief operations.
He approached the pilot and learned that the plane flew food supplies to various loca-
tions inside Somalia for the World Food Program and the International Committee of
the Red Cross. Libutti decided to join a subsequent flight into Baidoa for an orientation
and some personal reconnaissance. The pilot flew his plane into the remote airfield
there, where the general met with NGO representatives on the ground. The NGO work-
ers received the cargo of food and delivered it to the local village, where they had estab-
lished feeding kitchens. Libutti also noticed the presence of media representatives,
several of whom showed an interest in him. When a reporter from the BBC asked why a
senior U.S. Marine officer would accompany humanitarian flights into the interior of
Somalia, Libutti replied that he was simply there to provide support as part of the UN
relief operations.53 Libutti decided to take advantage of the friendship exhibited by the
C-130 pilot and instructed key members of his staff to accompany future flights so they
could evaluate airfields for possible U.S. operations, assessing their runways and soil
composition. At that point, the PROVIDE RELIEF command consisted of Libutti, the
small staff from Central Command, a few U.S. Air Force air control personnel, and two
C-141s.54
In addition to resolving political issues in Kenya, establishing his base of operations at
the airport, and gathering information on possible airfields, Libutti wanted to be sure
that ongoing problems within Somalia would not endanger his mission or his people.
An important way to accomplish this involved building rapport with the NGOs operat-
ing in the areas he would support. The relationship between military forces and NGOs
can be very difficult, and Libutti considered his initial contacts somewhat frosty.55 It is
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not possible to generalize about working with NGOs, because there are so many of
them, all with different charters and purposes. Although well intended and right-
minded, many NGOs compete for donations or missions, and this tends to make them
very independent and somewhat self-focused. NGOs also operate within a very differ-
ent organizational culture than does the U.S. military, and bridging the gap can be a
challenge for both sides.56 But Libutti and his staff made the effort to do so, and in his
view, the NGO personnel “became good friends and good supporters over time.”57
Ambassador Hempstone helped this process by facilitating a meeting between Libutti
and the ICRC early in the planning process. This experience helped convince the gen-
eral to work through that organization, because of its structure and communications
system, which operated in both Somalia and Kenya.58 It also had four established air-
fields in remote parts of Somalia, which supported roughly five hundred feeding sta-
tions within the areas served by the landing sites.59 Working with the ICRC required the
PROVIDE RELIEF operation to accommodate itself to some basic expectations, such as
placing red crosses on their airplanes and restricting arms from relief flights. Libutti
had no problem with marking his aircraft with the red cross, as long as it did not
obscure other symbols; the question of weapons was more problematic, one that he
needed to consider.60 The arrival of disaster assistance response teams (DARTs)
proved helpful in facilitating relations between NGOs and the military, as well as in
clarifying aid requirements and security conditions at airfields where Libutti’s air-
craft would land.61
Recognizing the need to open communications with key forces inside Somalia, Libutti
established contact with Osman Ato, Aideed’s second in command and the financier of
his operations.62 Libutti first met Osman Ato in Kenya and subsequently visited him
during trips into Mogadishu. They established a relationship that led to meetings with
Aideed and key members of his staff. Although plans did not initially call for PROVIDE
RELIEF flights to deliver supplies into Mogadishu itself, Libutti saw that good relation-
ships with the Aideed faction—which controlled the Mogadishu airport and port facil-
ities—would be necessary to ensure future access to the city. His contacts proved
particularly valuable some weeks later when the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps team
facilitated insertion of the five-hundred-man Pakistani peacekeeping battalion into
Somalia.63 They were also to help during the large-scale U.S. military commitment in
December 1992 under the rubric of Operation RESTORE HOPE. Additionally, the fac-
tion leaders were important in supplying guards and security teams for NGOs and
other agencies operating within Somalia; also, immediate access to the top leaders
could be helpful in controlling certain situations.64
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Once the PROVIDE RELIEF team
had completed the survey of air-
fields, contacted key people
within the NGO community,
coordinated with government
officials, and connected with
Somali factions, a standard rou-
tine developed that assured maxi-
mum efficiency in the delivery of
humanitarian aid.65 It was clear
from the beginning that C-141
aircraft could not operate in the
rugged terrain and makeshift landing fields in the remote parts of Somalia. Libutti
replaced them with the more rugged C-130s, which served as workhorses throughout
the operation. Libutti would have fourteen of these airplanes available at the height of
the relief activity during PROVIDE RELIEF.66 The C-130s came primarily from the 403rd
Wing of the U.S. Air Force Reserve, based at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, and the
324th Airlift Wing from Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, although German and
Canadian partners provided a few aircraft at various times.67 The C-130s operated off
the tarmac at Mombasa airport near the PROVIDE RELIEF cargo staging areas and
Libutti’s headquarters. At this point, the PROVIDE RELIEF staff—though still relatively
small—had been somewhat enhanced to support the additional aircraft and expanded
mission.68 During the period of greatest activity, the total number of people supporting
PROVIDE RELIEF grew to about six hundred, including both military and civilian.69
The operational routine that developed for PROVIDE RELIEF started with food aid ship-
ments arriving at the port of Mombasa from all over the world. Contractors would
transport the supplies to Libutti’s operational facility at Mombasa airport, where work-
ing parties palletized the bags of food. During the evening hours, the cargo would be
loaded in the C-130s for the next day’s flights. At 0330 (3:30 AM), pilot briefings were
conducted; the aircraft departed between 0500 and 0700 for their designated landing
sites. If the designated airfield was secure when the aircraft arrived, NGO representa-
tives on the ground would lay out a simple white sheet or flag, and the pilot would
land. If the airfield was not secure, the pilot had instructions to divert to another site or
return to Mombasa. Fortunately, that did not prove necessary during PROVIDE RELIEF,
due in part to superb advance communications.70 DART staffers supporting the opera-
tion coordinated with the NGOs inside Somalia on a daily basis to guarantee security
at the landing sites. They also verified the NGOs’ ability to off-load the supplies in a
timely manner, thereby reducing the exposure of aircraft and personnel on the ground.
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The rules of engagement (ROE) pro-
hibited landing under unsafe condi-
tions, but aircraft on the ground for
extended periods were bound to
attract attention. The NGOs’ use of
local Somalis for both labor and
security at the remote airfields and
villages ensured the efficacy of this
process.71 This in turn allowed the
people executing PROVIDE RELIEF to
focus on flying aircraft and delivering
supplies.
Once PROVIDE RELIEF reached a normal operating rhythm, its pilots flew at a rather
high operational tempo. This level of activity attracted considerable attention in both
East Africa and Washington. At one point in the process, the vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, visited the operation and accompanied
Libutti on a flight into Oddur, Somalia. Jeremiah received a tour of the local village,
where he observed conditions and relief operations under way. He and Libutti also
met with local elders and clansmen to discuss humanitarian activity and the relief
operations.72
Although PROVIDE RELIEF did not have a combat mission and had to conform to cer-
tain peacetime standards, Somalia remained a dangerous place. The good relationship
that developed between Libutti’s staff and NGO representatives, coupled with the work
of the DARTs, helped minimize the risk of delivering supplies to remote airfields. But
avoidance strategies can be uncertain, and they assume the cooperation of all indige-
nous parties.73 As a prudent commander, Libutti did not intend to rely solely on good
intentions or polite relationships with his NGO counterparts for the protection of peo-
ple and aircraft. In order to hedge against nasty surprises, he designated one of his C-
130s as a security plane and configured it to deal with unforeseen threats. He loaded
the aircraft with armed soldiers from the 5th Special Forces Group, the major element
of his ground security force.74 The airplane would circle landing sites while deliveries
were under way and respond to acts of violence on the ground. If a threat developed or
an airplane took fire while unloading, the pilot would take off and fly out of harm’s
way if possible. If not, he could call for the security aircraft, which would land and take
necessary action to rescue the people at the airfield and fly them to safety. Fortunately,
conditions never required employment of this security provision during Operation
PROVIDE RELIEF.75 Two of Libutti’s C-130s received small-arms fire, but no injuries
resulted, damage to the aircraft was slight, and the incidents did not endanger the
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operation. Libutti’s security element proved valuable beyond the protection it provided
to operations. While accompanying the relief flights, the soldiers also collected intelli-
gence on airfields, assessed the degree of danger within various regions, and obtained
other basic information that would be of use in case of future ground involvement. As
America’s commitment became larger and ground operations came to predominate,
the intelligence value of these flights was to prove vitally important.76
The leaders of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF established procedures and relationships that
seemed appropriate for their mission while addressing the particular and uncertain situa-
tions they found on the ground. They attempted to conform to standards acceptable to
the humanitarian relief community with whom they had to interface. This meant that
the military aircraft and crews did not carry weapons and landed only in relatively
secure areas. Of course, Libutti wisely allowed for the uncertainty of conditions, by cre-
ating the separate security plane to protect his unarmed crews while on the ground. At
the remote airfields, as we have seen, NGOs were responsible for unloading, transport-
ing, and warehousing
the food for use in the
feeding centers where
victims of famine gath-
ered. They hired local
Somalis to perform
this work, usually pay-
ing them with a com-
bination of money and
food.77 Despite the two
incidents of small-
arms fire, Operation
PROVIDE RELIEF went
more or less as
intended and made an important contribution to limiting the extent of the crisis. It
served areas that aid organizations could not reliably reach by road, and its cargoes did
not suffer the looting, pilfering, and outright thievery that created problems in other
parts of Somalia, especially in the coastal cities.78
American pilots flew over 1,400 missions and delivered seventeen thousand tons of
food through 4 December 1992, when Operation RESTORE HOPE brought a larger mis-
sion and higher level of American involvement to Somalia.79 Yet despite the success of
PROVIDE RELIEF, which operated at full capacity between August and December 1992,
the food deliveries amounted to no more than 10 percent of the minimum needed to
stabilize the Somali crisis.80 Additionally, the mission, with its benign nature, did
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nothing to address the larger problems of security and distribution. Ongoing threats
against staging areas, truck convoys, and feeding stations remained an issue in many
parts of Somalia that did not enjoy a secure port like Mombasa or relatively secure air-
fields like those used by PROVIDE RELIEF.81 Despite saving many lives and exhibiting the
noblest aspect of the American character, PROVIDE RELIEF could not solve the larger
problems of Somalia with the limited mission and assets it commanded.
Militias of the contesting factions, local gangs and bandits, and other criminal elements
at large in Mogadishu and the countryside—especially along the coastline—hampered
humanitarian relief efforts throughout the crisis.82 Among other things, these thugs
would often intimidate relief workers, sometimes people who had hired them for pro-
tection.83 Additionally, the fighting and violence often prevented unloading food sup-
plies, particularly at the port of Mogadishu.84 Some aid officials believed that as little as
20 percent of the food arriving in Somalia actually reached the needy. Although dis-
puted by many analysts, that figure influenced the thinking of American leaders and
became an important factor in the decision to undertake Operation RESTORE HOPE.85
In mid-September 1992, American leaders were not yet contemplating a major deploy-
ment such as RESTORE HOPE but remained focused on the five hundred peacekeepers
authorized under UN Resolution 751. That Pakistani battalion would find itself in the
unenviable position of a small force in the middle of a big problem. It was also lightly
armed and had both a vague mission and a restrictive set of rules of engagement,
imposed by the UN.86 Brigadier General Shaheen, who commanded the peacekeeping
force, considered the ROE far too restrictive under the circumstances, fearing they
could endanger his peacekeepers and prevent them from accomplishing their mission.87
Nonetheless, UN officials expected it to be a positive influence and a security force to
protect food shipments at the port and airport.
Peacekeeping is a somewhat amorphous concept, loosely justified under Chapter VI of
the UN Charter. Although not specifically mentioned in the charter, the idea of peace-
keeping developed over time to include both military-observer missions and larger sta-
bility operations.88 Though they are military in nature, the UN implements
peacekeeping operations in a nonthreatening manner, with the consent of all dispu-
tants. They apply principles of impartiality, mediation, and persuasion for maintaining
peace and restoring normalcy.89 In other words, the UN introduces peacekeepers as a
presence intended to calm a situation, not to assert authority. Peacekeeping is funda-
mentally different from “peace enforcement”—authorized under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter—which allows the use of coercive power, either economic or military.90
This thinking leads to the (usually naive) presumption that peacekeepers will be viewed
favorably—that is, be valued as helpful neutrals—when introduced into violent
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disputes. But in Somalia, Mohamed Farah Aideed had a decidedly negative view of UN
involvement and accepted peacekeepers only under considerable pressure from Ambas-
sador Sahnoun. This placed the Pakistanis in a precarious situation, since their primary
positions at the airport and the port of Mogadishu were in areas controlled by Aideed.91
Additionally, numerous crosscurrents existed within the factions, clans, and subclans in
Mogadishu, making effective control of people and events somewhat uncertain. Should
conflict develop between the peacekeepers and Aideed’s faction, the lightly armed Paki-
stanis would face adversaries with heavy guns, artillery, plenty of ammunition, and
serious attitude problems.92
Aideed had reasons for objecting to the deployment of peacekeepers, of course. Pos-
sessing the stronger force in Mogadishu, he rightly believed that any restraining factor
tended to favor his weaker enemy, Ali Mahdi. Beyond that, Aideed held deep suspicions
about UN intentions, because an airplane with UN markings had delivered arms to Ali
Mahdi’s faction in northern Mogadishu. Although this incident had actually involved a
contractor’s failure to repaint his aircraft after completing a UN contract and not UN
support for Ali Mahdi, it reinforced his tendency to distrust and resist UN involvement
in Mogadishu.93 Making things even worse, UN headquarters announced that it would
send another three thousand peacekeepers to Somalia just as Sahnoun had convinced
Aideed to accept the five hundred under discussion. The news incensed Aideed and
humiliated Sahnoun, since neither had known of this decision, learning of it from a
BBC radio broadcast.94 Nonetheless, under pressure from Sahnoun, Aideed reluctantly
decided to accept the initial five hundred peacekeepers, and the United States agreed to
fly them from Pakistan to Mogadishu in Air Force planes and use the Navy and Marine
Corps team to facilitate their entry into Somalia.95
American naval expeditionary forces within the Indian Ocean during September 1992
consisted of PhibRon 1, under Captain Braden Phillips, with 11th MEU (SOC)
embarked. Colonel Michael W. Hagee, a future Commandant of the Marine Corps,
commanded the Marines of 11th MEU (SOC). These commanders and their officers
had known of the instability on the Horn of Africa as they conducted their predeploy-
ment training at Camp Pendleton and off the California coastline. Noncombatant
evacuation operations—such as Captain Moser and Colonel Doyle had conducted at
Mogadishu during EASTERN EXIT—constituted an important element of their training
package. In this particular case, the Navy and Marine Corps team had the added advan-
tage of a firsthand orientation on EASTERN EXIT from Lieutenant Colonel Robert P.
McAleer. McAleer’s briefing dovetailed nicely with the NEO training and provided the
leaders of the amphibious force significant insight into conditions in Somalia. Both
Phillips and Hagee believed their units benefited from that direct connection, especially
since Somalia would be within their area of responsibility upon deployment.96
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In many ways, the amphibious force under Phillips and Hagee exemplified the highly
capable and well integrated Navy and Marine Corps team that had been emerging since
1776 at New Providence in the Bahamas. The two commanders cooperated closely
during their workup for deployment, with Phillips participating in much of the train-
ing that makes a MEU “special operations capable.” Phillips’s PhibRon 1 and Hagee’s
11th MEU (SOC) completed their training and set sail in June 1992 as a four-ship
amphibious readiness group (ARG), with Tarawa its flagship.97 The Tarawa ARG con-
ducted amphibious exercises in Hawaii, Okinawa, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia before
steaming eastward toward Singapore in early September. While en route east, it received
orders to proceed at best speed to Mogadishu and facilitate the introduction of Paki-
stani peacekeepers into Somalia.98 Central Command planners had originally consid-
ered using the ARG’s ships to transport the peacekeepers from Pakistan to Somalia, but
they ultimately decided against it due to space limitations and cultural issues. Instead,
as noted, the Air Force would fly them into Mogadishu with the Navy and Marine
Corps team orchestrating a safe insertion.99
En route to Somalia, Phillips and Hagee received notice to fly to Nairobi for a meeting
with the Central Command representative (General Libutti) and other key officials to
discuss the upcoming operation. The two commanders, along with several key staff
members, made a five-hundred-mile CH-53E helicopter flight from Tarawa to
Mombasa, where they boarded a C-130 for the trip to Nairobi. The subsequent confer-
ence occurred in the home of Ambassador Hempstone under Libutti’s overall direc-
tion. In addition to the principals, this meeting included Mohamed Sahnoun; Brigadier
General Shaheen; Raymond S. Marchand, of Conoco Somalia, Ltd. (who lived in
Mogadishu and understood its issues); John Fox, a U.S. embassy political officer and
evacuee from Mogadishu during EASTERN EXIT; and several other key staff officers.100
The purpose of the meeting was to coordinate the safe arrival of the Pakistani peace-
keepers into Mogadishu and guarantee their security until properly established. The
group discussed the current situation on the ground in Mogadishu, staging areas for
the arriving troops and their supplies and equipment, bivouac areas, and other such
administrative and logistical issues. It further addressed the need for a safe and con-
trolled environment in which the large Air Force planes could land and disembark the
peacekeepers. This constituted the most serious of the problems, and it was made more
vexing by the uncertainty of the situation.101 The group also agreed that the U.S. role in
the operation should remain as inconspicuous as possible, although its members bal-
anced that against the deterrent value of having an American naval expeditionary force
offshore.102 Once Phillips and Hagee returned to their ship, assessed the overall situa-
tion in Mogadishu, conducted a reconnaissance of the Mogadishu airport, and com-
pleted their planning, they would be able to formalize the Air Force flight schedules.103
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Following the Nairobi conference, the Tarawa ARG steamed to Mogadishu, where it
went into “MODLOC” about ten miles offshore.104 Throughout the operation, the ships
remained in that general vicinity—sometimes within view of the land and sometimes
over the horizon—exerting a calming effect on events ashore, in the opinion of Hagee.
The leaders of the various Somali factions knew that the ships contained Marines and
that the ARG possessed a power-projection capability. The implied threat from such a
force proved sufficient to control the situation.105 By this time, the Tarawa ARG had
been at sea for some time, and Phillips had logistical concerns. While attending the
Nairobi conference, he had coordinated with Hempstone and Libutti to secure a source
for supplies and to receive mail. Throughout the Mogadishu operation, Phillips shut-
tled two of his ships—Fort Fisher and Ogden—between Mogadishu and Mombasa on a
daily basis to conduct the needed logistical tasks. This approach worked quite well, in
Phillips’s opinion, because it supported the mission while providing some activity for
the ships other than hovering on station throughout the operation.106
The plan for inserting the peacekeepers involved sending a Marine force into the
Mogadishu airport, accompanied by an Air Force combat control team, which would
conduct terminal guidance for the Air Force planes flying the missions. The Marines
provided security for the control team and the arriving C-141 aircraft with the peace-
keepers. The Marines also protected the Pakistanis until they were in position to
assume their own security.107 The Air Force combat control team consisted of six air-
men, whom Hagee characterized as “big and squared away making a strong military
appearance.”108 These Air Force teams are components of the special operations com-
munity, and they are trained to conduct such missions in covert and nonpermissive
environments when necessary. Libutti visited Mogadishu prior to the beginning of the
operation, coordinating with the Pakistani commander and the Aideed faction, which
controlled the area surrounding the airport. Using his relationship with Osman Ato,
the general obtained a commitment from Aideed not to interfere with the insertions by
attempting to shoot down the aircraft or attacking them on the ground. Once Libutti
accomplished this, he notified Central Command to execute the insertion plan.109
Libutti’s efforts to eliminate the threat from the Aideed faction reduced the risk but of
course could not guarantee perfect security. Phillips and Hagee felt it appropriate to go
ashore themselves prior the actual operation to conduct a reconnaissance and assess
the situation in and around the airport. After determining that the airfield could han-
dle C-141 aircraft and that the situation was not prohibitively threatening, the two
commanders took a tour of Mogadishu. Raymond Marchand, the Conoco executive
whom Phillips and Hagee had met at the Nairobi conference, joined them at the airport
and provided what Phillips considered an eye-opening experience. They traveled in
several vehicles, known as “technicals,” mounting .50-caliber machine guns and
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manned by local Somalis working for Conoco.110 Their drive about the city included a
visit to the evacuated American embassy, which had been stripped of everything of
value and left an utter shambles.111
The Continental Oil Company (Conoco) in Somalia had acquired concessions and
begun exploring for oil in the northwest part of the country (the Republic of Somali-
land) in 1986. Marchand considered the prospect of finding oil in that region modestly
promising, foreseeing yields perhaps amounting to three hundred thousand barrels per
day once developed.112 Conoco had also established a large operational headquarters in
Mogadishu well before the spread of anarchy in the city. This complex constituted the
most secure location available to American officials after evacuation of the embassy in
January 1991. As president and general manager of Conoco Somalia, Ltd., Marchand
proved to be an invaluable—though entirely unofficial—asset to American diplomatic
and military efforts throughout the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Marchand possessed
substantial knowledge and understanding of the political, military, and social condi-
tions within Mogadishu and throughout the country. He also had key contacts with the
most powerful leaders of various factions, connections that he readily made available
to American authorities. The security arrangements Marchand had established to pro-
tect the Conoco compound and himself in his travels around Somalia were the best
available. He employed well-armed and well-paid guards who provided reliable service
to his company and its activities throughout the years of instability.113 The Conoco
headquarters in Mogadishu served as a focal point from which many Americans could
operate and where they could reside during the period in which no American consular
services existed.114
One peculiar factor that affected the Mogadishu operation involved the use of khat
among Somali people. Ironically, this recreational drug proved to be the only commod-
ity that retained a viable market in Somalia’s general economic collapse and famine.
Khat is a stimulant that Somalis chew in leaf form—as tobacco is chewed in some parts
of America—and that secretes concentrations of amphetamine. It is a very social prod-
uct, but after a full day of chewing khat, individuals become cranked up and irrational.
This often results in reckless and aggressive behavior, particularly in younger men. In an
environment where every male over seven or eight years of age seems to have a gun with
plenty of ammunition, this can create dangerous situations.115 Although the Marines of
11th MEU (SOC) did not operate under the highly restrictive ROE that constrained the
Pakistani peacekeepers, neither were they in Mogadishu to conduct combat operations.
Consequently, Phillips and Hagee decided to have their activities performed at the airport
in the morning hours and to return all personnel to the ships by about 1300 (1:00 PM)
each day. This would minimize the opportunity for violent encounters. That pattern
proved very effective during the insertion operation.116 Only Hagee remained ashore
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overnight, staying at the Conoco
compound and keeping in tune
with activities in the city.117
Throughout the operation,
Phillips and Hagee kept the
Marines and ships busy prepar-
ing for contingencies in case of
problems ashore. Should Amer-
ican forces at the airport come
under attack, they had a plan
prepared and rehearsed with
which to respond. If an antiair
threat developed that precluded
helicopters from flying,
Schenectady, with tracked vehi-
cles on board, could put
Marines ashore over the beach
to prosecute any action that
might be appropriate. In fact, Phillips inserted SEALs onto the beach to be available
should any action on the ground become necessary. Because of these precautions, the
entire amphibious force—not just the Marines and airmen operating at the airfield—
participated in the mission in very real ways.118
The Marines and sailors of the Tarawa ARG remained busy and took their responsibili-
ties quite seriously, but they received a large morale boost when visited by actress Aud-
rey Hepburn, as goodwill ambassador of the United Nations Children’s Fund.119 Hagee
had met her in Mogadishu, where a UNICEF group had come to meet with American
leaders. He and Phillips arranged for her to have lunch on the flagship, meet with
some of the Marines and sailors, and talk a little about her mission. Within three hours,
the troops had collected over four thousand dollars in donations for the UNICEF
cause.120 This received considerable press coverage that placed the Navy and Marine
Corps team in a very good light. Hepburn had been a UNICEF goodwill ambassador
since 1988 and visited many humanitarian disaster areas, but nothing had prepared her
for the experience of Somalia. She commented, “I walked into a nightmare. I have seen
famine in Ethiopia and Bangladesh, but I have seen nothing like this—so much worse
than I could have possibly have imagined.” Perhaps, after her dreadful experience
ashore, her visit with the Marines and sailors provided as much of a morale boost for
her as she did for the troops. Four months later Audrey Hepburn died from an incur-
able cancer, diagnosed after she returned home from the Somalia trip.121
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The operation now fell into a standard routine. For the first six days, until all the peace-
keepers were in place, helicopters would fly the Marines and Air Force controllers into
the airport every morning to support their arrival. The controllers would bring in the
Air Force planes while Marines protected the landings, off-loading, and defensive prep-
arations. After completing the objectives for the day, helicopters returned the U.S. team
to its ships. The Marines also escorted some peacekeepers to the port area, where they
intended to establish a post for protecting relief aid that arrived by ship. (After the
departure of the Tarawa ARG, the situation in Mogadishu did not permit the Pakistanis
to remain at the port, and they ultimately found themselves ensconced at, and limited
to, the Mogadishu airport.)122 After inserting the peacekeepers, the Tarawa ARG moved
off station. But before departing the Indian Ocean, Phillips and Hagee conducted a
debriefing—primarily through message traffic—with leaders of an incoming naval
expeditionary force, consisting of PhibRon 3, commanded by Captain John W. Peter-
son, and 15th MEU (SOC), under Colonel Gregory S. Newbold.123 That Navy and
Marine Corps team would lead the American forces ashore for Operation RESTORE
HOPE three months later.124
After negotiating for deployment of the five hundred peacekeepers, Ambassador
Sahnoun became embroiled in a conflict with the UN bureaucracy and felt compelled
to resign his post. This proved a serious loss to the peace process and humanitarian
relief effort, as Sahnoun had demonstrated great skill and effectiveness in the vexing
effort to save Somalia from total chaos and anarchy.125 When he left, relations between
the UN and Somali factional leaders—particularly Aideed and Ali Mahdi—deteriorated
to the point that a solution to the problems seemed even farther out of reach.126 Sahnoun’s
replacement, Ismat Kittani, also a veteran diplomat, could not replicate the trust and
cooperation that Sahnoun had nurtured among the Somali factions despite his similar
understanding of the problem. His approach to dealing with the issues and the leaders
of the most powerful factions proved overly structured, relatively ineffective in an envi-
ronment that valued close personal interaction. It is not clear, of course, whether the
agreements Sahnoun had carefully crafted among the diverse Somali factions could
have brought an ultimate solution to the conflict and famine. But it is clear that his depar-
ture marked an end to any hope for a near-term political or humanitarian solution.127
In November 1992, Brigadier General Paul L. Fratarangelo, USMC, replaced Libutti as
commander of JTF Provide Relief.128 Shortly after his return to Central Command
headquarters, Libutti received a call from the Pentagon indicating that the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, wanted him in Washington to brief
the Joint Staff on PROVIDE RELIEF and offer his impressions on Somalia and Kenya. A
large-scale humanitarian incursion into Somalia was under consideration at the time,
and in Washington Powell asked Libutti for his views on that as well. In his opinion,
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Libutti told Powell and the Joint Staff, this would likely lead to assuming responsibility
for nation building, which could be a ten-to-fifteen-year proposition.129 After a sub-
sequent session with Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, Libutti returned to
Tampa. A few days later, Libutti was ordered back to Mombasa to meet and work with
the new American special envoy to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley. About a week later, the
United States would begin landing Marines in Somalia to implement Operation
RESTORE HOPE.130
Operation PROVIDE RELIEF constituted a very important element of America’s Somalia
incursions of the 1990s. The participants gained a fundamental understanding of the
humanitarian crisis, social breakdown, and the military situation, with all its nuances
and intricacies. This information was to prove invaluable for the leaders of Operation
RESTORE HOPE, which absorbed PROVIDE RELIEF once the larger commitment got
under way. Both Libutti and Hagee returned to Somalia during the early stages of the
RESTORE HOPE to assist the JTF commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston,
USMC, and Ambassador Oakley in addressing the problems they faced and the duties
they performed.131
RESTORE HOPE proved to be an operation that would embody . . . From the Sea far
more than did PROVIDE RELIEF. Even so, thinkers within the sea services could draw
valuable insight from the accomplishments of PROVIDE RELIEF for the strategic and
operational concepts then in development. The skillful and casualty-free insertion of
Pakistani peacekeepers into Mogadishu clearly demonstrated the flexibility of forward-
deployed naval expeditionary forces operating from ships at sea. The deterrent value of
naval power projection contributed greatly to that success by deterring hostile actions
by militias and gangs ashore. The use of Air Force planes and controllers to fly peace-
keepers into Mogadishu demonstrated the concept of shaping naval forces to support
joint operations. The very creation of PROVIDE RELIEF illustrated the strategic notion
of conducting joint operations tailored for national needs as described in . . . From the
Sea.132 Libutti’s operation—including the relief flights out of Mombasa and the inser-
tion of peacekeepers into Mogadishu—reported directly to the commander in chief of
Central Command, who in turn operated under the direction of the National Com-
mand Authority.133 This permitted efficient command and control over operationally
agile forces maneuvering from the sea in response to strategic and policy objectives
from the highest level.134
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Operation RESTORE HOPE
Prelude and Lodgment
Throughout November 1992, the Bush administration pondered the question of lead-
ing a large-scale humanitarian intervention into Somalia. General Libutti’s trip to
Washington contributed to that process, particularly the assessment under way within
the Department of Defense. President Bush and his key advisers also received inputs
from intelligence sources, UN officials, members of Congress, U.S.- and internationally
based NGOs, and various African specialists.1 On 21 November, the interagency Depu-
ties Committee of the National Security Council, headed by retired admiral Jonathan T.
Howe, approved a concept paper—based on planning conducted at Central Com-
mand—that offered three options for augmenting the humanitarian response in Soma-
lia.2 These options comprised increased American support for existing and enhanced
UN peacekeeping operations, a new coalition organized by the United States but with-
out American troops, and a major multinational venture led by U.S. ground forces. On
26 November, after intense deliberations within the administration and at the UN,
President Bush offered to send American troops into Somalia.3
Although influenced by discussions with Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin L. Powell, and Acting Secretary of State
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and input from the Deputies Committee, President Bush’s
decision appears to have been very personal, based on his compassion for starving
Somalis.4 Many top leaders within the U.S. government also felt deep-rooted anguish
over the human suffering, while remaining ambivalent about the idea of a major U.S.
military commitment in Somalia. But the shortcomings of UNOSOM—including the
successful but insufficient PROVIDE RELIEF—had become increasingly apparent to all
observers as the year wore on.5 Although food shortages had abated somewhat by
November 1992, conditions remained horrific for many Somalis in the worst-stricken
areas. Additionally, the humanitarian tragedy continued to receive substantial attention
in the press, with an ongoing impact on the administration and American people.6
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Most American leaders and many key UN officials recognized that hundreds of
thousands of Somalis still faced the prospect of starvation despite some improve-
ment in food supplies. Many came to believe that only a strong U.S.-led coalition
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter offered hope for mitigating the humanitarian
catastrophe. President Bush concurred and favored the heavy application of U.S.
ground forces, from among the options provided in the Deputies Committee paper.
Initially the administration considered sending a division-sized component but this
increased to a three-brigade approach under pressure from General Hoar at Central
Command.7 Originally, Hoar wanted the United States to provide command and con-
trol, airlift, and communications for a UN force but no ground troops. When over-
ruled, he developed the three-brigade concept, including a brigade of Marines, a
brigade of American soldiers, and an international brigade (the nucleus for which was
already in Somalia).8 The prevailing theory of massive and overwhelming application
of U.S. military force—derived from the Weinberger and Powell doctrines—undoubt-
edly influenced thinking in this regard.9 Developed and published during the 1980s as
an outgrowth of the Vietnam War, these so-called doctrines were somewhat inconsis-
tent with the new concepts of expeditionary warfare in the post–Cold War environ-
ment. Yet the remarkable success of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM kept them alive
in the minds of many military and political leaders.10
After deciding on this course of action, President Bush contacted thirteen heads of
state and solicited their participation, believing that a major military commitment in
Somalia required international forces to legitimize the UN mandate. All but Great Brit-
ain agreed to send troops or provide other support functions.11 Once the operation
actually began, under American leadership, as many as forty-four nations offered to
contribute to the effort; of these, twenty-one had provided forces at some level by the
end of January 1993.12 On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council responded to
President Bush’s offer by unanimously passing Resolution 794, endorsing the offer of a
member state (the United States) to lead an international force to protect humanitarian
relief operations in Somalia.13 Among other things, Resolution 794 authorized, under
Chapter VII, “the Secretary General and all member states to use all necessary means
to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation
in Somalia.”14
The ensuing operation—generally known as Operation RESTORE HOPE—set a prece-
dent for UN action. The Security Council had authorized Chapter VII military opera-
tions by member states on four previous occasions, but those interventions had
resulted from external actions against sovereign nations. In Somalia, the situation
involved an internal conflict and focused on humanitarian relief rather than combat
operations.15 At this point, the president’s concept of a “New World Order” meshed
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nicely with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace,” which envi-
sioned a liberal use of Chapter VII peace-enforcement operations. Both leaders
believed that the end of the Cold War had created opportunities for a more assertive
UN involvement in dealing with problems of the world.16 Moreover, the use of U.S.
naval expeditionary forces to execute this mission to Somalia—jointly supported by
major elements from the Army and Air Force—served to demonstrate the efficacy of
the . . . From the Sea concepts then evolving within the American sea services. Indeed,
the entire set of U.S. incursions into Somalia during the 1990s tends to exemplify these
expeditionary precepts.17
Not everyone believed that the drift toward a major American deployment to Somalia
during November and December 1992 was a good idea.18 Those who supported the
commitment had the recent examples of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to illus-
trate the capabilities of an American-led coalition effort. Of course, the crisis in Soma-
lia differed from the Iraqi conflict in many ways, yet the model seemed applicable in
the minds of some leaders.19 Those who held reservations about the undertaking, how-
ever, did not believe the short-term commitment President Bush had in mind would
provide much more than temporary relief. In the minds of dissenters, only a substan-
tial involvement in Somali affairs over a long period could address the underlying
causes of famine and anarchy, and that could be costly in American blood and
treasure.20 Some humanitarian-relief experts—particularly Frederick C. Cuny, the
founder of Intertect Relief and Reconstruction Corporation and a consultant to USAID
in Somalia—believed that numerous, relatively small-scale incursions at various places
along the Somali coastline and directly to points inland would be preferable to a large-
scale effort operating out of a primary base at Mogadishu. Cuny proposed a series of
security zones established by naval expeditionary forces and Army airborne units
where relief agencies and Somalis could freely interact. This concept would utilize
small ports, over-the-beach deliveries, and helicopter insertions to disburse emergency
deliveries throughout the stricken areas.21 With the elimination of major supply depots
and overland delivery routes, opportunity for factions and clans to influence the pro-
cess would also diminish. This would have the effect of lessening the importance of
major warlords, who used control of the food supply to enhance their power. But such
an approach differed from current thinking within the Department of Defense, and it
received little consideration. In retrospect, it remains unclear whether Cuny’s approach
would have been more successful than the course of action actually undertaken.22
One of the more thoughtful contrarian viewpoints came from Ambassador Smith
Hempstone, whose earlier dispatches from Kenya had aroused so much awareness of
the humanitarian crisis.23 In a message to Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of State for
International Security Affairs, Hempstone expressed his “jaundiced view of apparent
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U.S. government plans to send large numbers of American troops into Somalia under a
UN fig leaf.” The ambassador acknowledged that the humanitarian issues were compel-
ling but expressed grave concern at the haste with which the government appeared to
“embrace the Somali tarbaby.”24 Hempstone allowed that the United States could effect
a landing and take control of Mogadishu with few if any casualties, but he expressed
concern for the longer term, when Somalis would likely revert to guerrilla tactics. In
Hempstone’s words, “If you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu.” He acknowledged that
American involvement would save tens of thousands of Somalis from starvation in
1993 but was convinced that they would all probably starve to death in 1994 anyway,
unless the United States was prepared to remain in the country.25
Hempstone believed that it would take at least five years to “get Somalia not on its feet
but just on its knees.” American involvement would move from providing food to
guarding and distributing food supplies, hunting guerrillas, establishing a judicial sys-
tem, forming a police force, creating an army, encouraging the formation of political
parties, and conducting free and fair multiparty elections. “This putative operation is
not a map exercise in Tampa,” he cautioned.26 “It is not a PR exercise. Real lives (Ameri-
can and Somali) are going to be lost. Billions of the American taxpayers’ dollars are
going to be spent. To what end?” Hempstone concluded his dispatch, “We ought to
have learned by now that these situations are easier to get into than out of. No good
deed goes unpunished. Somalia is an African and Islamic country. If international
intervention is contemplated, let it be led by African and Islamic countries. Take the
advice of the people on the ground. Inshalla. Think once, twice and three times before
you embrace the Somali tarbaby.”27
On 4 December 1992, President Bush addressed the nation on the situation in Somalia.
He described and praised U.S. contributions during PROVIDE RELIEF but also portrayed
the continuing anarchy and famine. He pointed out that “in many cases, food from
relief flights is being looted upon landing; food convoys have been hijacked; aid work-
ers assaulted; ships with food have been subject to artillery attacks that prevented them
from docking. There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down.
Anarchy prevails.” The president then announced a commitment of U.S. forces—under
overall command of General Hoar at Central Command—to ensure the delivery of
emergency relief aid to the starving people of Somalia. He identified the major forces
to be used: the naval expeditionary force then deployed off the coast of Somalia (the
Tripoli ARG); major elements of I MEF, in California; units of the U.S. Army 10th
Mountain Division, in New York; various ancillary support units from other services;
and unspecified elements from “about a dozen countries.”28 Planners estimated the
total number would amount to twenty-eight thousand Americans and about ten thou-
sand personnel from coalition nations.29 Although the actual numbers fluctuated
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during the deployment, at its peak Operation RESTORE HOPE would count nearly
twenty-eight thousand U.S. troops and as many as eleven thousand from over twenty
countries dispersed throughout central and southern Somalia.30 At this point, the
president’s actions had strong support from the American public, Congress, and even
President-elect William J. Clinton.31
The American and coalition forces operating in Somalia during RESTORE HOPE used a
variety of names and designators. Initially created by General Hoar on 27 November
1992 as Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia, the command progressed to become Combined
Task Force (CTF) Somalia as coalition forces joined the organization within Somalia.32
Shortly thereafter it officially became Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia.33 Lieuten-
ant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC, served as commander of the task force
throughout Operation RESTORE HOPE. The UN special representative to Somalia, Ismat
Kittani—who replaced Mohamed Sahnoun in October 1992—objected to the exclusive
use of U.S. force designators. It was this that produced the change to UNITAF, reflecting a
UN role, limited as it was. The United States had agreed to place the operation under
the UN Security Council with the understanding there would be no interference with
U.S. command and control over the entire force.34 Since American leaders intended to
transfer responsibility for operations in Somalia back to UN authority upon breaking
the famine, they believed it prudent to make that desired name change.35 Throughout
these evolutions, most of the media—within the United States and internationally—
continued to refer to the undertaking as “RESTORE HOPE.” In short, “UNITAF” became
the command designator, while RESTORE HOPE served as the operational name. In
General Johnston’s words, “Restore Hope was the message we were trying to send.”36
Although intended as a mission of mercy, RESTORE HOPE had authority for first use of
deadly force to ensure the success of its mission and the protection of its personnel.
Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations, which use a minimal number of troops
and place strict limitation on the application of military power, RESTORE HOPE would
operate in concert with the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force and
under rules of engagement that allowed expeditious use of weapons when necessary.37
Nonetheless, Americans going ashore for RESTORE HOPE—like those in EASTERN EXIT
and PROVIDE RELIEF—did not view combat operations as their primary purpose. In
fact, Johnston stated before leaving for Mogadishu that the mission would be strictly
humanitarian and would use force only to protect troops and food convoys. To the
consternation of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, this declaration appeared to narrow
the intentionally broad Security Council Resolution 794. It also seemed to moderate
the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force, as least as far as the use of fire-
power was concerned.38 Yet this policy of self-restraint in the use of weapons was con-
sistent with the humanitarian purpose of the mission.
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Obviously, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force had a limited appli-
cation in the amorphous world of relief operations. One area where the concept played
an important role involved the development of a clearly defined and specific mission
statement, coupled with a definite exit strategy. In this case, that meant a rapid transfer
of responsibility to the UN once UNITAF had broken the famine.39 Within this context,
U.S. leaders planned on a short-term, limited mission that focused on distributing food
and saving lives.40 UN leaders, however—particularly Boutros-Ghali—wanted a long-
term U.S. commitment, including an assertive role in restoring political and social sta-
bility. Boutros-Ghali’s expectations included the disarmament of clans, militias, and
gangs by the American-led force, as well as an active attempt at nation building.41 But
American commanders would go no farther than to require the factions to keep crew-
served weapons and technicals within cantonment areas and to confiscate weapons
found within prohibited areas or directly threatening to UNITAF members.42 This pol-
icy—occasionally enforced with combat action—did remove some of the most power-
ful weapons from the environment and contribute to a more stable situation during
RESTORE HOPE.43
General Hoar wanted full authority to act forcefully under Chapter VII when necessary
but did not want orders that required him to conduct a general disarmament. Since
rifles and assault weapons were pervasive throughout the operational area, full disar-
mament would be possible only by means of door-to-door and person-by-person
searches, creating constant confrontations with both organized and unorganized bands
of fighters. That would far exceed the mission conceived by American commanders and
lead to numerous casualties.44 Besides, Hoar pointed out, “We were having a very bad
time disarming warlords in Los Angeles and New York and it was less likely we could
do it in Mogadishu.”45 Hoar did support and enforce a selective disarmament should it
be necessary in order to accomplish the mission or protect UNITAF forces. The can-
tonment of heavy weapons and enforcement of that policy by inspections, along with
weapons sweeps when the security situation demanded, fit within his criteria, whereas
general disarmament did not.46
American leaders understood the Secretary-General’s perspective regarding disarma-
ment and the need to deal with deep-rooted problems within Somalia. They also recog-
nized that the solution to Somalia’s problems required a long-term commitment that
would address humanitarian relief, economic recovery, and political stability. But that,
they felt, should occur through a follow-on effort under UN leadership and not as part
of the RESTORE HOPE mission.47 RESTORE HOPE would focus on creating a secure envi-
ronment for delivery of relief supplies, thereby breaking the grip of famine in the coun-
try. To accomplish this, UNITAF would secure major air and seaports, control certain
key installations, protect major food distribution points, and ensure free passage for
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delivery of relief supplies.48 Beyond that, UNITAF would transfer operations to UN-
controlled forces, under a command that later became UNOSOM II. In other words,
UNITAF would solve the short-term crisis, and UNOSOM II would address long-term
problems.49 American leaders hoped to effect this transfer of responsibility by March
1993 (there had even been some early talk of 20 January—inauguration day); in the
event, it did not happen until May.50
As it became clear in late November 1992 that President Bush was moving toward a
commitment in Somalia, Central Command created JTF Somalia under command of
General Johnston, who also commanded I MEF, headquartered at Camp Pendleton,
California. I MEF would provide the core headquarters and a substantial portion of the
forces committed to JTF Somalia and its successor commands (CTF Somalia and
UNITAF). As the JTF commander, Johnston reported to General Hoar, who served
directly under the secretary of defense and thus the NCA.51 Concurrent with the presi-
dent’s decision-making process
and the planning at Central
Command, the State Depart-
ment established a U.S. Liaison
Office (USLO) in Mogadishu
to coordinate among various
American and UN entities and
indigenous political factions
within Somalia.
The president selected Robert
A. Oakley—who had earlier
served as ambassador to
Somalia and knew key military
and political leaders—to head the USLO, with the rank of ambassador.52 Oakley’s
résumé included duty in Vietnam and Lebanon as well as service with the United
States Institute of Peace, where he had chaired studies on peacekeeping and the
Somalia crisis. In his role as special representative to Somalia, Oakley would work
closely with Johnston and other key officials to achieve U.S. objectives during
RESTORE HOPE.53 Oakley arrived in Mogadishu on 7 December and immediately set
out to persuade the major political and military leaders to cooperate with the
American-led forces soon to arrive in Mogadishu.54
General Johnston had known by late November that I MEF would probably lead the
U.S. mission to Somalia once the president made a firm commitment. This would be a
logical choice, since the headquarters and major subordinate elements had conducted
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exercises for this type of operation in the recent past. Additionally, I MEF was struc-
tured, trained, equipped, and manned for expeditionary operations, as its name
implies.55 In a discussion with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E.
Mundy, Jr., Johnston learned that Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni was available to
support the operation as a member of the I MEF staff. Mundy had first coordinated
with General Hoar, who immediately blessed the idea of bringing General Zinni into
the operation. Hoar served with Zinni in Vietnam and had a very high regard for his
professionalism.56
Johnston considered Zinni the “number one warfighter in the Marine Corps” and the
prospect of his services as the J-3 (operations) officer for Operation RESTORE HOPE an
“absolutely priceless offer that I would not refuse.”57 Johnston saw Zinni as not only a
Marine officer of solid reputation but also one who had recent experience in humani-
tarian operations. Zinni had participated in CTF PROVIDE COMFORT at the end of
DESERT STORM, serving as chief of staff under Lieutenant General John M.
Shalikashvili—a future chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.58 That operation had pro-
tected, sheltered, and fed some five hundred thousand Kurds in the rugged terrain
along the Iraqi-Turkish border after a failed rebellion against Saddam Hussein.59
PROVIDE COMFORT had saved thousands of lives and created conditions that eventually
allowed the Kurds to return to their homes. The primary work of CTF PROVIDE
COMFORT occurred during the spring and summer of 1991 but continued through
1997 and ultimately evolved into Operation NORTHERN WATCH, which remained in
effect until 2003.60
After returning to the United States in May 1992, Zinni served as deputy commander
of Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) at Quantico, Virginia.
Knowing in November 1992 that a decision on Somalia was imminent and I MEF the
likely candidate to lead the operation, Zinni suggested that his experience could con-
tribute to the effort. This suited his immediate superior, Lieutenant General Charles C.
Krulak—a future Commandant of the Marine Corps—who wanted to make MCCDC
more relevant and valuable to the operating forces of the Marine Corps. He believed
that offering Zinni’s services for the Somalia operation would be a move in that direc-
tion. After discussions with Commandant Mundy and General Johnston, Zinni joined
the I MEF staff in early December, just days before it deployed to Somalia. General
Mundy had intended for Zinni to serve as chief of staff, but Johnston wanted him as
director of operations (J-3). Although J-3 was technically a lower-level position, the
arrangement proved satisfactory to Zinni, who held Johnston in very high esteem and
“would rather do operations than anything else.”61
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Planning is the key to success in all operations, despite the fact that no plan is ever exe-
cuted as written.62 But without a plan, there is no basis for action, there are no troops
for maneuvering, no weapons for fighting, no equipment for working, no logistics for
sustainment, and no means for communicating. Even if all this is available, without a
plan they will not be in the right configuration, at the right places at the right times,
and could not move when and where needed. Planning—as every officer in the U.S.
services knows—is both continuous and concurrent. Although deliberate planning is
the primary model, the Somalia operation required crisis-action planning, as do so
many operations that naval expeditionary forces conduct.63 In fact, Johnston—one of
the most experienced and professional officers in the U.S. military—has stated, “In
thirty-five years I cannot think of ever executing a deliberate plan.” He also contends
that Marines and sailors are at their best in crisis-action planning.64 Throughout this
process, constant deliberations occur at various levels, providing a flow of information
well before decisions become final.
In preparing for the Somalia commitment, leaders conducted discussions in Washing-
ton while planning occurred simultaneously at Central Command, I MEF, and lower
levels of command.65 As the president and his advisers made key decisions and created
policy guidance for the Somalia operation, Central Command hammered out an oper-
ation plan in conjunction with the JTF Somalia/I MEF future-planning cell. Although
officially established on 25 November 1992, the future-planning cell for Somalia actu-
ally began work as early as 20 November. On 1 December, the NCA issued a warning
order for the Somalia incursion, and an execution order followed on 5 December. Cen-
tral Command issued its operation order the following day.66
By the time the warning order from the NCA reached Central Command, General
Hoar, for the most part, already knew what it would contain and had an operation
order well on the way to completion. In fact, Generals Hoar and Powell, acting under
guidance from the secretary of defense, made all high-level military decisions through-
out the planning phase.67 Similarly, no surprises greeted Johnston and the I MEF staff
when they received directives from Central Command, because they had contributed to
their development. The skills that Navy and Marine Corps officers develop through the
rapid planning process during short-notice amphibious operations contributed to this
effort, by ensuring the most efficient use of limited time. The operation order that
resulted involved a four-phase approach to executing RESTORE HOPE.68 The first phase
entailed gaining control of key objectives in Mogadishu and then rapidly moving into
Baledogle and Baidoa; phase II involved occupying relief centers at Belet Uen, Oddur,
and Gialalassi; phase III included capturing the port and airfield at Kismayo, securing
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Bardera, and establishing control of the land route between Baidoa and Bardera; and
phase IV involved the transfer of responsibility from UNITAF to a UN peacekeeping
force, which would be known as UNOSOM II.69
Ambassador Oakley proposed that he, or key members of his team, would precede each
major move into a new area and prepare local communities for the arrival of UNITAF
forces.70 This included coordination with local leaders and a cross section of the popu-
lation to explain the impending action and seek cooperation.71 Oakley’s approach was
implemented and proved very effective in gaining acceptance of, and even participation
in, the relief activity by residents and refugees in many of the affected areas.72 In the
event, Oakley felt secure when he went into these areas, because of the presence of
naval aircraft from carriers offshore. He later stated, “I’d go into these places first. But
with aircraft overhead, I didn’t have anything to worry about.”73
The operation plan for RESTORE HOPE envisioned a timeline of 90–180 days for
achieving the objectives of phases I through III. American leaders hoped to be out of
Somalia no later than March 1993, which would occur at about the ninety-day point.
Of course, the worst-case scenario envisioned that the plan could take twice that long.
(As things turned out, UNITAF accomplished all objectives well ahead of schedule,
making it theoretically possible to transfer control before the ninety-day period and
meet the goal of a March departure.74 But other factors were to intervene, and UNITAF
would not actually be able to terminate operations and transfer command to
UNOSOM II until May.) Additionally, in negotiating a transition, the United States
agreed to leave American elements in Somalia to provide a quick-reaction force (QRF)
and ongoing logistical support for UN operations. Ultimately, this provision was to
embroil the United States in Somalia’s internal conflict.75
Despite efficient communications among levels of authority and good cooperation in
the planning process during November and December 1992, the entire effort was
highly compressed, causing everyone to operate on short timelines.76 After the presi-
dent announced his commitment to send forces into Somalia, Johnston, Zinni, and the
staff at I MEF had little time to complete the planning that would initiate the flow of
personnel and material under the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System
(JOPES) necessary to accomplish the mission.77 The initial lodgment in Somalia would
be conducted by the Tripoli ARG, which had been positioned offshore at Mogadishu.78
Captain John W. Peterson served as commodore of the ARG and Colonel Gregory S.
Newbold commanded the embarked Marines. The Tripoli ARG would provide a spear-
head for the leading elements of JTF Somalia.79 The landing needed to be closely coor-
dinated with the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies that followed to ensure a
fluid, efficient, and professional operation. It would be unimpressive to Somali
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warlords if a lag occurred between the arrival of the amphibious force in Mogadishu
and the follow-on echelons. To have the best possible effect, the operation needed to
occur rapidly and forcefully. The flexibility of the Navy and Marine Corps team and the
competence of the commanders within the ARG made this possible, in the opinion of
Johnston.80
During October 1992—after completing its predeployment training in California—
the Tripoli ARG departed U.S. waters for the Indian Ocean. Regrettably, it fell short of
having a full naval expeditionary force on the model of the Navy and Marine Corps
team (Tarawa ARG/11th MEU [SOC]) that inserted the Pakistani peacekeepers in
September 1992 during Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. The Navy had initially proposed a
two-ship naval element for this deployment, rather than the traditional four-ship
amphibious task force (ATF).81 Navy leaders wanted to relieve the pressure on their sail-
ors created by the high operational tempo resulting from the recent DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM operations.82 Although a worthy goal, this policy severely reduced
shipping available to the operating forces and deprived the nation of an adequate
forward-deployed, ready-response capability. To Peterson, Newbold, and many other
interested parties, this arrangement was unconscionable. Should they be committed to
a fight having only the combat strength available from two amphibious ships, it could
result in embarrassment to the nation and unnecessary loss of young American lives.83
General Johnston fiercely argued against this option, taking his case to Lieutenant Gen-
eral H. C. (Hank) Stackpole III, Commander, Marine Forces Pacific/Commanding
General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. The two commanders that would take the ARG to
sea, Colonel Newbold and Captain Peterson, also protested up their chains of com-
mand, with the issue ultimately getting the attention of the Commandant of the
Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations.84 Because of all this effort, U.S.
Pacific Fleet headquarters reluctantly acquiesced and agreed to source a three-ship
force. A three-ship ATF is able to deploy a full MEU (SOC) if among the vessels is one
of the larger and more capable LHA or LHD amphibious assault ships.85 Unfortunately,
none of these “big decks” were available, due to turn-around times and long-range
scheduling issues. Peterson and Newbold would have to make due with the older and
less capable LPH. When an LPH served as the centerpiece of an ARG, it required three
additional amphibious ships to load a full MEU.86
Although restoring one ship to Peterson’s squadron constituted somewhat of a moral
victory for the operating forces, Peterson and Newbold would deploy to the Indian
Ocean with an ARG that would still be one ship under strength.87 This reduction in lift
capacity caused the Marines to have shortages in transportation, engineering equip-
ment, aviation assets, logistics, and manpower. A traditional MEU would deploy with
2,000–2,200 Marines and sailors, whereas Newbold would have only 1,850. Although
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trained to full MEU (SOC) standards, the shortage of Marines and equipment obvi-
ously meant that Newbold did not have full MEU (SOC) mission capability.88 Even
though the ARG could deploy and execute some missions, the shortage of men and
equipment strained the capacity of Newbold’s headquarters, logistics, communications,
and combat power. This limited his ability to mitigate unintended events and left the
MEU with no reserve capability.89
In an awkward and inadequate effort to compensate, the Navy assigned a ship from
Maritime Prepositioned Ships Squadron Three (MPSRon 3) operating out of the
Mariana Islands to join Peterson in the Indian Ocean.90 That ship—USNS 1st
Lieutenant Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011)—contained valuable operational equipment and
supplies that would be available to the Marines, but required a benign, deepwater port
facility for off-loading.91 It also required a fly-in naval support echelon to conduct the
offload once in port.92 The contents of Lummus would therefore not be available during
the early stages of an operation. Additionally, Lummus had not been available to partic-
ipate in the predeployment workups off California and could not operate tactically
with the amphibious ships.93 In other words, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
ship could not contribute to the initial power projection that is critically important in
all amphibious operations.94 Of course, the equipment, ammunition, food, water, and
spare parts available in large quantities on board Lummus would be of great value once
off-loaded later in the campaign.95
Not having a fully structured ATF, Peterson properly designated his squadron as an
amphibious task unit (ATU) in a “3 + 1” configuration, with USS Tripoli serving as the
flagship.96 Marine Corps authorities designated Newbold’s unit an SPMAGTF, thereby
emphasizing its reduced capability.97 If Newbold’s unit had been able to deploy at full
strength in personnel and equipment, it would have been designated 15th MEU (SOC).
As a result, many pundits have referred to it as 15th MEU in their writings. But this
gives an inaccurate impression of the capability of that unit and wrongly implies an
acceptance of deploying suboptimal naval expeditionary forces. The suggestion by
some senior officers that the reduced ATU/SPMAGTF could call for additional assets
should a crisis occur during the deployment seemed the epitome of naiveté to
Newbold. In his words, “Crises don’t wait for adequate forces—you meet the crisis with
what you have.”98 Yet in October 1992, this understrength, underequipped, and under-
manned amphibious force with its odd mix of ships constituted the leading edge of
American power in the region and at the time that America needed them for Operation
RESTORE HOPE.99 Generals Hoar and Johnston would have to depend on this force to
take and prepare the ground in Mogadishu—a very uncertain environment—for
arrival of American and coalition units that would constitute UNITAF.
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Despite having reduced capability, the Navy and Marine Corps team proved equal to
the mission in Somalia because it met very little resistance during landing operations.
Additionally, in keeping with the amphibious culture of the U.S. sea services, the
Phillips and Hagee team on the Tarawa ARG maintained close communications with
Peterson and Newbold before they arrived on station. This provided some orientation
regarding the city of Mogadishu and a frame of reference for operations in and around
its airport.100 Equally important, Peterson, Newbold, and their blended staffs had devel-
oped a strong, efficient, and professional relationship, which helped overcome deficien-
cies inherent in their suboptimized force.101 Nonetheless, Newbold considered his forces
spread “very, very thin” at certain locations during the early period of the Mogadishu
operation.102
Operation RESTORE HOPE began in Somalia on 9 December 1992. Navy SEALs and
Marine reconnaissance units from the Tripoli ARG landed in the early morning hours,
followed shortly thereafter by the full strength of Newbold’s SPMAGTF. Newbold’s tac-
tical operation plan specified four objectives his Marines would quickly capture: the
main airport, the port facilities, coastal sites suitable for landing beaches, and the U.S.
embassy, which had been abandoned since the evacuation in January 1991.103 The oper-
ation also called for the surface landing to occur at GREEN Beach (as planners named
the landing site) and then push on inland to capture the embassy. Upon arriving, the
Marines found the newest—and at one time the most beautiful—American facility in
that part of the word a filthy wreck.104 Indeed, all of Mogadishu had suffered the rav-
ages of war, reminding many Americans of the images of bombed-out European cities
during and immediately after World War II.105
The Marines and sailors of the Tripoli ARG had very little information about the sit-
uation ashore as they prepared for their landing. Although Peterson and Newbold
had included Mogadishu as a notional target during some of their training exercises
back in California, they did not anticipate actually operating within Somalia when
they departed U.S. waters.106 In fact, by the time they reached Singapore, Central
Command had placed the ARG on alert for a possible humanitarian operation in
Bangladesh, not Somalia. But by 24 November, the prospect of an involvement in
Bangladesh had diminished, and the two commanders began receiving indication
that an operation in Somalia might be in the offing.107 As they started planning for
that prospective mission, Peterson and Newbold realized they had very little updated
information on the situation and even less insight into the cultural dynamics of
Somalia and its people. The knowledge they received from the Tarawa ARG was help-
ful, but far from being the detailed and current information needed for mission plan-
ning. The officers of the SPMAGTF were desperate for good maps, information on
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the combatants, satellite photos, and other such material regarding the operational
environment.108 The intelligence material they did receive tended to be outdated,
irrelevant, repetitive, and of such a high volume that it was very difficult to sort
through.109 More significantly, Somalia had been an intelligence vacuum since the
EASTERN EXIT evacuation in January 1991. There simply was not much current infor-
mation available, and as a result, both Peterson and Newbold considered themselves
astoundingly ignorant about the environment they were entering.110 For this and other
reasons, the commanders were amazed when they arrived offshore at Mogadishu in the
middle of the night on 2 December 1992 to find the largest city in Somalia completely
dark due to lack of electricity.111 Equally surprising, the sky over Mogadishu would
occasionally light up with the eruption of gunfire and tracer rounds. They later learned
that this nightly custom resulted in great part from random acts of violence conducted
by youths after daylong bouts of chewing khat.112
For two nights prior to the landing, Peterson sent SEAL teams to reconnoiter the near
shore of GREEN Beach, the prospective landing site just south of the city. He also sent
teams to assess an alternate landing site, named BLUE Beach north of the harbor, and
ordered swimmers into the port area. Peterson needed substantial information to lay
out the beach approaches because he considered the charts available for that part of the
world abysmal. He tasked the SEALs with providing information relating to currents,
tides, coral heads, vertical faces, and other hydrographic aspects of the potential land-
ing sites. During reconnaissance of the port area, Peterson’s swimmers also observed
the security procedures for its defense, concluding that the landing force could take the
entire port area very quickly.113 After the landing occurred, Peterson had the SEAL
teams conduct a thorough hydrographic survey of the port and harbor to prepare for
the movement of numerous U.S. and coalition ships needed to support Operation
RESTORE HOPE.114
The general division of labor regarding reconnaissance for the amphibious force had
SEALs conducting surveillance within the water and near shore, and Marine force
reconnaissance units surveying shore-based areas. Unfortunately, the ARG could not
get permission from Central Command or Washington to insert SEAL or reconnais-
sance teams until 6 December despite continued requests starting on 2 December when
they first arrived offshore.115 The SEALs conducted two days of work in the water prior
to the landing and joined Marine force reconnaissance units as advance elements of the
landing force. The only “boots on the ground” insertions for Marine reconnaissance
units prior to D-day involved a team sent into Mogadishu the night before the landing
to conduct liaison with the Pakistani battalion.116
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The sailors and Marines in the Tripoli ARG knew Somalia to be a very violent place.
The sight of nightly firefights in Mogadishu reinforced that awareness and created
questions among members of the landing force about what might happen during the
amphibious operation.117 In that respect Peterson and Newbold labored in what Gen-
eral Hoar referred to as “that twilight area between peace and war”; they had no way of
knowing for sure what would happen upon landing.118 They were neither politically nor
culturally knowledgeable about the current situation, and they had no opportunity to
improve their understanding before going ashore.119 The intelligence obtained by SEAL
teams during their reconnaissances provided only physical information about the
hydrography, harbors, and beaches. The violence in Mogadishu and uncertainty as to
the attitudes of various Somali factions and clans caused many members of the landing
force to go ashore expecting a possible shoot-out.120
The scheme of maneuver for the amphibious operation involved a simultaneous sur-
face landing over GREEN Beach, a helicopter insertion at the airport, and a Zodiac
soft-boat attack to secure the port and harbor.121 When the landing force went ashore
at GREEN Beach, Peterson attempted to watch from the bridge of Tripoli, despite the
darkness of early morning. At H-hour he observed what appeared to be a massive
firefight from the landing beach. Peterson immediately called sick bay and ordered it
“to stand by for casualties,” explaining, “We have a giant firefight on our hands.”
Shortly after giving the alert, Peterson’s chief of staff suggested, “Commodore, I think
that might be flashbulbs.” The international press had gotten word of the landing and
had awaited the Marines and SEALs at GREEN Beach to capture the event on camera.
The situation offered the potential for disaster, since nobody in the landing force had
expected such reception ashore and, as noted, even thought it possible that there would
be resistance.122
For many people, the beach episode amounted to little more than an amusing—though
embarrassing—occurrence at the nexus of world events. Some leaders even considered
the incident a good way to advertise America power and demonstrate its capability.123
But to others it represented an act of gross irresponsibility. Peterson and Newbold had
welcomed a large number of media representatives on board Tripoli the day before the
landing and provided them a detailed briefing on the operation. The media personnel
had then been sequestered and not allowed outgoing communications until the opera-
tion had taken place. But other members of the press had remained ashore and learned
the exact time and location for the beach landing. Apparently, well intended American
officials back in Washington—who hoped for some good publicity about the incur-
sion—had alerted the press but failed to inform the Tripoli ARG that they had done
so.124 No one in the landing force or on board the ships had any idea the press would be
there. Peterson and Newbold were livid, feeling the incident brought into question the
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situational awareness of many high-level leaders in Washington.125 Did they have any
idea what they were getting into in Somalia? Conversely, Peterson and Newbold also
felt that the incident demonstrated the quality and discipline of the enlisted personnel
and junior officers. Highly professional and trained for combat, they had gone into an
uncertain environment and had been surprised by klieg lights and flashbulbs, and yet
they had been able to think on their feet, assess the situation, and restrain the impulse
to fire. In Peterson’s words, “To this day, I’m amazed that they didn’t blow away a num-
ber of the international press.”126
The two main factions that American leaders needed to co-opt during RESTORE HOPE
were those belonging to Aideed and to Ali Mahdi. Ambassador Oakley and General
Libutti—who had returned to Somalia to work with the ambassador just days before
the landing operation—conducted several meetings with the warlords to procure their
cooperation during the landings and subsequent operations ashore.127 This cooperation
included acceptance of the ongoing aircraft flights and ship traffic that would bring in
the follow-on forces and deliver equipment and supplies to support the operation.128
But numerous other clans, subclans, gangs, and thugs not controlled by Aideed or Ali
Mahdi also existed in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia. Their existence created
enormous uncertainty for leaders unfamiliar with the current political situation and
the conflict among major factions within the operational area. Tapping into a knowl-
edgeable resource, Oakley established his USLO headquarters in the Conoco com-
pound, making use of the firm’s local executive, Raymond Marchand, before and
during the early phase of the U.S. incursion.129 As seen above, Marchand and his staff
had already provided important service to the United States and now continued to be
valuable, providing facilities, assistance with travel into dangerous areas, and help in
communicating with local chieftains.130 Libutti’s prior relationship with key Somali
players, such as Osman Ato, also aided in this regard. Libutti helped smooth the way for
the initial incursion and continued working with Oakley and his staff for several weeks
thereafter.131 In addition to assisting with security, he helped establish an effective liai-
son relationship between Oakley’s USLO and the growing military structure, which
included Johnston, Zinni, Newbold, and the other high military officials arriving on
the scene.132
Despite the media fiasco during the landing and a brief and ineffectual resistance at the
port, the landing force quickly secured all of the D-day objectives.133 Newbold was
aware of the efforts of Oakley and Libutti to persuade the major warlords not to resist
the landing or the subsequent incursion. In fact, Newbold and Libutti had intermittent
contact before the 9 December landing. Nevertheless, Newbold was unaware of the
results of Libutti’s efforts and so had to be concerned that unaffiliated rogue elements
might try to test his forces. Being a prudent commander, Newbold “planned for the
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worst and prayed for the
best.”134 By moving aggres-
sively with speed and
determination, he over-
whelmed and deterred any
potential opposition.135
Once Newbold—who
accompanied the initial
landing wave on the
beach—had visited all
four objectives and deter-
mined they were secure,
he transferred command
ashore; at that point
Peterson assumed a sup-
porting role.136 The
SPMAGTF then prepared
to hand over control of Mogadishu to incoming forces of the 1st Marine Division,
under Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, and then to move on quickly to capture
Baledogle and Baidoa in accordance with the operation plan. The early capture of
Baledogle proved particularly important, because it provided an additional airfield for
the strategic airlift of military personnel, as well as needed “bed-down” space for U.S.
tactical aircraft.137 Wilhelm arrived in Somalia with a relatively small staff on 11
December and assumed duties as the Marine Forces commander under Johnston’s
component organizational structure. Newbold and his SPMAGTF would come under
Wilhelm’s command for the remainder of their time in Somalia.138
During the amphibious
landing at Mogadishu
and subsequent opera-
tions ashore, F-14 Tom-
cat and A-6 Intruder
aircraft from USS Ranger
(CV 61) provided air
cover for the Marines and
coalition forces. These air
missions could provide
close air support for
troops on the ground
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should conditions dic-
tate the need. They also
reminded all parties in
Mogadishu of the
immense power avail-
able to the task force.
Equally important,
Ranger provided imag-
ing of the operational
area—particularly,
beach and city views—
from F-14s equipped
with Tactical Aerial
Reconnaissance Photo System (TARPS) pods.139 Ranger furnished this imagery to Tri-
poli for distribution to Marine commanders in the field.140
Prior to the Somalia incursion, the Ranger battle group had operated in the Persian
Gulf, where its planes enforced the no-fly zone over southern Iraq (Operation
SOUTHERN WATCH).141 During the early days of December, it became clear in the minds
of many American leaders—particularly General Hoar at Central Command and
Admiral Jeremiah at the Joint Chiefs of Staff—that it made no sense to put twenty-
eight thousand American troops ashore in Africa without air cover. After discussions at
Central Command headquarters between Hoar and his naval component commander,
Vice Admiral Douglas J. Katz, the NAVCENT commander ordered the Ranger battle
group, commanded by Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, to support Operation
RESTORE HOPE.142 Just prior to the 9 December landing, Hancock arrived on the scene
and met with Peterson and Newbold aboard Tripoli. In addition to coordinating sup-
port for the operation, he attempted to identify areas where the capabilities of his battle
group could complement the plan and assets of Peterson and Newbold.143
As a result of this meeting, Hancock placed all his F-14s and A-6s in a standby status
loaded with five-hundred-pound laser-guided bombs. All flights supporting the land-
ing or subsequent operations ashore would have airplanes with five-hundred-pound
bombs under each wing available to the Marines and coalition forces should the need
arise. During the first several days of Operation RESTORE HOPE, Hancock cycled his
entire air wing through patrol duty, focusing on recognizing roads, observing force
concentrations, and identifying built-up areas, a process that familiarized his aircrews
with the layout of the country.144 Through the energetic use of his carrier assets, Han-
cock made a significant contribution to the safety and success of the amphibious
operation. His support would continue to have an impact as coalition forces began
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arriving at Mogadishu airport and moving to locations throughout central and south-
ern Somalia.145
For Peterson and Newbold, the entire operation—from training in California through
establishing command ashore in Somalia—validated the efficacy of existing tactical
doctrine, the emerging strategic and operational concepts as articulated in . . . From the
Sea, and two hundred years of naval tradition, notwithstanding an ARG hamstrung by
inadequate force allocation. Just as Peterson’s Tripoli ARG and Newbold’s SPMAGTF
embodied the tenets of . . . From the Sea, so too did Hancock’s Ranger battle group
exemplify the emerging concept “Forward . . . From the Sea.” The complementary use
of the amphibious ready group in conjunction with the aircraft carrier battle group
foreshadowed the formalization of that coequal relationship—coupled with the reaffir-
mation of the traditional Navy and Marine Corps relationship—expressed two years
later in the Department of the Navy concept paper Forward . . . From the Sea.146
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Operation RESTORE HOPE
Operations and Transition
The quick success of the special-purpose marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF) on
9 December 1992 permitted a synchronized flow of U.S. and coalition forces into the
operational area to begin almost immediately. Generals Johnston and Zinni, along with
key staff officers, arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December and established headquarters
in the remains of the American embassy.1 Their immediate task was to supervise the
complex deployment and logistical activity that would determine the efficiency of
Operation RESTORE HOPE. Concurrently, they recognized the importance of addressing
political and military issues that would also have great effects on their mission.
Johnston, Oakley, and UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani arranged a meeting
with Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and their top aides for the following day.2 Despite some inevi-
table bickering, the meeting’s participants agreed on a variety of issues, including a
strategy to secure the newly organized humanitarian relief sectors established as part of
the RESTORE HOPE plan.3 More important, in Oakley’s view, “the Somalis reached a
seven-point agreement on a cease-fire, free movements in the city, removal of
‘technicals’ and militias from the city and to designated locations, and establishing a
joint committee on security matters.”4 Oakley would later believe that the work of this
security committee was the key to the low casualties and relative stability that were to
mark RESTORE HOPE. All principal leaders participated in the new committee’s meet-
ings, either personally or through highly placed representatives, permitting the devel-
opment of relationships and the sharing of information. In Oakley’s words, “We
decided the top priority was going to be dialog, followed by the threat of force, and
very, very rarely, the use of force.”5 General Hoar shared Oakley’s view of the impor-
tance of information sharing. Although he felt confident in the ability of UNITAF
forces to handle any necessary actions, Hoar wanted to avoid “a misunderstanding
where we found people shooting at one another because they were unaware of what it
was they were trying to do.”6 When UNITAF later transitioned into UNOSOM II, the
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committee ceased to exist, and when it did, communication between the parties virtu-
ally ended.7
As Oakley, Johnston, Wilhelm, and Newbold worked to make things happen on the
ground in Somalia, U.S. and coalition forces flowed into the Mogadishu airport, and
their supporting equipment and supplies arrived at the port. Yet by December 1992,
just when UNITAF operations needed these facilities the most, conditions had deterio-
rated so much in Mogadishu that use of the seaport and airfield had become problem-
atic. For example, no ground-controlled approach (GCA) capability existed at the main
airfield. During the early stages of the operation—before the Air Force airfield kit and
radars arrived in Somalia—Johnston had to depend on Admiral Hancock’s Ranger bat-
tle group to furnish services normally provided by a Joint Force Air Component Com-
mander. Hancock utilized his E-2C Hawkeye aircraft to supply theatre air control in
support of the C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy flights, and he placed his Aegis cruiser
(USS Valley Forge) close to shore, where it could provide the GCA. The E-2Cs also sup-
ported ground convoy operations with airborne communications relay, while simulta-
neously conducting the air control mission.8 Johnston believed that “the value of the
carrier was priceless,” both for the aircraft it could put in the sky during operations and
for its control of air operations during the early days of RESTORE HOPE.9
A well synchronized and efficient off-loading of the maritime prepositioning ships
(and other ships with valuable cargoes) would be critical for supporting and sustaining
the operational forces. For this crucial job, Johnston selected a naval officer he held in
the highest regard: Rear Admiral James B. Perkins III.10 Perkins and his staff of twelve
officers also arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December, shortly after General Johnston. In
his normal duties, Perkins commanded Amphibious Group 3 (PhibGru 3), located in
San Diego, California. PhibGru 3 supported I MEF deployments by assigning and
training the ships and sailors that team with West Coast MEU(SOC)s for deployment
to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.11 All but one of the officers Perkins brought to Soma-
lia were members of his PhibGru 3 staff.12 Johnston and Perkins had great respect for
each other and developed a strong professional and personal relationship, working out
of their respective headquarters at Camp Pendleton and San Diego.13 Perkins was a pro-
fessional naval officer in every sense; Johnston considered him a “real gunfighter” and
“as much a Marine as a Marine could be.” (Johnston meant that as a compliment, of
course, although he was not sure that Perkins would so take it, being such a dedicated
Navy officer.) Johnston admired Perkins’s “can-do attitude” and considered him a true
“champion” of RESTORE HOPE.14
In Mogadishu, Perkins would take charge of and operate the port facility, off-load
ships, and coordinate issues afloat for Johnston and his command.15 Overseeing port
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operations would prove a challenge, because Maritime Prepositioned Ships Squadron 2
(MPSRon 2) had set sail with three ships from Diego Garcia for Mogadishu on 7 Decem-
ber.16 USNS 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus—from MPSRon 3, on Guam—had already
arrived in the operational area with the Tripoli ARG. It entered the port of Mogadishu
on 11 December; Perkins and his team began off-loading it at the earliest opportunity.17
All these ships were part of the U.S. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), thirty-four
ships stationed around the world under control of the Military Sealift Command
(MSC). The MPF consists of three distinct elements—sixteen ships supporting the
Marine Corps, ten larger ships that support the Army, and eight ships that support the
Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency. Ultimately, sixteen ships of the MPF
fleet delivered cargo for RESTORE HOPE.18 The MPF concept involved Marine Corps and
Army units designated to fly into crisis areas, where they would unite with equipment
and supplies delivered on the MPF ships.19 Of course, this requires a port, an airfield,
and a benign environment. If the port or airfield is under hostile control, the evolution
is still possible, but only if preceded by the forced entry of an expeditionary force. The
insertion of Newbold’s SPMAGTF into Mogadishu and its subsequent control of the
port and airfield is an example of this principle in action. Although the Somalia ven-
ture falls in the category of military operations other than war, the concept is applica-
ble across a broad range of military options.20
Perkins needed to off-load
the MPF ships in the port of
Mogadishu very quickly to
forward the equipment and
supplies necessary to support
the U.S. and coalition ele-
ments arriving daily at the
Mogadishu and Baledogle
airfields. He had not only to
synchronize off-loading
material with arriving mili-
tary units but also to coordi-
nate with the many
humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) regarding delivery of their own aid sup-
plies.21 Perkins had to accomplish this through a very small and dysfunctional port
facility that was too shallow to allow all the arriving vessels to enter.22 Yet within thirty-
five days, the admiral had off-loaded thirty-four military and fourteen civilian ships
while doubling the historical throughput of the port. This amounted to some 114,000
tons of supplies (39,700 tons of which were relief supplies), 6,668 vehicles, and 5.22
S O M A L I A . . . F R O M T H E S E A 9 9
Port of Mogadishu.
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:12:39 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
million gallons of fuel. The port of Mogadishu had been virtually inoperable when
Perkins arrived on the scene, but by the end of December it was among the busiest in
Africa.23 His off-loading of Lummus at the earliest possible time proved critical to
Newbold, who needed much of its equipment—especially the seven amphibious trac-
tors he immediately commandeered—if he were to move as quickly and robustly as his
mission required.24
Logistical support in the earliest days of RESTORE HOPE—before the off-loading of the
MPF ships—came in the form of material and equipment that arrived on the Tripoli ARG.
As Peterson and Newbold shared their assets with newly arriving forces and Admiral
Perkins off-loaded the MPF ships, Brigadier General Marvin T. Hopgood, Jr., com-
mander of 1st Force Service Support Group (Forward)—or 1st FSSG (Fwd.), an ele-
ment of I MEF—assumed command responsibility for support and sustainment of the
task force.25 By 27 January 1993 the U.S. Army Joint Task Force Support Command,
under Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon, USA, had assumed responsibility for sup-
porting UNITAF. This freed up approximately 2,700 Marines from Hopgood’s 1st FSSG
(Fwd.) to return to Camp Pendleton.26 At its height, Solomon’s operation consisted of
some 5,200 American personnel supporting a coalition force of over thirty-seven thou-
sand troops located throughout central and southern Somalia.27 Several thousands of
Solomon’s soldiers would remain in Somalia after the transition from UNITAF to
UNOSOM II.28 Perkins would continue to oversee port operations in Mogadishu for
about six weeks until relieved by the U.S. Army’s 7th Transportation Group, under the
command of Colonel Daniel L. Labin, USA.29
An unfortunate incident early in RESTORE HOPE illustrated the flexibility of naval
expeditionary forces. Shortly after the SPMAGTF had secured its objectives on D-day,
a company of the French Foreign Legion, about 150 strong, arrived at the Mogadishu
airfield, the first coalition unit on scene.30 Although its participation in RESTORE HOPE
had been coordinated at higher levels, Newbold learned of its planned arrival only the
day before his own landing. Newbold considered the legionnaires excellent troops and
assigned them to positions at the “Kilometer Four” traffic circle, which controlled the
roads between the port, airport, and embassy.31 This checkpoint, under a French lieuten-
ant and jointly manned by legionnaires and U.S. Marines, was there to prevent hostile
elements from approaching American and coalition positions. On one occasion, a vehi-
cle full of civilians drew near the checkpoint and, in apparent confusion, failed to
respond to commands to halt. French legionnaires and U.S. Marines are both very
sensitive to this type of situation, because some ten years earlier both services had suf-
fered large loss of life in Beirut, Lebanon, after failing to act decisively under similar
circumstances.32 The legionnaires and Marines opened fire, killing two Somali nationals
and wounding seven.33 Upon hearing the report, Peterson decided to bring the most
1 0 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:12:39 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
severely wounded casualties on board Tripoli,
which had the best medical facilities and sur-
gical teams within the ARG—within the
entire area, for that matter. After a series of
long surgical procedures, the Somalis
treated on Tripoli survived and eventually
recovered.34
Although a tragic event, the outcome of the
incident served a humanitarian purpose
while illustrating the confusion that existed
in the early period. It also illustrates the
value of sea-based medical facilities and the
importance of having them available at the
very beginning of an operation. At the time
this incident occurred, no U.S. Army or
coalition hospitals had yet arrived. The two
civilian hospitals in Mogadishu were in a
horrible condition and badly overburdened
with casualties.35 Without the facilities on board Tripoli and Peterson’s willingness to
make use of them, these Somali civilians would undoubtedly have died. Even as late in
the operation as 23 December 1992, American lives were to be saved only because of
the availability of medical facilities aboard Tripoli. In that instance, four American
officials operating independently and covertly east of Bardera struck a mine or impro-
vised explosive device, and Newbold’s Marines rescued them under fire. All had suf-
fered severe wounds, but three survived due to the medical treatment received on
board Tripoli.36
Among General Johnston’s first thoughts about RESTORE HOPE were plans for medical
support. Having no idea how violent the operation might become, he chose to provide
for a worst-case scenario. As task force commander, Johnston believed that “medical
care has got to be at the top of the shopping list.”37 Of course, other leaders shared his
concerns, including the Surgeon General of the Navy, who, with Johnston’s hearty con-
currence, personally selected Captain Michael L. Cowan to serve as surgeon for the
operation.38 Should conditions in Somalia become hostile, Johnston and his medical
planners did not want to have to fly casualties to an air-transportable clinic in
Mombasa.39 He wanted medical care facilities immediately at hand, either ashore or
afloat. The JTF planning staff attempted to obtain a Navy hospital ship, but none was
available, due to higher-priority missions—although it is difficult to understand what
could have been more important at that time.40 Johnston planned to establish an
S O M A L I A . . . F R O M T H E S E A 1 0 1
Somali being treated by U.S. Navy personnel.
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:12:40 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Army field hospital in Mogadishu as early as possible, but that option became prob-
lematic. The MSC ship that carried the hospital could not off-load due to the limita-
tions of the port of Mogadishu.41 Consequently, the hospital did not become available
for several weeks.
The inadequate conditions at the port of Mogadishu affected more than just the Army
hospital.42 Two LASH (lighter aboard ship) vessels, the SS Green Valley and SS Green Har-
bor, could not launch their preloaded lighters (barges) offshore due to sea conditions.43
The containerships SS Titus and SS Gibson could not enter the port because of their deep
drafts. These four vessels had to return to Diego Garcia, where they cross-decked their
cargo onto “handysize” ships capable of operating in the port of Mogadishu.44 The port
of Mogadishu had not only shallow water and limited berthing space but insufficient
staging room for cargo transfer. This made it especially critical to synchronize the off-
loading of material with the arrival of operational units for which it was intended, so as
not to clog the “lay-down” space in the port area.45
A standard ARG—in fact, even a reduced ARG like Peterson’s—has a superb medical
capability, although not normally staffed to support a force as large as UNITAF would
become. But it would have been possible to augment quickly the medical element on
board Tripoli enough to triple its casualty-handling capacity; this capability is an
important but often overlooked dimension of the Navy and Marine Corps team.
Fortunately, casualties during RESTORE HOPE were low, and expanding the medical
staffs on the amphibious ships proved unnecessary. Yet as with so many aspects of
expeditionary warfare, the best solution to the medical issue—at least in the early
stages—was to provide that critical function from the sea.46 Eventually, UNITAF head-
quarters established several military hospitals in Somalia, but the medical facilities
aboard Tripoli were available and used from the very outset, serving American and
coalition medical needs.47
In addition to the Navy’s contribution to medical support during RESTORE HOPE, the
U.S. Army deployed an evacuation company into Somalia from Germany. Led by Major
Pauline Knapp, whom Johnston described as a “dynamic commander with a ‘we can do
it’ attitude,” the 159th Air Ambulance Company of the 421st Medical Evacuation Bat-
talion used UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters in its rescue and evacuation missions.48
The Black Hawks represent a strong capability in an area where the Navy and Marine
Corps are a little “light”—powerful, fast, long-range medevac helicopters. Major Knapp
staged her Black Hawks at various locations in the operational area as the U.S. and
coalition troops extended their occupation of Somalia. The rapid-evacuation capability
of the Black Hawks, coupled with the presence of the ships of the ARG and later two
field hospitals ashore, ensured that casualties could be delivered to a surgeon’s care
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from anywhere in the operational area within an hour.49 The medical support of U.S.
and coalition forces during RESTORE HOPE demonstrated joint and combined opera-
tions at their very best.
As capability built up in the Mogadishu area, UNITAF elements branched out into the
countryside to occupy key locations and establish secure food-delivery routes.50 General
Zinni created eight humanitarian relief sectors—later increased to nine—during the
planning for RESTORE HOPE. These provided a structure for the military occupation of
the countryside and the
support of humanitarian
relief.51 In a traditional
military operation, plan-
ners would use such terms
as “zones of action” or
“tactical areas of responsi-
bility.” But Zinni had
learned during PROVIDE
COMFORT that it is best to
minimize military termi-
nology when working with
NGOs and civilians gener-
ally.52 Zinni named the sec-
tors after the major cities
within their respective
confines, configuring them
to address such concerns
as clan and political boundaries, military capabilities and span of control, lines of dis-
tribution and communications, and security.53
Even after the arrival of UNITAF and establishment of its control in the operational
environment, UNOSOM did not cease to exist. The Pakistani force under General
Shaheen and UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani continued to operate within its
designated area at the airport compound under Chapter VI peacekeeping rules.54 Its
original mission of guarding the airfield, port, and convoys had proved unsuccessful,
due to the resistance of Aideed and the inherent weakness of the peacekeeping force.55
Its light armament and restrictive ROE rendered the Pakistani battalion ineffective
against the more forceful militia of Aideed. Ironically, American leaders had to attempt
to bolster the UN operation while simultaneously eclipsing its function. Introduction
of the more robust UNITAF forces into the operational area reduced the relative stature
of UN peacekeepers. This resulted in friction and resentment, which exacerbated
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tensions already present from conflicting views over the scope and purpose of RESTORE
HOPE. Yet despite this situation, Oakley and Johnston believed it important to work
with Kittani and Shaheen, believing that UNOSOM would be the agency for transfer-
ring authority back to the UN once RESTORE HOPE terminated.56
The primary purposes of RESTORE HOPE were breaking the famine and saving lives.
UNITAF could make this possible through improved security and control of the envi-
ronment, but the humanitarian relief community had to accomplish the actual delivery
and preparation of food for suffering Somalis. Recognizing the importance of working
closely with NGOs and HROs from his experiences in PROVIDE COMFORT, General
Zinni directed that a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) be established and
made operational upon arrival in Somalia. Underscoring its importance, General
Johnston demanded that the leaders of the CMOC “get things going very fast.”57 Marine
colonel Kevin M. Kennedy—who had served as General Libutti’s highly effective chief
of staff during PROVIDE RELIEF and understood relief operations—would head the
UNITAF CMOC.58 Its staff came from soldiers of the Army’s 96th Civil Affairs Battal-
ion (Airborne) and Marine Corps personnel from Zinni’s J-3 organization. The funda-
mental purpose of the CMOC would be to coordinate UNITAF’s military support for
humanitarian operations.59 Among the first things on Kennedy’s agenda was connect-
ing with representatives of the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA) and its disaster assistance response teams (DARTs) to establish a system for
coordinating with the humanitarian relief organizations.60 The principal figures
involved in accomplishing this included Bill Garvelink and Kate Farnsworth, who
successively headed up the OFDA element in Somalia.61
The UN headquarters in Somalia operated a similar organization, called the Humani-
tarian Operations Center, or HOC, designed to coordinate relief and assistance
throughout the stricken areas of Somalia. Located at UNOSOM headquarters, the
HOC came under Philip Johnston, the UN coordinator of humanitarian operations.
Johnston also held the position of president and chief executive officer of the Coopera-
tive for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).62 Zinni and Kennedy agreed to
colocate the UNITAF CMOC with Philip Johnston’s HOC at UN headquarters to facili-
tate communications and coordination with the NGOs and HROs. The CMOC devel-
oped into an integral component of the HOC, with Philip Johnston at the head,
Kennedy the military deputy, and Garvelink (later Farnsworth) the civilian deputy.63
Despite some tension between UNOSOM and UNITAF, the HOC and CMOC arrange-
ment proved effective, because it focused on the mission and not prerogatives. Addi-
tionally, the officers and staff working within the HOC and CMOC made an effort to
overcome institutional and cultural differences, which can easily undercut the
effectiveness of such organizations.
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The HOC/CMOC operation included all interested parties (UN agencies, UNITAF,
NGOs, other HROs, ICRC, etc.) and established links to the various CMOCs within
each humanitarian relief sector.64 This arrangement produced invaluable communica-
tion, although the level of cooperation and effectiveness varied among the sectors, with
Mogadishu proving the most contentious and difficult. Not all NGOs—especially local
Somali organizations—felt they had full access to the CMOC or that their knowledge
was fully utilized to the benefit of the mission.65 Yet even with difficulties and imperfec-
tions, the HOC/CMOC concept proved effective in helping the relief community and
military forces accomplish their missions during RESTORE HOPE.66
Despite American leaders’ laserlike focus on the basic mission to end famine in Soma-
lia, a certain amount of “mission creep” occurred from the very beginning: such activ-
ity as engineering services to repair or rebuild roads, bridges, airfields, orphanages,
schools, and clinics; the reestablishment of the Somali police force; and assistance in
refugee resettlement.67 Although some of this work was mission critical, UNITAF went
beyond simply addressing the essentials.68 In the words of Brigadier General Hopgood,
“If it is good, if it is legal, and if it feels right and doesn’t hurt anybody, do it.”69 These
civic-action projects created goodwill for UNITAF among the population and with cer-
tain Somali leaders. The fact that UNITAF tried to avoid favoring any clan or faction
tended to reinforce the positive message. Generals Hoar and Johnston recognized the
value of goodwill, as is apparent in their self-imposed restraint on weapons use and rel-
atively liberal authorization of improvement projects. Even so, the commanders did
not intend to permit Somali factions or gangs to perpetrate violence or threaten
UNITAF forces. In the event, several incidents occurred that required military
responses to ill-advised actions against American troops.70
The first major incident occurred on 12 December, when U.S. helicopters received fire
from forces northwest of the American embassy compound. The helicopters returned
fire, destroying two technicals and damaging one M113 armored personnel carrier
(APC).71 On 6 January 1993, Somali gunmen from Aideed’s militia fired upon Marine
convoys from a weapons cantonment site near the embassy.72 The Marines established
blocking positions to seal off the area, and Colonel Michael W. Hagee—who had
returned to Somalia at Johnston’s request—informed Brigadier General Mohamed
Kedeye Elmi, a member of Aideed’s staff, that all weapons from those sites would be
confiscated the next day.73 On 7 January, a psychological operations (PSYOPS) team
using loudspeakers warned the defenders to surrender. The weapons cantonment area
actually consisted of two sites; one complied, but the other responded with gunfire.
The Marines attacked the second facility from both air and ground, forcing it to sur-
render, while taking no casualties.74 In the words of General Wilhelm, “We unleashed a
firestorm on them.”75 The Marines confiscated all weapons within the cantonment areas,
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including a platoon of tanks, fifteen artillery pieces, ten technicals, six towed mortars,
and various armored vehicles.76 The exact number of Somali casualties is unknown, but
most of the Somalis involved in the firefight were either killed or captured.77
As forces continued to assemble in Somalia, Johnston rapidly moved them into the
humanitarian relief sectors where they would undertake the mission of RESTORE HOPE.
Of course, the actual work of assigning the forces to geographical locations and placing
them within the organizational structure fell to his operations officer, General Zinni.
For a period early in the operation, this became so demanding a function that Zinni’s
staff took to calling him the “Century 21 Man” (recalling a well known advertising
campaign of an American realty firm).78 The variety of forces from the United States
and coalition nations created a very complex grouping that Johnston and Zinni struc-
tured into a component-type organization. It was similar to the command structure
that General Schwarzkopf had used in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990–91,
when Johnston had been Schwarzkopf ’s chief of staff. Simply stated, “components” are
subordinate organizations assembled around a service or function.79 In the case of
RESTORE HOPE, Zinni integrated most of the coalition forces under one or another of
the four service components, primarily the Marine Forces component.80 Several con-
tributing nations required their forces to report directly to the UNITAF commander, as
illustrated in figure 2.
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FIGURE 2
Lieutenant General Johnston’s UNITAF Component Command Structure
Source: Allard, Somalia Operations, p. 27; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p. 31; MFS/IMEF
(Fwd.), Command Chronology, secs. 1, 8; Resource Guide, p. 1.
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As forces flowed into the operational area, they assumed their roles in the organiza-
tional structure and took control of their sectors. For example, even as Newbold’s
SPMAGTF moved through Mogadishu and on to Baledogle and Baidoa, it became an
element within the Marine component, under command of General Wilhelm. Wilhelm
also commanded the 1st Marine Division, which provided the major elements to the
Marine Forces component within UNITAF.81 Brigadier General Lawson William
Magruder III served briefly as the Army component commander, followed by the com-
manding general of the 10th Mountain Division, Major General Steven L. Arnold.82
Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik served as the Air Force component com-
mander. The Naval component had seven different commanders, whoever was senior
officer in the theatre at a given time.83 Appendix C provides more details on the service
component commanders during Operation RESTORE HOPE. Figure 2 shows the compo-
nent structure of Johnston’s UNITAF force.
After establishing ascendancy in
Mogadishu, UNITAF forces rap-
idly moved into the surrounding
areas of central and southern
Somalia to oversee the sectors
and support the humanitarian
relief community. From 13
through 31 December Johnston’s
coalition had gained control of
Baledogle, Baidoa, Kismayo,
Bardera, Oddur, Gialalassi, Belet
Uen, and Merca.84 Although there
was nothing easy about the planning or execution, the operation had been efficient,
effective, and successful. That did not mean the country had become peaceful or that
factions always respected their cease-fire agreements. For example, on New Year’s Eve
1992, clan warfare broke out in Mogadishu, resulting in major casualties.85 Despite the
initial success of RESTORE HOPE and the growing prospect for breaking the famine,
Somalia remained a very violent place.
President Bush himself arrived in Somalia on 31 December 1992 for a three-day visit to
meet with American troops and the Somali people.86 Ironically, a leader who held a very
different view of America’s role in Somalia, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, visited
Mogadishu only a few days later.87 Somalis received President Bush enthusiastically
wherever he visited, whereas Boutros-Ghali’s motorcade received stones and rotten
fruit. On one occasion, an angry mob even prevented his vehicles from entering the UN
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headquarters.88 The president’s
Somalia visit proved to be an upbeat
experience, whereas the Secretary-
General’s was a humiliation. Never
popular in Somalia, because of a per-
ception that he had collaborated with
the Siad Barre regime when he had
been the Egyptian deputy foreign
minister, Boutros-Ghali’s status, and
that of the UN in general, had deteri-
orated even further after the depar-
ture of Mohamed Sahnoun.89 For a variety of reasons, Somalis viewed the United States
and UNITAF as alternatives to the UN at this point and as untarnished by it.
Although President Bush spent much of his time ashore visiting various commands
and meeting with troops and Somalis, he spent two nights on board Tripoli and min-
gled with the sailors and Marines.90 In the opinion of the commodore of the Tripoli
ARG, Captain John Peterson, President Bush inspired everyone he met and was the nic-
est of any of the dignitaries who spent time on board his ships. In Peterson’s words, “It
was like having dinner with your grandfather; he was amazing.”91 President Bush would
leave office on 20 January, less than a month after his Somalia visit, having been defeated
in his bid for reelection by William J. Clinton. But that did not seem to matter to the
sailors and Marines, who genuinely appreciated his visit and the manner in which he
related to them.92 To the troops, he seemed a far more genuine person than the many sen-
ators, congressmen, and news celebrities who frequently visited their environment.93
On 20 January 1993 the United States would inaugurate a new president, but UNITAF
would still be in the field. Originally, President Bush had hoped to have American
forces out of Somalia by inauguration day rather than leave his successor with unfin-
ished business. But serious-minded planners and operators had known that it was
never a possibility.94 Many American officers believed that March 1993 was a reasonable
exit date, but even that proved elusive. Although RESTORE HOPE appeared to be suc-
cessful and working according to plan well before that date, the transition to UNOSOM
II proved far more difficult than any American leader had expected. Ultimately, the
United States could terminate UNITAF only by agreeing to remain involved in the sub-
sequent UNOSOM II operations and participating in their nation-building efforts.95
Among the more volatile areas where UNITAF operated during RESTORE HOPE was
Kismayo, a coastal city some 250 miles south of Mogadishu, not far from the Kenyan
border. During much of the period of RESTORE HOPE, fighting continued in and
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around Kismayo between forces allied to Aideed and an element led by General Omar
Hagi Mohamed Hersi (Morgan). General Morgan was Siad Barre’s son-in-law and a
leader associated with grave atrocities under that regime.96 General Hoar considered
Morgan “one of the most recalcitrant guys in the country.”97
A large percentage of the casualties that UNITAF was to suffer during the five months
of RESTORE HOPE occurred in the Kismayo area. The total number of casualties for
UNITAF forces amounted to eight killed and twenty-four wounded (another ten deaths
resulted from various accidents during the operation). The Somali casualty count
amounted to about two hundred militiamen killed and perhaps a hundred civilian
deaths, mostly people caught in cross fire.98 Virtually all of these casualties occurred in
and about Kismayo and Mogadishu, the two toughest cities in Somalia. Of course, these
figures do not include casualties that various Somali factions inflicted on each other
during this same period.
In the original plan for RESTORE HOPE, planners scheduled the occupation of Kismayo
to occur during phase III. But depredations by Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess—an ally of
Aideed—and his Ogadeni-based Somali Patriotic Movement militia caused Johnston to
accelerate that action.99 Equally important, UNITAF needed the port of Kismayo and its
airfield to help handle the heavy inflow of troops and material.100 Johnston and Zinni
had designated elements of the 10th Mountain Division, from Fort Drum, New York,
along with a reinforced battalion of Belgian paratroopers to occupy and administer the
Kismayo sector.101 In the interest of efficiency and in response to necessity, planners
wanted to fly as many troops as possible directly into the city rather than stage them
through Mogadishu.102 To do so, UNITAF needed control of the airfield and port, along
with a somewhat stable military environment. In the broader scope of the RESTORE
HOPE mission, UNITAF needed Kismayo and its facilities to support humanitarian
activities in southern Somalia.
Kismayo promised to be difficult, because the militia of Omar Jess had taken control of
the port and was attempting to charge exorbitant rates for all transactions.103 As in
Mogadishu before the arrival of U.S. forces, commerce and transportation in Kismayo
had slowed to a virtual standstill.104 Additionally, heavy fighting had broken out
between Omar Jess and Morgan, further prompting Johnston to take quick action to
gain control of Kismayo.105 To accomplish this, Johnston created a task force—tempo-
rarily under General Wilhelm’s Marine component—consisting of the Belgian 1st Para-
chute Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Marc Jacqmin; a company of
Marines from Battalion Landing Team 2/9 (that is, a landing team formed from 2nd
Battalion, 9th Marines, an element of Newbold’s SPMAGTF); two ships from Captain
Peterson’s Tripoli ARG (USS Juneau and USS Rushmore); and the French destroyer
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FS Dupleix. Since this move-
ment involved an amphibi-
ous landing, the task force
included not only the com-
pany of U.S. Marines but
also Major John L. Ledoux,
of Newbold’s staff, who
served as S-3 (operations)
officer for the action.106
Peterson would act as the
Commander, Amphibious
Task Force (CATF), and
Jacqmin as the Commander,
Landing Force (CLF).107
As a critical part of the overall RESTORE HOPE “game plan,” the principal leaders had
agreed, as noted, that Oakley or his representative would precede military forces in the
occupation of various humanitarian relief sectors. He would meet with elders and
other leaders as well as individual Somalis to explain UNITAF actions and reduce the
potential for confrontation. This had proved effective during the occupation of
Baledogle and Baidoa, and it was thought that the situation in Kismayo would likely
benefit from this approach.108 On 17 December, Oakley and his team met with Omar
Jess and Morgan to find a basis for future operations in southern Somalia. Oakley did
not personally meet with Morgan, because of the general’s association with the Siad
Barre regime and his responsibility for the 1988 destruction of Hargeisa, with great loss
of civilian lives.109 Even now, most of Morgan’s Somali National Front forces were rem-
nants of Siad Barre’s old
national army.110 The upshots
of Oakley’s effort to pacify
the area were the establish-
ment of Kismayo as an open
city and separation of the
warring parties. Omar Jess’s
faction would remain in the
city, while Morgan would
move his forces away from
Kismayo to the north.111 The
political groundwork had
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thus been laid for landing UNITAF forces and, ideally, ending the carnage in southern
Somalia. This latter aspiration proved overoptimistic.
On 20 December, the Marines and the Belgian paratroopers—on board helicopters and
surface amphibious assault craft—landed at PURPLE Beach in Kismayo, with no oppo-
sition.112 Jet aircraft from USS Ranger roared overhead, providing air cover and psycho-
logical impact, just as they had done for the Mogadishu landing. The USS Kitty Hawk
battle group had relieved the Ranger group on 19 December, and Kitty Hawk’s air wing
would take over air support on the second day of the Kismayo operation.113 (Com-
manded by Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, the Kitty Hawk team was the very epitome of
professionalism, holding nothing back in its support of forces ashore during RESTORE
HOPE.)114 After going ashore at Kismayo, the landing force immediately secured the
port and airfield, while the Belgian contingent continued to flow reinforcements
ashore.115 Peterson and Jacqmin met with Omar Jess, who agreed to keep his forces off
the street during subsequent operations of the landing force.116 The following day,
Jacqmin released the Marine detachment, which back-loaded onto Juneau and
Rushmore, returned to Mogadishu, and resumed its duties with the SPMAGTF.117 This
set the stage for arrival of 10th Mountain Division units, which would augment the
Belgian paratroopers and establish Task Force Kismayo under command of Brigadier
General Magruder.118
By late January 1993, the situation in Kismayo again became critical, threatening
UNITAF with the worst level of violence yet experienced. To contain the escalating
conflict, Magruder met with Morgan on 23 January and demanded that he consolidate
his technicals at Dhoobley (northwest of Kismayo near the Kenyan border), pull back
all forces from Beer Xaani (also spelled Bir Hane, thirty-five kilometers west of
Kismayo), establish cantonment areas for his infantry, and desist from fighting with
other factions. Morgan acknowledged these demands, but the following day he attacked
an element of Omar Jess’s militia guarding a weapons cantonment at Beer Xaani.119
Magruder again ordered Morgan to withdraw, and when he failed to respond, Task Force
Kismayo engaged his militia.120 Attacking with Belgian paratroopers and U.S. Army heli-
copters, UNITAF destroyed six technicals, four howitzers, an armored vehicle, and a
rocket launcher.121 Magruder now demanded yet again that Morgan remove all technicals
from the Kismayo area and withdraw from Beer Xaani, and this time he complied.122
A second major incident occurred on 22 February, when Morgan infiltrated troops into
Kismayo for another attack on his adversary.123 Omar Jess and his militia fled north
toward Jilib but in the process had looted a warehouse they had been guarding and
fired random shots at Belgian soldiers. Johnston and Oakley issued an ultimatum,
ordering both forces out of the lower Jubba Valley (in the Kismayo vicinity) and into
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designated areas.124 Johnston also ordered a quick-reaction force (QRF) into the city to
show strength and to conduct weapons-control operations. Although both factions
complied with Johnston’s ultimatum, misinformation about events filtered into
Mogadishu, sparking demonstrations and several firefights. These were inspired by
Aideed and his followers, who wrongly concluded that UNITAF had favored Morgan,
the enemy of Aideed’s ally.125 Additionally, efforts by UNITAF to empower leaders at
various localities in Somalia and encourage them to take responsibility for their com-
munities had offended and angered Aideed. They tended to undercut the system he had
installed during the civil war and to infringe upon his power base.126 Aideed therefore
was already of a mind to oppose UNITAF, although only up to a point.
The Mogadishu flare-up ran its course for several days, after which conditions returned
to normal (by Somali standards) and remained so through the end of RESTORE
HOPE.127 By March 1993, UNITAF leaders felt able to resume their planning for transi-
tion to UNOSOM II. Kismayo experienced an additional clash between Omar Jess and
Morgan during March, which frustrated UNITAF commanders and again resulted in
dispatching a QRF to the town. But this crisis passed and ultimately did not appear to
endanger the transition process.128 Yet this incident caused UN officials to believe that
Kismayo—and by extension all of Somalia—was far from stable.129
Despite the sporadic problems in Kismayo and Mogadishu, by 4 February 1993 Ameri-
can leaders in Somalia believed that UNITAF had completed its humanitarian mission.
At that point, they began planning for transition to UN control and the redeployment
of U.S. forces.130 UNITAF leaders wanted a degree of stability during the handoff to
UNOSOM II, but that had never been the criterion for transition in the minds of most
American officials. For them, breaking the famine and saving lives constituted mission
success for Operation RESTORE HOPE; nation building would occur in the follow-on
phase, under UN cognizance.131 This was the view not only of American leaders in
Somalia and at Central Command but of the top levels of the U.S. government.132 As
President Bush stated in a letter to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali the day after the
Security Council passed Resolution 794, “I want to emphasize that the mission of the
coalition is limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the
feeding of the starving people and allow transfer of these security functions to the UN
peacekeeping force.”133
Despite the president’s unequivocal message, American officials in both Washington
and Somalia felt it necessary to reaffirm constantly the limited nature of RESTORE
HOPE and to resist efforts by UN officials to expand and extend the mission.134 Boutros-
Ghali and key UN officials did not want the transition to occur before midsummer.
Neither did they want to accept responsibility on the ground without a major
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American military commitment to the follow-on effort. They were reluctant because,
among other reasons, it was clear that many coalition forces would not remain in
Somalia under UNOSOM II if the United States did not participate.135 UN officials also
wanted UNITAF to accomplish a greater degree of disarmament and establish wider
geographical control before turning over responsibility.136 Essentially, Boutros-Ghali
expected UNITAF to accomplish tasks that most American leaders considered the work
of UNOSOM II. If United Nations officials could persuade UNITAF to accomplish
these goals during RESTORE HOPE, UNOSOM II would be able to function under
Chapter VI peacekeeping rules rather than as a Chapter VII peace-enforcement opera-
tion. UNITAF would have a better chance than the UN to succeed at peace enforce-
ment, in the opinion of UN leaders, because only the United States had the military
strength and organizational structure to accomplish the difficult tasks that rebuilding
the Somali state required. The reticence of UN leaders became clear as early as January
1993, when they failed to meet their commitment to General Johnston and the State
Department to send a “technical team” to UNITAF headquarters to plan the
transition.137 This seeming indifference did not surprise General Zinni, who believed
that UN leaders considered the Somali predicament a “poison apple and were very
reluctant to take control.”138 Because of ongoing resistance by the UN, the transition
dragged out three months beyond the point at which Johnston believed UNITAF had
accomplished its mission.139
As the February and March incidents in Kismayo and Mogadishu subsided, a peace
conference occurred in Addis Ababa that once again appeared to achieve reconciliation
between Aideed and Ali Mahdi.140 There had actually been a series of sessions in the
Ethiopian capital throughout RESTORE HOPE, culminating in accords reached in Addis
Ababa on 27 March 1993. Fifteen of the most powerful Somali warlords and faction
leaders signed this agreement, causing many observers to believe that it had a good
chance to resolve the crisis.141 The participants named it the “Addis Ababa Agreement
concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia,”
implying an ongoing process rather than a final agreement.142 On 26 March 1993—as
the Addis Ababa conference moved toward its conclusion—the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 814, which officially established UNOSOM II under Chapter VII
authority and provided for transition from UNITAF control.143 Among other things,
Resolution 814 called for a secure environment and the rehabilitation of Somalia’s
political institutions and economy.144 It also demanded “that all Somali parties, includ-
ing movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken
. . . at Addis Ababa, and in particular with the agreement of implementing the cease-
fire and on modalities of disarmament.”145 This language clearly tied the mission of
UNOSOM II to the Addis Ababa accords.
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The Addis Ababa conference seemed so hopeful to observers because in it the most
important warlords and faction leaders had committed themselves to reconciliation,
reconstruction, development, the establishment of an impartial police force, and peace
in Somalia. Interestingly, the agreement also invited “the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and his Special Representative in Somalia, in accordance with the
mandate entrusted to them by the Security Council, to extend all necessary assistance
to the people of Somalia for the implementation of this agreement.”146 Considering
Aideed’s distaste for the UN and its Secretary-General, it is somewhat surprising that
he agreed to this provision. Ironically, the United States, which generally endeavored to
reduce its direct involvement and presence in Somalia, had pressed at UN headquarters
for this larger mission. To some extent, this resulted from the new foreign-policy con-
cept of assertive multilateralism articulated by the new administration of President
William J. Clinton.147 Clinton’s ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, reflected
this thinking in stating that the Resolution 814 amounted to “an unprecedented
enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country.”148
The two key UN officials who would oversee the implementation of Resolution 814
and the Addis Ababa agreement were the UN special representative, Admiral Jonathan
T. Howe, USN (Ret.), and the UNOSOM II force commander, Lieutenant General
Cevik Bir, both recently appointed by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali.149 The United
States appointed Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, USA, to serve as Bir’s deputy
and senior American commander in Somalia during UNOSOM II.150 By 20 March, all
three officials had arrived in Mogadishu, completing the high-level command structure
for the new entity.151 General Johnston approved on 14 March the UNITAF transition
plan, intended to facilitate the assumption of command by the new leadership team.
He also provided General Bir office space at UNITAF headquarters and made similar
arrangements for supporting staff sections as UNOSOM II personnel arrived for
duty.152 Yet despite this preparation, the transition from UNITAF would be anything
but efficient, and the command relations under UNOSOM II anything but clear.153
Admiral Howe became the UN special representative in Somalia when Ismat Kittani—
who had always considered his role as interim—departed from that position in March
1993. In an obvious attempt to ensure continued American involvement in Somalia,
Boutros-Ghali asked the United States to recommend a replacement. When the United
States suggested Howe, Boutros-Ghali quickly agreed. Howe offered impressive creden-
tials for the job, having attained the rank of full admiral in the U.S. Navy and served as
deputy national security adviser under President Bush. In his latter role, Howe had
been the president’s focal point on issues relating to Somalia and had played a major
role in planning and decision making for RESTORE HOPE during November 1992. Many
key members of the Bush administration considered Howe a highly skilled manager
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who could apply those qualities to improve UN operations in Somalia.154 Others viewed
him as a Washington insider whose primary influence came from his considerable time
on staffs within the departments of Defense and State.155 In either case, Howe was well
connected with both the outgoing Bush administration and the new Clinton team.156
Just before Howe arrived in Somalia to assume his duties, Robert Oakley returned to
the United States, considering his role in RESTORE HOPE complete. Oakley intended his
leaving to signal a change in leadership and responsibility in Somalia.157 The function
of the UN special representative (the position that Kittani now tendered to Howe) in
relation to that of the U.S. special envoy (which Oakley now relinquished) had been
ambiguous and subtle during RESTORE HOPE. Oakley’s close relationship with
Johnston and Zinni—coupled with Kittani and Boutros-Ghali’s lack of credibility
among many important Somali leaders—had thrown the U.S. envoy into a leading role
during UNITAF. Now that Oakley had left Somalia, most observers assumed that Howe
would restore the UN special representative to a more dominant position for the dura-
tion of UNOSOM II. Oakley’s replacement, Robert Gosende, did not attract the same
attention or assert the same influence as his predecessor. Of course, the circumstances
had changed, and the United States wanted a more prominent role for the UN during
UNOSOM II. The appointment of General Bir—a Turkish officer with broad NATO
experience—as the military commander for UNOSOM II further underscored the
expectation of UN preeminence.158
Yet despite these important changes, the operation in Somalia retained an American
flavor. Howe might be the UN special representative, but he was still an American, with
access to the highest levels of his government. Moreover, Bir’s deputy commander,
General Montgomery, had a separate reporting structure—through General Hoar at
Central Command—for the use of U.S. forces during UNOSOM II.159 This left the deci-
sion to use American forces, the most capable in Somalia, clearly in the hands of Amer-
ican authorities. Also, notwithstanding the prominence of Americans in the new
organization, the changeover from UNITAF to UNOSOM II remained bogged down
throughout March and April, causing a high level of frustration and angst for the U.S.
commanders of UNITAF.160
The provisions of Security Council Resolution 814 and the Addis Ababa accords chiefly
prescribed Howe’s responsibilities as UN special representative in Somalia.161 Howe did
not believe the UN had adequate preparation or sufficient resources to assume the mis-
sion.162 He tried to convince Johnston and Zinni to extend UNITAF through June and
to expand its operation into the northern parts of Somalia—just as Boutros-Ghali had
wanted.163 Unable to convert either officer to his viewpoint, Howe attempted to use his
high-level connections in Washington, but this time to no avail.164 Johnston and Zinni’s
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exit strategy from Somalia had the support of General Hoar at Central Command and
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Hoar and Johnston argued that the action
requested by UN leaders would constitute a new mission, requiring additional
resources and further presidential approval. Despite considerable lobbying, Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali and Admiral Howe could not persuade the White House to
override the position of the military.165 In the view of most American leaders, RESTORE
HOPE had been a success, UNITAF had served its purpose, and the time had come for
the UN to assume the responsibility for rebuilding Somalia.
The problems associated with transition stemmed from differences in perception of the
RESTORE HOPE mission that had dogged relations between the United States and UN
all along. Not only did Americans see RESTORE HOPE as a short-term and limited oper-
ation, but they also believed that the handoff to UNOSOM II should be rapid and effi-
cient. UN leaders—acting in accordance with the views of the Secretary-General—
feared that UNITAF units would “withdraw hastily, before the reestablishment of a
truly secure environment in which the transition to traditional peace-keeping envis-
aged by UN Security Council Resolution 794 could proceed successfully.”166 In the opin-
ion of Boutros-Ghali, the outburst of violence in Kismayo during February and March
1993, coupled with sporadic violence in Mogadishu, clearly demonstrated that the rela-
tive stability resulting from RESTORE HOPE was precarious at best. He also concluded
that a return to simple peacekeeping as originally intended would not be possible, that
UNOSOM II required Chapter VII enforcement powers to have any hope of success.167
When Resolution 814 passed, it not only authorized Chapter VII actions by UNOSOM
II forces but also threatened individual accountability, including prosecution of indi-
viduals responsible for “breaches of international humanitarian law.”168 In short, it
intended to put teeth (at least on paper) into the enforcement authority of UNOSOM
II. Interestingly, this constituted the first Chapter VII operation organized and com-
manded directly by the United Nations itself. In previous cases, the UN had only man-
dated actions, whereas member states actually executed the missions.169 In promoting
this concept, the United States found itself in the curious position of promoting a
larger UN commitment to Somalia—through the action of its ambassador to the
UN—while simultaneously reducing American support and commitment to the
undertaking.170 As Madeleine Albright later stated, “This was an ambitious mandate,
requiring the UN to do more than the United States had accomplished but with fewer
and far less potent forces.”171
Despite American action to terminate RESTORE HOPE, disband UNITAF, and withdraw
the bulk of its forces from Somalia, the Secretary-General continued to press for at
least two major milestones before transferring operations to UNOSOM II. The first
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involved a greater level of disarmament, including the total disarming of irregular
gangs and the confiscation of the heavy weapons (artillery, large-caliber machine guns,
assault weapons like rocket-propelled grenades and recoilless rifles, and anything
mounted on technicals, etc.) from the organized factions. This demand was nothing
new, of course, but rather a refinement on the Secretary-General’s ongoing effort to
have U.S. forces achieve general disarmament in Somalia. The second condition
required an expansion of the UN mandate throughout Somalia. UNITAF had focused
its efforts only where the famine actually existed, in the central and southern sections
of the country. That constituted only about 40 percent of Somalia; the northern parts
of the nation were relatively stable, and people there were not dying of starvation.172
From the American point of view, expanding operations into the northern areas had
nothing to do with the original purpose of RESTORE HOPE. These two conditions of the
Secretary-General were highly unrealistic, because the United States had no intention
of undertaking a large-scale disarmament effort or of sending additional forces to
occupy areas where no humanitarian crisis existed.173 Nevertheless, it became obvious
to American leaders that they would need to make some concession if the UN was to
assume responsibility under UNOSOM II.174
The United Nations intended to assemble a force of about twenty-eight thousand
troops to conduct operations. Some of these would be coalition troops already in
Somalia serving in UNITAF. As part of the American accommodation with the UN,
American officials agreed to leave about 4,200 soldiers in Somalia for duty with
UNOSOM II. This included a quick-reaction force and a logistical support element,
both to be provided by the U.S. Army.175 The QRF consisted of a reinforced infantry
battalion from 10th Mountain Division and an aviation task force of six Cobra attack
helicopters, eight scout helicopters, and fifteen Black Hawk helicopters, along with a
support battalion, all under a brigade-level headquarters—a total of about 1,100 sol-
diers.176 The logistics package would consist of some 3,100 U.S. troops from the Joint
Task Force Support Command, which had assumed responsibility for general logistics
support of UNITAF in late January.177 These forces constituted a price the United States
paid to extricate itself from its large commitment in Somalia.178
Nevertheless, many American leaders remained nervous about turning these forces over
to UN authority. That would be very different from the RESTORE HOPE model, where the
United States had operated under UN authority but maintained command and control
over coalition forces.179 To mitigate this concern, American officials placed all U.S. forces
under General Montgomery, who would exercise command within two reporting chains.
One of Montgomery’s superiors would be General Bir (the UNOSOM II military com-
mander, under Jonathan Howe) for issues relating to the UN. The other would be Gen-
eral Hoar at Central Command for operations involving U.S. forces.180 This awkward
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command structure would become even more convoluted as the UNOSOM II mission
progressed and as conflict with Somali factions became more prevalent.181
Just as the command designator changed from UNITAF to UNOSOM II on 4 May
1993, so too did the U.S. operational name change, from RESTORE HOPE to CONTINUE
HOPE.182 Yet unlike the RESTORE HOPE name, “CONTINUE HOPE” did not catch on with
the media or American public. Instead, “UNOSOM II” became the label commonly
associated with that segment of the Somalia incursions. Whatever the name, the UN
command element finally took control of operations in Somalia on 4 May 1993—too
soon from Howe’s point of view, not soon enough in the minds of Johnston and
Zinni.183 Johnston had actually been redeploying forces back to the United States as
early as February 1993. Throughout March and April, elements of the U.S. contingent
had “retrograded” units and heavy equipment out of Somalia.184 By the time transfer of
responsibility actually occurred, only the two elements designated to support
UNOSOM II (the QRF and logistics team) remained within Somalia.185 Also during this
period, Johnston began transferring responsibility for the nine humanitarian relief sec-
tors to coalition forces designated to control them during UNOSOM II.186 Yet all this
was not to contain the American involvement in Somalia. The number of Americans
committed to UNOSOM II would increase substantially in the future, and the scope of
their involvement would expand. Ultimately, the warnings of Smith Hempstone proved
correct: “These situations are easier to get into than out of.”187
By the end of April, only those units identified as part of UNOSOM II remained in
Somalia.188 The impact of this drawdown had been somewhat mitigated by the arrival of
the USS Wasp ARG, commanded by Captain Kenneth Pyle, and the 24th MEU (SOC),
under Colonel Matthew E. Broderick.189 They collectively represented for UNITAF (and
UNOSOM II) commanders a naval expeditionary force that could act as an operational
reserve during the redeployment and transition process. In fact, the MEU proved to be
of far greater service, providing forces ashore during the remainder of RESTORE HOPE
and sporadically under CONTINUE HOPE. When the ARG arrived in Mogadishu on 23
March, Commodore Pyle assumed duties as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Somalia.
Pyle, Broderick, and key members of their staffs coordinated with the UNITAF leader-
ship to prepare for operations. Meanwhile, AV-8B Harrier aircraft flew missions over
Mogadishu, to demonstrate the strength of the ARG, and conducted reconnaissance
flights throughout the Kismayo sector.190 General Johnston immediately sent the ARG
down to Kismayo, where, he believed, it could help control the potentially explosive
situation.191 Before departing, Broderick assigned a detachment of Marines to remain
in Mogadishu and help patrol the city streets.192 On 26 March, the 24th MEU (SOC)
went ashore on PURPLE Beach at Kismayo to assist the Belgian and U.S. Army forces
operating within the city and throughout southern Somalia. During its time in the
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Kismayo area, elements of 24th MEU (SOC) conducted night and day patrols, weapons-
interdiction operations, and roadblock and strongpoint duty; they also escorted relief
convoys and undertook civic-action programs.193
On 27 March, a reinforced company of 24th MEU (SOC)—designated Task Force
RESOLVE—conducted a mechanized march to Dhoobley.194 Intended primarily as a
show of force and demonstration of the MEU’s reach, the 180-mile trip (one way)
enjoyed an escort of helicopters to provide airborne radio relay and fire support if
needed.195 After entering Dhoobley unopposed, the convoy returned to Kismayo on 28
March, having made a statement about the capability and resolve of the 24th MEU
(SOC). It also allowed the Marines to become familiar with the general area and gain
experience operating in southern Somalia. A similar mechanized force—designated
Task Force HAMMER—marched to Jilib in the north on 6 and 7 April, accomplishing
much the same result.196
Broderick’s energetic use of his MEU included helicopter raids on the villages of
Goobyen, Hoosingow, and Afmadow, primarily to search for unauthorized weapons
and provide humanitarian assistance when possible. Afmadow, for example, was a node
in the gunrunning routes in southern Somalia often used by warlords to move weapons
out of cantonment areas in violation of UNITAF policy.197 The Marines conducted a
textbook operation at Afmadow and met no open resistance, but they found no weap-
ons and felt a certain silent hostility during their initial sweep of the village. (Broderick
learned later that the Somalis had removed the weapons the night before and returned
them after the Marines departed.)198 A second raid at Afmadow later in the deployment
proved equally unproductive.199
In addition to executing rapid raids inland, the Marines of 24th MEU, accompanied by
SEAL teams, conducted riverine operations along the Jubba River. Although intended
to observe traffic on the river and interdict weapons movement, these patrols made no
direct contact. Yet the continuous presence of the Marines within the operational area,
coupled with their establishment of strongpoints at key locations, helped control the
flow of illicit arms while monitoring the movement of Somali men of fighting age.200 In
addition to the normal possibility of violent conflict with Somali factions, the Marines
and sailors on the Jubba River had crocodiles and hippopotamuses to deal with, threats
not addressed in standard amphibious training.201 These operations helped suppress
activity by various troublemakers in the Kismayo sector.202 They also had the effect of
separating the two warring forces (those of Omar Jess and Morgan), thereby reducing
their ability to engage each other or disrupt the transition process.203
Like Colonel Newbold before him, Broderick believed it important to impress local
warlords with the MEU’s speed, mobility, and operating tempo. Also like his
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predecessor, Broderick recognized
the importance of maintaining a
positive image with the local Soma-
lis and the outside world, to the
extent possible. He therefore bal-
anced the display of military power
with gestures of goodwill. These
involved the MEU’s medical and
logistical capabilities as well as
civic-action projects undertaken by
individual Marines and sailors.204
Broderick’s engineers conducted numerous improvement projects, and his medical and
dental personnel frequently established clinics to assist local Somalis.205 Even during the
raid on Afmadow, Broderick ordered a team of doctors and corpsmen to accompany
the Marine force and offer medical care to the villagers. This took the edge off the raids
and searches and earned the goodwill of many Somalis.206 These humanitarian efforts
by 24th MEU (SOC) sought to improve the lives and circumstances of the Somali peo-
ple and to encourage cooperation.207
By late April, the mission of 24th MEU (SOC) had ended (for the time being). Marines,
sailors, and equipment from various parts of Somalia back-loaded onto Commodore
Pyle’s ships and departed for the Persian Gulf.208 They would return to Somalia in June
1993 and again during early 1994 in support of UNOSOM II, but their departure in
April signaled the termination of the American operations under UNITAF.209
Broderick and Pyle believed they had made a difference in Kismayo. In addition to sta-
bilizing the situation through patrolling, manning checkpoints, conducting riverine
operations, and other actions, the 24th MEU (SOC) had worked very hard at helping
the Somali people. Through a variety of actions such as escorting food deliveries, oper-
ating health clinics, and dealing with Somalis directly, personally, and respectfully,
Broderick and Pyle felt they had won the hearts and minds of the people in Kismayo by
the time they departed.210
One experience that won the hearts and minds of the Marines and sailors on board
the Wasp ARG was a visit from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin
Powell. During his visit Wasp returned to Mogadishu, where Powell visited after a day
of meetings ashore. Like other ships of the fleet, Wasp had many VIP visitors, but the
Powell visit was a highlight, not the ordeal that most were. Like President Bush during
his earlier visit to Tripoli, Powell proved a motivational presence. He mingled with the
Marines and sailors, offered to have their pictures taken with him, and showed a
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genuine interest in every person on board. The morning after his arrival, Broderick
learned, was Powell’s birthday, so he orchestrated a birthday party, including a
cake, on the ship’s flight deck. Powell’s visit was a special event, one that the
Marines and sailors would remember as one of the high points of the deployment
of the Wasp ARG.211
Operation RESTORE HOPE took place between 9 December 1992 and 4 May 1993.
Observers and analysts generally acknowledge that it succeeded in breaking the famine
by ensuring delivery of food and supplies to needy Somalis—its primary mission.212
Although estimates vary, there is little doubt that RESTORE HOPE, coupled with the
contribution of PROVIDE RELIEF, saved many thousand Somali lives.213 The fact that this
occurred with only minor fighting should not suggest that it was easy. In addition to
the incidents in Mogadishu and Kismayo between Somali fighters and UNITAF forces,
sporadic sniping occurred throughout the operation, causing casualties and several
deaths. Numerous confrontations also resulted when UNITAF elements disarmed
Somalis caught in violation of arms agreements or during weapon sweeps considered
necessary for mission security. Fortunately, most of these cases did not result in severe
violence.214 The cooperation of major warlords in the cantonment of technicals and
heavy weapons helped remove these armaments from the streets and reduced the
potential for violence.215
Conditions would be very different for UNOSOM II during Operation CONTINUE
HOPE, with its more ambitious missions. At the time of transition, UNOSOM II con-
sisted of about seventeen thousand troops from twenty-one nations, making it more a
combined, and less a joint, organization than UNITAF. At its peak strength in Novem-
ber 1993, UNOSOM II would number just under thirty thousand soldiers from twenty-
nine nations.216 CONTINUE HOPE never had the expeditionary flavor of RESTORE HOPE,
as it tended to operate out of fixed bases and built semipermanent structures for its
units. Regrettably, it also proved less successful. Many critics suggest that the incom-
plete work of UNITAF preordained failure for UNOSOM II, whereas others have
blamed the second operation itself.217 In either case, CONTINUE HOPE would have a
very different outcome than RESTORE HOPE.
The expeditionary nature of RESTORE HOPE and the degree to which it relied on sea-
based forces in many ways exemplify the precepts of . . . From the Sea. The tendency to
focus both the amphibious ready group and the carrier battle group on power projec-
tion ashore illustrates the growing importance of the littoral mission, as opposed to the
blue-water operations of the Cold War era.218 The skillful air-control measures of the
carrier battle group in the early stages of the operation, the medical support capability
of the amphibious ready group, and the joint nature of the mission further embodied
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the precepts of . . . From the Sea. The mobility of the ARG and MEU (SOC) along the
long Somali coastline, particularly between Mogadishu and Kismayo, demonstrates to a
considerable extent the “marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare based
on sea-borne maneuver, sea-based sustainability, and rapid execution,” as would be
codified several years later in the Marine Corps concept paper Operational Maneuver
from the Sea.219
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Operation CONTINUE HOPE
Operations and Conflict
Operation CONTINUE HOPE officially began on 4 May 1993, when Lieutenant General
Cevik Bir took command of UNOSOM II military operations in Somalia. Major Gen-
eral Thomas M. Montgomery served as Bir’s deputy as well as Commander, U.S. Forces
in Somalia (USFORSOM).1 During the transition process, UNITAF leaders had consid-
ered UNOSOM II slow to assume command of the Somalia mission.2 But from the per-
spective of Generals Bir and Montgomery, the handoff had been hasty and had not met
their needs or adequately prepared them.3 At the time of the change of command,
UNOSOM II had an immature communications capability, insufficient infrastructure
to operate its headquarters, and less than 30 percent of its staff in place.4 This resulted,
in part, from the slowness of the United Nations in passing Security Council Resolu-
tion 814, delaying funding and formal authority for assigning the headquarters staff.5
When the resolution passed on 26 March 1993, it officially established UNOSOM II
through 31 October 1993, with an annualized budget of $1.5 billion.6 It officially estab-
lished the 4 May transition date and authorized Bir and Montgomery to allocate funds
and prepare for the transition.7 The changeover occurred on schedule but not in the
“seamless” manner that leaders of UNITAF and UNOSOM II intended. The political
and military controversy between the United States and UN regarding prerequisite con-
ditions for transferring control created friction that affected personnel from both when
they came together in Mogadishu.8
At the beginning of UNOSOM II, Bir commanded about seventeen thousand soldiers
from twenty-one nations, including just over four thousand U.S. troops. His degree of
authority varied widely.9 With regard to American forces, the Logistics Support Com-
mand—now under command of Brigadier General Norman Williams—would be part
of the UNOSOM II organization, but the QRF remained outside that structure, report-
ing through Montgomery, in his capacity as USFORSOM commander, to General Hoar
at Central Command.10 In U.S. military terminology, operational control of the QRF
remained with Central Command (General Hoar), whereas tactical control came under
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USFORSOM (General Montgomery).11 In other words, Montgomery could use the
QRF on his own authority for emergencies, but for operations in support of the
UNOSOM II mission he needed consent from General Hoar.12 In addition to the Amer-
ican troops stationed within Somalia, Central Command maintained in the Indian
Ocean a naval expeditionary force (an amphibious ready group with an embarked
Marine expeditionary unit), which would be available to Montgomery should the need
arise.13 Of course, the ARG would also be available for other missions and might not
always be on Somalia station when required.14 The UNOSOM II command relations—
like those within USFORSOM—were also somewhat complicated, and they became
even more so in late August 1993 with the arrival of Task Force RANGER, under Major
General William F. Garrison, U.S. Army.15
Command and control over the coalition forces—which would eventually grow to
nearly thirty thousand troops from twenty-nine nations—proved problematic
throughout Operation CONTINUE HOPE.16 Not all forces arrived on schedule, and those
that did often came without weapons or equipment, useless until their shipments
arrived, sometimes substantially later.17 Additionally, many coalition commanders
operated under limitations imposed by their national governments or required home
approval before executing UNOSOM II orders. When confronted with conflicts
between UN missions and national agendas, field commanders would always follow
directions from their home governments, creating disruption in planning and danger
during combat.18 These infringements upon unity of command made many of the
troops essentially unusable, reducing the ability of UNOSOM II leaders to prevent or
respond to provocations. This situation was very worrisome, because Generals Bir and
Montgomery felt certain that Aideed would challenge the UN and its commitment to
the UNOSOM II operation.19
In the weeks immediately after taking control in Somalia, UNOSOM II forces contin-
ued to support humanitarian relief missions while conducting shows of force within
Mogadishu and elsewhere. This consisted of increased patrolling and expanded check-
point activity intended to maintain a visible presence and give the appearance of a
seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II.20 Additionally, UNOSOM II
leaders planned to continue the inspection of weapons cantonment sites (also called
“authorized weapons storage sites,” or AWSSs) using the inventories created and pro-
vided by UNITAF. Of course, Mogadishu remained the greatest area of concern,
because Aideed and his militia controlled a large portion of the city. In contrast, Ali
Mahdi and his USC faction (which controlled the northern part of Mogadishu) contin-
ued to cooperate with UN efforts within Somalia.21
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Because of the strength and ambition of Aideed, Montgomery considered Mogadishu
the center of gravity for the entire Somalia mission. He believed that actions there
would determine the success or failure of Operation CONTINUE HOPE, whatever prog-
ress was achieved in other parts of Somalia.22 Predictably, the first severe crisis for
UNOSOM II occurred in Mogadishu, on 5 June 1993, with a murderous ambush linked
to the inspection of weapons storage sites. It was a shocking and distressing incident,
but there had been forewarnings of greater confrontation with Aideed’s Somali
National Alliance (SNA) throughout the month since UNITAF’s departure.23
On 6 May, only days after UNOSOM II assumed the mission in Somalia, Kismayo had
again erupted, when Omar Jess attempted to recapture the city. Belgian forces had
thwarted his effort, and Montgomery dispatched a portion of the QRF to help stabilize
the area.24 Meanwhile, Aideed began broadcasting virulent attacks against the United
Nations over Radio Mogadishu (also known as Radio Somalia, or Radio Aideed), which
he had taken over after the fall of the Somali government in 1991.25
“Radio wars” had been going on in Mogadishu since the arrival of UNITAF in Decem-
ber 1992. Aideed claimed that Radio Mogadishu constituted the official, state broad-
casting system, but he had often used it for blatant propaganda purposes, promoting
his own claim to national leadership and supporting the interests of his political fac-
tion. Much of his cant had consisted of highly inflammatory rhetoric against the UN
and its activities. For their part, UNITAF leaders had created a Somali-language news-
paper and radio station in Mogadishu, both named Rajo (sometimes spelled Raja,
meaning “hope” in Somali), as parts of its public-information and psychological oper-
ations activity.26 In response to provocative transmissions, UNITAF would broadcast
rebuttals, matching their intensity to that of the invective coming from Radio
Mogadishu. This gave Generals Johnston and Zinni bargaining power with Aideed,
causing him to keep his messages more moderate. That approach had proved some-
what effective during the period of Operation RESTORE HOPE.27
But now, after the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, Generals Bir and Mont-
gomery had a much smaller psychological operations element, with virtually no radio
broadcast capacity.28 Having no way to moderate Radio Mogadishu, they and Admiral
Howe considered the possibility of closing it down.29 Doing so would create problems,
including concerns over free speech and protection of the radio’s archives, both of
which Montgomery considered important to the Somali people. Many people ques-
tioned the wisdom of closing down a radio station while trying to promote democracy
and freedom in Somalia. UNOSOM II leaders would have preferred that Radio
Mogadishu moderate its broadcasts but did not believe Aideed would do so.30 In late
May, eleven leaders from factions not allied with Aideed urged UNOSOM II officials to
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take over the radio station and operate it as a national asset, providing access to all
political groups.31 Aideed had made this difficult by declaring the premises of Radio
Mogadishu part of one of his weapons cantonment areas, collocated with the station,
known as AWSS-5. Many UNOSOM II officials and Somali leaders suspected that
Aideed did this simply to ensure his exclusive use of the facility.32 When Aideed and
other SNA leaders learned that UNOSOM II was considering shutting down the sta-
tion, they had reasoned that a takeover would likely occur in conjunction with an
inspection of AWSS-5.33
In late May, UNOSOM II commanders began planning for inspections of the AWSSs
within Mogadishu, in accordance with prior agreements between the UN and Somali
warlords.34 According to UNITAF records, Ali Mahdi had two storage sites within
Mogadishu, and Aideed operated five.35 Montgomery intended to conduct a simulta-
neous inspection of them all, to preserve the impression of evenhandedness.36 In addi-
tion to the fact that Resolution 814 specified disarmament as an objective for
UNOSOM II, Bir and Montgomery wanted to ensure that heavy weapons remained in
storage and did not show up on the street.37 This was of particular concern because evi-
dence suggested that the factions had begun removing heavy weapons from their can-
tonment sites.38 UN leaders also wanted to establish a baseline accounting of weapons
within the city, validate the accuracy of their inventory lists, and be certain that the
warlords used these sites for the cantonment of weapons only.39
The Italian contingent of UNOSOM II had responsibility for the section of Mogadishu
under the control of Ali Mahdi, the Pakistani element for the area under Aideed.40 Dur-
ing the final stages of planning for the AWSS inspection, leaders of the Italian brigade
notified General Montgomery that they had disestablished the two Ali Mahdi canton-
ments back in March. The Italian commanders had made this decision on their own
and failed to notify either UNITAF or UNOSOM II leaders.41 Despite this complication,
Generals Bir and Montgomery decided to go ahead with the inspections at the five
Aideed cantonment sites. When UNOSOM II officials delivered the notification of
inspection on 4 June, the evening before the scheduled inspections, the SNA minister
of internal affairs became irritated and declared, “This will start the war tomorrow.”42
Based on subsequent events, this seems a significant warning, but SNA officials—
including Aideed himself and the minister of internal affairs—often made extreme
statements that they did not act upon.43 In Ambassador Oakley’s view, this reaction
resulted from lack of dialogue between UNOSOM II and the Somali factions. During
RESTORE HOPE, Oakley or another high-level leader would make an appointment with
Aideed personally and well in advance, with the result that the inspection process dur-
ing UNITAF occurred without problems.44
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The next morning, 5 June 1993, Pakistani units arrived at Aideed’s cantonment sites at
0700 in company strength and conducted the inspections as planned. Contrary to some
accounts, the Pakistani leadership had prepared very well for this operation. Photo
imagery received from overflights of the cantonment sites the afternoon of 4 June
showed newly installed weapons covering avenues into some of the facilities. The Paki-
stani commanders had received this information, along with copies of the photographs,
and had planned accordingly.45 Additionally, Montgomery had ensured that all the units
of the Pakistani brigade had M113 armored personnel carriers, for use in this and other
operations.46 The Pakistani teams came prepared to conduct the inspections by force if
necessary, but they experienced no resistance from the militia guarding the cantonments.47
Only one incident occurred during the inspection process. A crowd of protesters con-
fronted the soldiers at the Radio Mogadishu site (AWSS-5), resulting in some warning
shots from the Pakistanis and rock throwing by the Somalis. According to the UN
inquiry published a year later, a Pakistani soldier also shot a Somali man who
attempted to snatch his rifle during the demonstration.48 The disturbance at AWSS-5
constituted the first occasion during the UNOSOM II deployment where Somali agita-
tors mingled with women and children, using them as human shields to screen them-
selves.49 The fact that a U.S. technical team accompanied the Pakistani component may
have created suspicion among Aideed’s followers regarding the real purpose of the
inspection. (The team was intended to evaluate the problem of taking the radio station
off the air, but not to actually do so on this occasion.) In the minds of SNA leaders,
this inspection was nothing more than a cover for intelligence gathering about the
broadcasting station and its equipment, information that could be helpful in a future
effort to silence Radio Mogadishu. Some may even have expected an attempt to seize
and deactivate the station during the inspection.50
By about 1030 that morning, the Pakistanis had completed inspections of all five sites
and had begun returning to their base and headquarters, at a soccer stadium. They had
confiscated no weapons, and Radio Mogadishu remained open and functioning. In pre-
paring for the inspection, the Pakistani brigade had organized itself into four teams.
Before the movement back to their base camp, two teams joined at one of the sites
(AWSS-3, where a radio retransmission site was also located), thereby creating three
separate processions marching back to the stadium, from different directions. So far,
only the demonstration at AWSS-5 had marred the morning action. But that period of
relative accord would draw to a quick and violent end.51
On the return march from the cantonment sites, the Pakistani element formed of two
inspection teams joined together tripped an ambush of automatic-weapons fire and
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). This occurred on 21 October Road near a facility
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named the “cigarette factory,” west of the soccer stadium. A nearly simultaneous attack
opened against a Pakistani detachment providing security at a south Mogadishu feed-
ing station, armed Somali fighters again mingling with women and children.52 This
mixed crowd of women, children, and armed men overwhelmed the Pakistani soldiers
and in some cases “literally took them apart by hand.”53
Somali fighters also struck at several Pakistani checkpoints and ambushed reinforce-
ments dispatched to the embattled units.54 The attacks had all the earmarks of a well-
planned and coordinated operation designed to inflict maximum casualties and so
challenge UN operations in Somalia.55 In addition, demonstrations and shootings
erupted throughout Mogadishu.56 Montgomery dispatched helicopters and elements of
the QRF to relieve the Pakistani troops where possible. But by the end of the day,
UNOSOM II had suffered twenty-four Pakistani soldiers killed and another fifty-six
wounded. Six Pakistani soldiers had been captured, one of whom died in captivity,
while five were returned to UNOSOM II two days after the battle. Additionally, three
American soldiers and one Italian soldier received wounds on that day.57
Bir and Montgomery had expected Aideed and his followers to challenge UNOSOM II
at some point, but this attack was a stunning event.58 It not only crossed a major
threshold of violence against UNOSOM II but threatened to undercut the efficacy of
UN peace operations throughout the world. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and UN
officials in New York feared the broader implication of this action. They believed that
failure to respond adequately would be a signal to miscreants in other conflict areas—
where some ninety thousand peacekeepers were at risk—that they could attack UN
forces with impunity.59 It was also a challenge to the new policies of “assertive multi-
lateralism” and “engagement and enlargement” of the Clinton administration. This
early Clinton strategy envisioned a post–Cold War expansion in democracy, market econ-
omies, and multilateral cooperation.60 Administration officials believed that Somalia,
though not strategically important to the United States, offered a test of this concept.61
Whether planned, instigated, or spontaneous, the Somali actions of 5 June in
Mogadishu were very cunning in that they occurred after—not before or during—the
inspections. The Pakistani and UNOSOM II planners had prepared for possible resis-
tance at the cantonment sites but had not considered the possibility of an attack after
the fact. Neither had they expected attacks at separate and unrelated locations, such as
the feeding centers, UN strongpoints, or routes of reinforcement. In short, they did
not consider themselves involved in a war. Among the most shocking incidents of these
assaults was the mutilation of Pakistani soldiers overwhelmed by mob action.62 In the
words of General Montgomery, “That was a real initiation into the kind of brutality
we faced.”63
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All of these attacks on 5 June occurred within the area controlled by the Aideed faction,
leaving little doubt as to SNA complicity.64 Aideed and his leaders had either orches-
trated the events or at the very least created the conditions that spawned them.65 Later
in the CONTINUE HOPE incursion, the extent of Aideed’s personal involvement in
ordering these attacks became a matter of some debate. In fact, the entire question of
whether the violence had been spontaneous or planned and orchestrated became the
subject of considerable disagreement.66 Nevertheless, few of the American and UN per-
sonnel in Mogadishu at the time had any doubt regarding Aideed’s culpability.67 The
inventories taken during the inspection of the cantonment sites revealed that Aideed’s
faction had removed numerous heavy weapons, including all technicals, from the
AWSSs. This further demonstrated to the satisfaction of UNOSOM II leaders in
Mogadishu and UN officials in New York that the SNA no longer intended to cooperate
with Resolution 814 or the Addis Ababa accords.68
The 5 June 1993 attacks on the Pakistani soldiers in Mogadishu caused international
revulsion, particularly among nations providing troops to UNOSOM II. They were,
after all, in Somalia for humanitarian purposes, to help the Somali people and nation
in a time of difficulty. The UN Security Council, prompted by the delegate from Paki-
stan and strongly supported by the United States, responded the next day by passing
Resolution 837.69 Among other things, it condemned the attack and called on the Secretary-
General “to take all measures necessary against all those responsible for the armed
attacks . . . including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks.”70
Although early drafts of Resolution 837 named both Aideed and his faction as being
responsible for the 5 June attacks, the final version mentioned only the SNA.71 None-
theless, broadcasts over Radio Mogadishu praising the assaults of 5 June, coupled with
the reappearance in south Mogadishu of heavy weapons, some of which Somalis had
used in the attacks of 5 June, convinced UN officials that they needed to take action
against both Aideed and his SNA faction.72 The UN resolution was pushed through the
Security Council over the weekend, with virtually no input from U.S. military leaders
or State Department specialists.73
Critics of the UNOSOM II operation often argue that Resolution 837 amounted to a
declaration of war on Aideed and the SNA.74 They say the resolution and the action it
spawned amounted to taking sides in the internal Somali conflict and unnecessarily
making an enemy of Aideed. They also suggest that in trying to pick the winners and
losers in Somalia, UN leaders forced Aideed’s hand.75 Some critics go so far as to sug-
gest that the 5 June inspection of the AWSSs did in fact amount, as Somalis had sus-
pected, to a cover for confiscating Aideed’s weapons and closing down his radio
station.76 The clear implication of this line of criticism is that UNOSOM II leadership
and not the intransigence of Aideed caused the violence of 5 June 1993, the subsequent
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fighting, the ultimate failure of UNOSOM II, and the eventual evacuation of Somalia.
We shall explore these ideas, along with contrary viewpoints, later in this study, but one
thing is certain: Resolution 837 called for action against the perpetrators of the 5 June
attacks, and UNOSOM II leaders in Somalia felt compelled to act accordingly.77 What
followed amounted to “a virtual war situation between UNOSOM II and the SNA, as the
two sides attacked each other over a period of four months.”78 This is a clear example of a
tactical incident having strategic implications. This one essentially ended all efforts at
nation building in Somalia and greatly reduced support for humanitarian operations.79
In addition to condemning the 5 June attacks and directing UNOSOM II to arrest the
responsible individuals, Resolution 837 called on UN forces to disarm factions in
Mogadishu and neutralize Radio Mogadishu.80 During 12–14 June 1993, UNOSOM II
leaders initiated action under the mandate of Resolutions 814 and 837—both of which
called for disarmament of Somali factions—by attacking weapons and munitions stor-
age areas within Mogadishu. This included both authorized AWSSs and clandestine
weapons sites, garages for the maintenance and storage of technicals, the cigarette fac-
tory, and Radio Mogadishu and its retransmission site.81 These attacks involved AC-130
Spectre aircraft (temporarily assigned to USFORSOM on 9 June) in conjunction with
Montgomery’s QRF and other UNOSOM II forces.82 On 17 June, UNOSOM II again
took the initiative, attacking Aideed’s Mogadishu enclave with AC-130 gunships and
following up with a cordon-and-search operation. The QRF played a lead role, sup-
ported by French, Italian, Moroccan, and Pakistani elements of the UNOSOM II
force.83 Also on 17 June, Admiral Howe “called for the arrest and detention of General
Mohamed Aideed.”84 Howe was supported in his action by the American envoy in
Somalia, Robert Gosende, who had become a strong advocate of removing Aideed after
the 5 June attacks on the Pakistani troops.85
The decision to declare Aideed a wanted man came after careful consideration of the
issues and the possible impact on the situation in Mogadishu.86 The most critical factor
in Howe’s thinking was the finding of a panel of UN jurists who had reviewed the evi-
dence of the 5 June attacks and found “powerful circumstantial evidence . . . buttressed
by the testimony of a credible witness,” that the attacks had been well planned, well exe-
cuted, and well coordinated.87 The panel also confirmed the complicity of Aideed and
determined that adequate grounds existed for his arrest and prosecution.88 Howe fur-
ther discussed the matter with Kofi Annan (at the time Assistant Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping), Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and other Somalia specialists at the
UN before deciding to arrest Aideed.89
The final element influencing Howe’s decision was a 13 June demonstration at the
Kilometer Four strongpoint in south Mogadishu. During this protest, Pakistani troops
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manning that position received fire from gunmen in the crowd and from snipers in
nearby buildings. Between eight and twenty Somalis suffered wounds in an exchange of
gunfire during that incident, depending on the source.90 Based on intelligence that
Howe considered solid, it appeared that Aideed’s followers had fired into their own
protesters to inflate casualties and create the impression of UNOSOM II brutality.91
Howe believed that “if this man would kill his own people in order to accomplish his
goals, he really ought to come off the streets, he ought to be detained. He needed to go
through the legal process.”92 Several weeks later, UN officials authorized a $25,000
reward for information leading to Aideed’s arrest. According to feedback Howe
received from military leaders, UNOSOM II’s warrant for Aideed’s arrest had no credi-
bility on the street without a reward; offering rewards for information on terrorists had
become normal throughout the world even at this early date.93 There followed various
reports that Aideed had in turn placed a reward on Howe for a million dollars, and on
other UNOSOM II leaders for as much as $250,000.94 When told that the SNA had put
a million-dollar price on his head in response to the $25,000 reward for Aideed, Howe
quipped, “Well, all I can tell you is that we can pay the $25,000.”95
Over the next several weeks, UNOSOM II executed a series of attacks against SNA facil-
ities and weapons sites. The QRF led most of these actions, with the participation of
some coalition units. Concurrently, Aideed’s forces conducted mortar and RPG attacks
against UNOSOM II positions at the port, airport, embassy, and other facilities, as well
as ambushes and sniper fire at targets of opportunity.96 On 12 July, the QRF launched a
controversial attack on a major SNA command-and-control center and meeting place
known as “Abdi House.”97 Officers of the QRF had planned and scheduled the raid
based on information that important militia leaders would confer there that day. After
attacking with helicopters firing TOW antitank missiles and 20 mm guns, a U.S. air
assault company swept the facility. After a firefight within the compound, it cleared the
objective area and departed the scene.98 U.S. forces suffered no casualties, but afterward
irate Somalis attacked and killed four international news reporters who came to survey
the site.99
Although highly successful as a tactical operation and damaging to Aideed’s operation,
the unilateral nature of the attack on Abdi House created problems within the
UNOSOM II alliance. Most of the previous attacks had been combined operations, and
they had been preceded by warnings, permitting civilians and noncombatants (com-
batants as well, for that matter) to flee the scene. The attack on Abdi House had
included no such warning, causing some coalition members to consider it unduly
provocative.100 Additionally, some observers contended that the supposed meeting of
militia leaders had been in fact a convocation of various clan and faction leaders who
gathered to discuss “a less belligerent approach to United Nations and the possibility of
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Mohammed Aideed leaving the country for a while.”101 One particularly well informed
news reporter has suggested that there were actually two separate meetings—the
Aideed military conference and a meeting of Somali elders—in near proximity; U.S.
intelligence had known only about the militia planning session, and the attack had
inadvertently encompassed both groups.102 All these complications (the consternation
of UNOSOM II partners over the attack and the murder of the reporters), coupled
with the unifying effect this attack may have had within Somali factions, tended to nul-
lify any tactical advantages gained from this operation.103
On 23 June, the USS Wasp ARG and 24th MEU (SOC) returned to Somali waters to
shore up U.S. military capability and support UNOSOM II operations. A normal rota-
tion of command had occurred in the Persian Gulf, with Captain Charles Vian replac-
ing Kenneth Pyle as commodore of the Wasp ARG.104 Upon arrival of Wasp off
Mogadishu, Colonel Broderick conferred with General Montgomery to discuss future
operations. During the meeting, fresh intelligence arrived on the location of Aideed,
and the two leaders agreed to prepare a direct-action mission by 24th MEU (SOC) to
capture the SNA leader. Broderick quickly tailored his maritime special-purpose force,
consisting of elements from the MEU (SOC) and naval special warfare forces, and
launched the mission from the deck of Wasp.105 The raid was based on current intelli-
gence regarding Aideed’s whereabouts, and it was flawlessly executed, but Aideed was
not at the target site.106
After this operation, Broderick again mixed military action with humanitarian activity,
sending his medical team ashore at Merca (near Mogadishu) and other locations to set
up medical and dental clinics. Throughout the day, as Marines fanned out to clear the
surrounding areas and provide secure environments, Navy doctors and corpsmen
treated Somali patients, often as many as thirty per hour.107 Broderick’s 24th MEU
(SOC) also escorted grain convoys, conducted riot-control training for coalition forces,
and augmented the aviation and explosive-ordnance-disposal elements of the QRF.108
It even undertook helpful civic-action projects in faraway Bossasso before departing
Somali waters—one of the few operations undertaken in northern Somalia during the
various incursions of the 1990s.109
After the 12 July attack on Abdi House, the conflict between UNOSOM II and Aideed
continued at varying levels of intensity through the end of August. Four American
military policemen died on 9 August when their vehicle was destroyed by a command-
detonated mine.110 This followed an attack on an American contractor (Brown & Root)
vehicle that had wounded two Americans. Largely, these attacks resulted from attempts
of SNA forces to regain the initiative they had lost when the QRF began offensive oper-
ations following the 5 June ambush.111 It became clear that Aideed and his leadership
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had decided to target Americans to the maximum extent possible (although not limit-
ing their attacks to U.S. personnel).112 Fully schooled on the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and
the retreat from Lebanon after the October 1983 Beirut bombing, they had correctly
identified the center of gravity for UNOSOM II as being the American media and
political leadership.113 Inflict enough U.S. casualties, SNA leaders reasoned, and the
media will create pressure on American politicians for withdrawal.114 Once American
involvement was ended, Aideed’s forces could marginalize the UN mission to Somalia
and eventually compel it to depart.115 In Ambassador Oakley’s words, “The United
States became public enemy number one for all the Somalis who supported Aideed.”116
During July and August, Montgomery organized and trained the QRF for “snatch oper-
ations,” to capture Aideed and his most important lieutenants.117 That effort, along with
attacks against SNA operation centers and facilities, had the effect of driving him
deeper into hiding in the backstreets and underground of Mogadishu.118 Montgomery
had a very high regard for his QRF, but it was essentially light infantry of the 10th
Mountain Division, not trained or equipped for this type of operation. He believed
that UNOSOM II needed special-operations troops with the configuration, training,
and capability designed for such missions. Additionally, Montgomery believed he
needed to augment UNOSOM II with heavy forces to protect his troops and better sup-
port humanitarian operations as the conflict with Aideed intensified. Accordingly,
Montgomery requested a mechanized task force and an air cavalry troop.119 As we shall
see, the issue of sending heavy forces onto Somalia would have a long and tortured life.
Montgomery did not need to request special operations units, because Admiral Howe
was already making repeated appeals for them through his contacts in Washington, and
had been since as early as 8 June.120 Montgomery now supported these requests, of
course, thereby giving them more weight with American decision makers.121 However,
neither General Powell in Washington or General Hoar in Tampa had any enthusiasm
for sending those forces into Somalia.122 Hoar was particularly skeptical about the like-
lihood of capturing Aideed, considering the prospect for success no better than one in
four.123 Both Hoar and Powell ultimately acquiesced to the request for special opera-
tions forces, because the commanders on the scene considered them necessary to
accomplish the mission.124 But even more to the point, President Clinton and his
national security adviser, Tony Lake, decided on 22 August, after an attack that
wounded six Americans, that it was time to bring Aideed to justice and ordered the
deployment.125 This led to the arrival of Task Force RANGER late in August 1993.126
Task Force RANGER consisted of a specially structured (task organized) team of various
special operations units amounting to some 450 soldiers. Commanded by Major Gen-
eral William F. Garrison, USA (who also commanded the Joint Special Operations
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Command in Fort Bragg, North Carolina), Task Force RANGER possessed capability
that UNOSOM II leaders believed would ensure the capture of Aideed. Despite the task
force’s name, U.S. Army Rangers made up only about a third of the unit, essentially one
company. The other major elements included a squadron from Delta Force and a
detachment of the U.S. Army’s special operations aviation unit from Task Force 160.127
“The unit’s mission was to capture Aideed and six of his top aides” and bring to justice
those considered responsible for the 5 June ambush of the Pakistani soldiers.128
As mentioned earlier, the arrival of these special operation units further complicated
the already complex command relationships between UNOSOM II forces. Although
Task Force RANGER operated within Somalia in support of CONTINUE HOPE’s objec-
tives, General Garrison served under the operational and tactical control of Central
Command.129 In short, Task Force RANGER remained a strategic asset, under the
authority of General Hoar. Despite this anomalous situation, General Hoar made it
clear that he expected Garrison to coordinate his actions with Montgomery and keep
Montgomery well informed of plans.130 In fact, Garrison established an excellent rela-
tionship with Montgomery, and the two commanders worked very well together.131 Yet
this did not constitute unity of command, and that fact would prove problematic when
a well planned and well executed operation turned bad.
In mid-September, Montgomery again requested heavy reinforcements for
USFORSOM, including an armor platoon of four M-1 tanks, a mechanized company
with fourteen M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and an artillery battery of six 105
mm howitzers.132 As commander of U.S. forces and deputy commander of UNOSOM II
operations, Montgomery believed he needed these units to enhance force protection,
given the increased incidents of mine warfare, sniping, mortar attacks, and ambushes
continuously experienced since 5 June. Admiral Howe agreed, believing these forces
were needed to permit movement within Mogadishu and for continued support of
humanitarian operations.133 Generals Hoar and Powell endorsed Montgomery’s request
(minus the artillery), but Secretary of Defense Les Aspin rejected it, out of concern
over congressional and public criticism.134 This decision, like the unity-of-command
issue, would come back to haunt military and civilian leaders within the Department of
Defense.
For the most part, the problems that forced UNOSOM II into the role of a combatant
in Somali factional warfare had been limited to Mogadishu—specifically, the areas of
the city controlled by Aideed and his SNA faction. The rest of Somalia actually experi-
enced improvement throughout the summer of 1993.135 The famine had been broken
by February, and in many areas calm and stability had begun to return. The resumption
of business activity and the reopening of schools demonstrated that progress was
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possible despite the continuing crisis with Aideed in Mogadishu.136 Nevertheless, Gen-
eral Montgomery had been correct to identify Mogadishu as the center of gravity for
CONTINUE HOPE. However improved the conditions in most of Somalia, the conflict
between Aideed and UNOSOM II and the consequent battle for control of the capital
city would decide the outcome of the UN mission in Somalia.137
With the arrival of Task Force RANGER at the end of August, the search for Aideed
became the focus of UN operations, attracting the attention of military leaders and the
international press. After a short period of settling in and rehearsals, Task Force
RANGER launched a succession of operations intended to capture and detain Aideed
and his top aides.138 The first major action involved an attack against the Lig Ligato
House on 30 August. The Lig Ligato House had supposedly replaced the Abdi House as
a command-and-control node and SNA meeting place. Unfortunately for Task Force
RANGER and USFORSOM, this assault proved somewhat of an embarrassment, because
the U.S. team captured eight employees of the UN Development Program, whom they
immediately released. (Perhaps the UNDP employees should have been the ones
embarrassed, since they were in a location frequented by Aideed, and from which UN
leadership had instructed them to depart. The presence of substantial amounts of cash
and contraband material also raised questions regarding their activities.)139
During September, there followed a series of textbook operations that captured a num-
ber of SNA leaders. Notwithstanding the skill and professionalism demonstrated in
these raids, getting current intelligence on Aideed and his most important lieutenants
proved very difficult.140 This shortcoming resulted in the occasional detention of inno-
cent people, causing criticism from various individuals—mostly in the media—with no
understanding of the difficulty of such missions. Regrettably, they also drew caustic
criticism from Secretary Aspin, who should have appreciated the problems.141 But an
operation on 21 September that succeeded in arresting Aideed’s most important lieu-
tenant, Osman Ato, somewhat offset that negative commentary. The apprehension
occurred near the Digfer Hospital in downtown Mogadishu, and it also netted three of
Osman Ato’s bodyguards.142 Osman Ato, of course, had been an important point of
contact for American leaders during PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE, before the
fissure between UNOSOM II and the SNA developed during CONTINUE HOPE. He was
sent into captivity on an island off Kismayo, but General Hoar would arrange for his
early release.143
Several other important considerations flowed from the 21 September action. First,
Aideed—who already had gone into hiding—went even farther underground, making
it more difficult to obtain information on his whereabouts or movements.144 Addition-
ally, whenever the special operations helicopters, known as “Little Birds” (an armed
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variant of the Army’s OH-6A Cayuse), lifted off from the airfield, SNA leaders assumed
that they were on a snatch mission. If Aideed happened to be in a vulnerable location,
he simply took a walk and submerged himself in the friendly masses of Mogadishu.145
By this point Aideed had become more important to Somalis as a symbol of resistance
than as the leader of his faction and subclan. The failed efforts to capture Aideed
tended to enhance his stature and to unify him and the SNA with all but his most
implacable enemies.146 This played into Aideed’s hands as he skillfully manipulated the
information front.147 Among other clever ploys, he cast the UN and United States in the
role of neocolonialists attempting to establish a new trusteeship in Somalia. In so
doing, he defined himself as defender of the nation.148
A second important point emerging from the 21 September raid was the considerable
firepower encountered by the helicopters of Task Force RANGER. For the first time a
high volume of RPG rounds was received from the SNA militia. It required the Rangers
and Delta Force soldiers to return fire, inflicting an unknown but substantial number
of casualties. Previous raids by Task Force RANGER had been so fast and efficient that
neither side received high casualties;149 the experience of 21 September suggested that
operations could become more dangerous. Aideed’s fighters had obviously adjusted to
American tactics, and this boded ill for the future.150 Four days later, on 25 September, a
Black Hawk helicopter belonging to Montgomery’s QRF became the victim of an RPG
round, killing three American crewmen.151
In the early afternoon of 3 October, leaders of Task Force RANGER learned from a Somali
informant of a meeting near the Olympic Hotel, in the heart of Aideed-controlled
Mogadishu. According to this intelligence, the gathering would include two of Aideed’s
top lieutenants, Abdi Hassan Awali and Omar Salad Elmi.152 The Delta team leaders
quickly developed a plan and dispatched a snatch team, which captured twenty-four
individuals, including the two Aideed advisers.153 The task force called for a prestaged
truck convoy to evacuate the detainees, which arrived on the scene at about 1600.
Twenty minutes later a Black Hawk helicopter piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Clifton
Wolcott, which provided fire support from onboard snipers, was struck by a rocket-
propelled grenade and crashed into the Mogadishu street, killing two and injuring five
U.S. soldiers.154 This precipitated the best-known action of the Somalia incursions—the
“Black Hawk Down” incident, or the “Battle of Mogadishu.”155
As Rangers and Delta operators moved to protect their comrades in the downed heli-
copter, a second Black Hawk, piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, also
took an RPG round and crash-landed some distance to the south. A rescue column
consisting of Task Force RANGER personnel, followed by a company of the QRF under
command of Lieutenant Colonel William C. David, attempted to break through to the
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Durant crash. But
just past the Kilo-
meter Four traffic
circle the relief
element tripped
an ambush that
forced it back to
the airport.156 A
special operations
helicopter
inserted two
Delta Force non-
commissioned
officers near the Durant crash site, where they attempted to hold off a growing throng
of armed Somali fighters. After a heroic stand, the small party of defenders was over-
run by the mob, killing all except Durant, who suffered serious injuries.157 When a res-
cue party finally broke through to the Durant crash site some hours after midnight,
neither Durant nor the American bodies remained. Durant had become a prisoner of
the SNA, and irate Somalis had desecrated the bodies of his five comrades.158
After the failure of the first relief effort to break through at the Kilometer Four circle,
Montgomery had organized a composite force of U.S. troops, Pakistani tanks, and
Malaysian armored personnel carriers; it took some time to organize and prepare for
action. Clearly, if Montgomery had possessed the armored task force he had requested,
a powerful reaction force could have been launched much sooner.159 Once Montgomery
put together his “pickup” rescue team, it fought its way to the two crash sites in the
early morning hours of 4 October.160 The soldiers of Task Force RANGER had been
fighting in downtown Mogadishu for over fourteen hours when the relief column
arrived.161 During the day, they received small reinforcements by helicopter, along with
a resupply of ammunition. The nearly one hundred soldiers of Task Force RANGER who
had formed around the Wolcott crash site fought off all attempts to overrun their posi-
tion. Unlike at the Durant crash site, the rescue team arrived in time to relieve the
Wolcott defenders, evacuate the wounded, and recover the dead.162
The fierce battle of 3–4 October 1993 constituted the bloodiest urban fighting for U.S.
forces since the Vietnam War. The American and coalition forces suffered eighteen
Americans killed and eighty-four wounded, two Malaysians killed and seven wounded,
and two Pakistanis wounded. Estimates of Somali casualties vary widely, but the U.S.
Army after-action report puts the number at three to five hundred killed and over
seven hundred wounded.163 The Somali figure would have been even greater (and
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American casualties would have been lighter) had not Special Operations Command
unthinkingly removed the AC-130 Spectre gunships from Somalia in early August.164
Grotesque pictures of an angry mob dragging a dead American soldier through the
streets of Mogadishu appeared in the United States late on 4 October.165 It was a sudden
shock to the American people and their political leadership.166 The United States had
gone into Somalia to end the famine and save lives. How had that resulted in bloody
urban combat and the dragging of an American soldier through the streets of
Mogadishu? Additionally, a public exhibition of severely injured Chief Warrant Officer
Durant, the only survivor of the fighting at his crash site, also became a dominant news
item, further distressing and angering the American public.167
The Battle of Mogadishu and the earlier failures to capture Aideed had vindicated Gen-
eral Hoar’s doubts about the efficacy of this approach, much to his distress. His regret,
of course, was the loss of U.S. troops, whom he characterized as “superb soldiers[;] . . .
nobody’s any better than these guys.”168 He also believed the decision process had been
weakened by the presence of people in high positions who did not understand the real-
ities of combat operations. Additionally, he felt that options with greater promise than
the capture and trial of Aideed had existed during the summer and fall of 1993. The
most hopeful of them had been an offer by the president of Ethiopia to host a meeting
of all aggrieved parties to resolve outstanding issues and end the violence.169 Leaders in
the UN and United States, however, had found no attraction in that prospect at the
time. Hoar also finds fault in himself, for permitting the snatch operations to continue
after the first several failures. He never believed that the operation had much chance of
success in the first place, and he saw virtually none after the element of surprise had
been lost: “I feel that I was culpable by not ending that goddamn thing.”170 Of course,
that would have been difficult, since orders for the operation came from the White
House.171
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Operation CONTINUE HOPE
Reinforcement and Withdrawal
In some ways, the Battle of Mogadishu was a replay of the 1968 Vietnam Tet offensive,
in microcosm. American leaders had not prepared the public for this level of violence,
and as a result the vivid press images created revulsion within the population and
among members of Congress.1 Just as Tet 1968 weakened American commitment in
Vietnam by shattering the will of irresolute political leaders, so too would the Battle of
Mogadishu result in American withdrawal from Somalia.2 In both cases, elected offi-
cials had committed the armed forces of the United States to a role that Americans did
not fully understand. When press coverage of an unexpected and violent battle revealed
the deception (intentional in the case of Vietnam, probably unintended in Somalia),
the revelation impaired the war effort.3 Ironically, the same media clout that had origi-
nally stimulated U.S. intervention in Somalia by exhibiting images of suffering now
undercut that effort with the images of the desecration of an American soldier.4 Of
course, the Vietnam analogy goes only so far. The size, impact, and results of the two
failures are not comparable. Yet it is interesting to note that if both Tet 1968 and
Mogadishu 1993 constituted public-relations defeats, they also represented military
victories. But they were victories that American leaders at the time chose not to exploit.
It is understandable that Americans did not have a clear appreciation of their country’s
role in Somalia at the time of the Battle of Mogadishu. Many thought American
involvement had ended with the return of U.S. troops at the conclusion of Operation
RESTORE HOPE. In a highly publicized event at the White House on 5 May 1993, Presi-
dent Clinton greeted General Johnston and a representative group from the UNITAF
force with a laudatory speech declaring, among other things, “I say to you General
[Johnston], and to all whom you brought with you: Welcome home, and thank you for
a job very, very well done.”5 This seemed like a “mission accomplished” ceremony,
although people who followed the Somalia situation in detail knew that the United
States had a continuing commitment to the UN effort. But for most Americans—who
do not follow foreign affairs closely—this welcome home on the White House lawn
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sent a message that the Somalia incursion was now finished.6 Certainly, the achieve-
ments of RESTORE HOPE justified the recognition that President Clinton conferred. Yet
due in part to good press coverage of the White House event, there remained only a
vague awareness among most Americans that nearly four thousand U.S. soldiers contin-
ued to serve in Somalia, and there was even less clarity about their role.7 After the Battle
of Mogadishu, this ambiguity and the anger it engendered strengthened the hand of
political leaders who wanted the United States out of Somalia and free of the UN com-
mitment. It also gave rise to a new term in the American lexicon—“mission creep.”8
“Mission creep” is a somewhat amorphous concept that is now widely used by politi-
cians, military leaders, and pundits alike. It suggests the drifting of a military mission
into something of higher responsibility and of greater cost in terms of blood and trea-
sure than originally intended. The initial incursions of PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE
HOPE had operated well within the mandate of Security Council Resolution 794 and
the intentions of American leaders. Any expansion of U.S. activity during UNITAF
operations—such as engineering support to local communities, reestablishment of a
police force, civic-action projects, and refugee resettlement assistance—had been
humanitarian in nature and did not cross a threshold that would lead to major combat
situations.9 Although some may consider even this a form of mission creep, it never
committed the United States to higher levels of responsibility in Somalia. Some critics
even suggest the UNITAF operation constituted “mission shrink,” by virtue of its fail-
ing to disarm all Somali factions in accordance with the Resolution 794 mandate and
the expectations of many leaders.10 This study has already addressed the debate on dis-
armament in some detail, but it is important to note that many observers believe the
failure of UNITAF to disarm the major warring factions in Somalia contributed to the
problems experienced later during UNOSOM II.11 Nevertheless, had UNITAF
attempted a complete disarmament as these critics suggest it should have, the accompa-
nying violence would surely have constituted severe mission creep.
The transition from RESTORE HOPE to CONTINUE HOPE clearly signaled a greater
involvement in Somali affairs through the process of nation building, as expressed in Res-
olution 814, substantially drafted by representatives of the United States.12 The foreign
policy initiatives of the new Clinton administration—“assertive multilateralism” and
“enlargement and engagement”—greatly influenced the language of Resolution 814.13
Unfortunately, the individuals who committed the United States to nation building in
Somalia did not coordinate with the established national security organizations, thereby
preventing leaders who questioned its wisdom from voicing their objections.14 The UN
decision to take the step toward violent conflict with Aideed’s SNA after the 5 June
attacks on the Pakistani forces found expression in Resolution 837, again supported by
representatives of the U.S. government.15 In fact, with passage of Resolution 837 the UN
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mission overtly changed from humanitarian operations to a form of violent conflict
between UNOSOM II and Aideed’s SNA. This was a very deliberate decision, taken by
the UN Security Council and supported—even instigated—by representatives of the U.S.
government.16 In General Zinni’s view, declaring Aideed an outlaw and placing a
reward on his head moved the mission from peacekeeping or peacemaking to a form of
counterinsurgency warfare.17 This change in the Somalia mission did not result from a
mindless drift but from specific actions knowingly undertaken by high-level leaders in
New York and Washington, as well as in Mogadishu.18
On 7 October 1993, three days after the Battle of Mogadishu, President Clinton
addressed the nation on Somalia. In it he praised the success of RESTORE HOPE and
lamented the fact that “the people who caused so much of the problem in the begin-
ning started attacking American, Pakistani, and other troops who were there just to
keep the peace.”19 He also professed that the United States would finish the job in
Somalia, but he allowed less than six months for that purpose: “All American troops
will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st, except for a few hundred support
personnel in noncombat roles.”20 Many leaders in the administration and Congress
wanted an immediate withdrawal, but a consensus of the National Security Council
and other key leaders convinced President Clinton that such action would be uncon-
scionable.21 In the interim, the president stated, he would increase U.S. strength by
ordering more ground troops and armor into Somalia, along with an aircraft carrier
and two amphibious ready groups, carrying some 3,600 Marines. The basic purpose of
these forces included protecting American troops, continuing the humanitarian relief,
and creating conditions wherein the Somali people could solve their problems among
themselves. To facilitate this process and achieve its rather nebulous objective for the
Somali people, the president asked Ambassador Robert Oakley to return once again to
Somalia.22 To Aideed, hunkered down in the recesses of Mogadishu, all this must have
sounded a lot like victory.23
After President Clinton had made the decision to withdraw from Somalia, he had
tasked General Hoar and Ambassador Albright with informing Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali prior to its public release. It was a message the Secretary-General did
not want to hear and did not take graciously.24 Ambassador Oakley returned to
Mogadishu on 9 October, two days after the president’s speech, accompanied by Gen-
eral Zinni and a new U.S. policy for dealing with Aideed and the Somalia problem.25
Ironically, this new American policy provided sufficient military power to accomplish
the original goals of Operation CONTINUE HOPE yet restricted the ability of Generals
Bir and Montgomery to use that power.26 A departure date having been announced,
America’s military posture in Somalia now became primarily defensive in nature. In
Oakley’s words, “Clinton personally ordered the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff, Admiral Dave Jeremiah, and General Hoar to stop any further action by U.S.
forces against Aideed, the SNA, or other Somalis except in self-defense.”27
President Clinton’s policy shift constituted the third major strategy for U.S. military
involvement in Somalia. The first—under President Bush, Ambassador Oakley, and
General Johnston—had focused on breaking the famine while minimizing conflict with
Somali warlords. Although this strategy involved cooperation with Aideed and other
faction leaders, it was backed up by hardball diplomacy and a powerful military force
under UNITAF, consisting primarily of U.S. Marines and soldiers of the 10th Mountain
Division.28 The second strategy—under President Clinton, Ambassador Albright,
Anthony Lake, General Montgomery, and UN officials Admiral Howe and General
Bir—consisted of nation building through auspices of the United Nations. It consti-
tuted a classic mismatch between strategy and resources, wherein the UN attempted to
accomplish larger and more intrusive objectives than under the earlier policy, with sub-
stantially less military power and diplomatic support.29 During this phase, communica-
tions between the UNOSOM II force and the Aideed faction broke down, allowing the
factor of surprise to enter into the equation within Mogadishu. That resulted in misun-
derstandings between the SNA and UN, contributing to the subsequent conflict
between Aideed and UNOSOM II.30 The third strategy followed President Clinton’s
policy speech of 7 October and the consequent reduction in military activity. In this
phase, the United States essentially moved into an exit strategy designed to extract the
United States from UNOSOM II and Somalia after a decent interval. Although U.S.
military and diplomatic power temporarily returned to Somalia during October 1993,
it primarily became a force to protect American personnel until the withdrawal date of
31 March 1994.31 Only during the first phase of America’s involvement in Somalia—
RESTORE HOPE/UNITAF—was there an appropriate match between strategy and
resources. In the second and third phases substantial mismatches existed, although only
in the second phase did this create problems.
Aideed reacted to President Clinton’s speech of 7 October and the changing political
environment in Washington and Somalia by declaring a unilateral cease-fire in
Mogadishu.32 Officially, the UN and United States did not acknowledge Aideed’s cease-
fire, but the change in American policy, coupled with the absence of offensive military
activity by UNOSOM II forces, served as an unofficial recognition and acceptance of
the gesture.33 For Aideed, this provided a needed respite. His militia and supporters
had suffered grievous losses in the Battle of Mogadishu. In General Zinni’s opinion,
“the battle that day really took its toll. . . . [A]t that stage in the game they were really
down and worried.”34 But Aideed no longer needed to fight against U.S. and UN forces.
He had only to wait until 31 March 1994, and the situation would turn decidedly in
his favor.35
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Admiral Howe, as the Secretary-General’s special representative in Somalia, also
believed that the Battle of Mogadishu had severely damaged Aideed and the SNA. But
in his view, there was now an opportunity to destroy the power of Aideed, whom he
considered the major impediment to progress in Somalia.36 Howe considered the
Somalis good people, who had achieved a level of stability everywhere in their country
except where Aideed ruled.37 Even Omar Jess and General Morgan had made an accom-
modation in southern Somalia, and Kismayo was no longer the flash point for violence
that it had been in the past.38 With substantial U.S. ground and naval forces flowing
into the operational area, Howe believed UNOSOM II could now eliminate the power
of Aideed and place Somalia on the road to full recovery.39 Unfortunately for Howe and
his concept of victory, President Clinton’s restrictions ensured that the powerful Amer-
ican forces building up in Somalia would primarily operate in a defensive mode.40 They
did conduct extensive planning and rehearsals, along with several complex operations.41
But these were more in the nature of exercises and shows of force. The days of taking
the fight to Aideed and the SNA had ended with the Battle of Mogadishu.42
Upon their arrival in Mogadishu, Oakley and Zinni (who returned to Somalia at
Oakley’s request) met with Howe, Bir, and Montgomery to gain an understanding of
their position on the issues and explain the new American policy for Somalia.43 Of
course, U.S. objectives would drive UN action in the future, just as they had in the past.
After discussions with UN and American leaders, Oakley and Zinni met with represen-
tatives of the SNA and eventually with Aideed himself. (They also met with Ali Mahdi
representatives, although UNOSOM II had not been at war with his SSA faction.) The
first order of business involved release of Chief Warrant Officer Durant. During meet-
ings with Aideed’s representatives, Oakley and Zinni persuaded them (and indirectly
Aideed himself) to release Durant, along with a Nigerian soldier, Umar Shantali, whom
the SNA had captured in a bloody shoot-out some weeks earlier.44 Obtaining these
releases had been problematic and very challenging. In Oakley’s words, “Aideed’s deci-
sion to release the prisoners without quid pro quo was exceedingly difficult. Thou-
sands of casualties in south Mogadishu in the summer and fall had been among his
followers and kinsmen, and feelings were running very high.”45
Oakley’s credibility and his skill at hardball diplomacy overcame opposition to
Durant’s release. Oakley did not actually negotiate for Durant’s release or promise any
U.S. action in return. He simply demanded the release as a gesture of good will, while
suggesting dire consequences if refused.46 But when Oakley returned to the United
States, he contacted General Hoar and mentioned that Osman Ato was quite ill in his
captivity (on, as noted, an island off Kismayo) and that he thought it might be a nice
gesture to release him. Hoar accommodated, telling Oakley, “I’m going to release him,
Bob, but please don’t tell anybody.”47 Certainly, Oakley did not offer Aideed any quid
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pro quo for the release of Durant, but it is probably fair to say that one goodwill
gesture deserved another.
Although the release of Durant was important to Oakley’s mission, his broader pur-
pose involved restarting the peace process in Somalia and returning conditions to polit-
ical and diplomatic tracks.48 Whereas Howe hoped to finish off Aideed militarily,
Oakley intended to re-create the more conciliatory relations of RESTORE HOPE.49 This
was consistent with President Clinton’s intent “to make it possible for the Somali peo-
ple, working with others, to reach agreements among themselves so that they can solve
their problems and survive when we leave.”50 Oakley’s effort had a positive effect on
calming the situation in Somalia, and his credibility with Aideed and SNA leaders gave
him considerable influence. But Clinton’s lofty goals had no real hope for success once he
announced the withdrawal date of 31 March 1994. Zinni came to believe that the Clinton
administration had given up on accomplishing anything beneficial in Somalia and there-
after simply used Oakley to place the best possible face on the American withdrawal.51
On 16 November, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 885, which in effect
suspended arrest actions against Aideed and set the stage for release of SNA prisoners,
including Mohamed Awali and Omar Salad Elmi, “snatched” by the Delta Force in
October. Resolution 885 essentially nullified the provisions of Resolution 837. It also
authorized “the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry . . . to investigate armed
attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them.”52 The results of
that investigation, entitled Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to
Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel, was pub-
lished 1 June 1994. Among other things, the investigation found, “the mandate given to
UNOSOM II, at least as it was interpreted, was too pretentious in relation to the instru-
ments and to the will to implement it.”53 In other words, there existed a mismatch
between strategy and resources, and an insufficiency of will.
U.S. forces began flowing into Somalia almost immediately after President Clinton’s 7
October address to the nation. The first element included a battalion-sized reinforce-
ment from the 10th Mountain Division, along with AC-130 Spectre gunships. General
Hoar had assigned AC-130s to support Montgomery after the 5 June attacks on the
Pakistani troops, but as noted, Special Operations Command had reassigned them to
other missions during August. As part of the force protection plan in the wake of the
Battle of Mogadishu, Hoar had the Spectres returned to the Horn of Africa.54 Based out
of Mombasa, Kenya, these AC-130s would patrol the skies over Mogadishu as “airborne
guardians” to the American and UNOSOM II forces below.55 Howe believed these
gunships represented an ideal weapon, if used in conjunction with other American
forces, for defeating Aideed’s militia and eliminating him as a force in Mogadishu. But
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he would not get the opportunity to utilize these or any other U.S. weapons for that
purpose. At this point, American leaders intended the AC-130 Spectres, like the other
U.S. forces arriving on the scene, for troop protection and as a show of force.56
In addition to the infantry battalion from Fort Drum and the AC-130 aircraft, General
Montgomery received heavy ground forces to support and protect USFORSOM. These
included the immediate ready company of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
with a platoon of M1 Abrams tanks attached. That force moved to Mogadishu by stra-
tegic airlift (C-5 Galaxy aircraft) from Fort Stewart, Georgia, within days of Clinton’s
speech.57 The immediate ready company constituted the lead element of a larger orga-
nization known as Task Force 1-64 (1st Battalion of the 64th Armor), which arrived in
Mogadishu by strategic sealift during mid-November.58 Once fully established in Soma-
lia, Task Force 1-64 consisted of five armored and mechanized company teams, a 155
mm self-propelled artillery battery, an engineer battalion, and various support ele-
ments, totaling well over a thousand soldiers.59 Task Force 1-64 was a very powerful
detachment, far stronger than the mechanized and armor forces Montgomery had
requested during August and September. Although intended as an instrument of force
protection and deter-
rence, the increased
American military
power also enhanced
the bargaining posi-
tion of Oakley and
other American lead-
ers on various issues
of particular interest
to the United States,
such as the release of
Chief Warrant Officer
Durant.60
To organize the forces
arriving in Somalia and provide a vehicle for command and control of the growing U.S.
Army component, Central Command activated on 14 October 1993 a new headquar-
ters, named “Joint Task Force Somalia” (JTF Somalia), under Major General Carl F.
Ernst, USA. The new JTF Somalia commander integrated the forces arriving from the
United States with the existing units of the 10th Mountain Division constituting the
QRF, essentially taking control of U.S. operational units within Somalia.61 Figures 3 and
4 illustrate the organizational structure of U.S. forces before and after the arrival of JTF
Somalia. The primary mission of JTF Somalia involved “U.S. force protection and
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FIGURE 3
UNOSOM II/USFORSOM Command Structure prior to October 1993
U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 119; Bolger, Savage Peace, p. 309; Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 12.
FIGURE 4
USFORSOM–JTF Somalia Command Structure after October 1993
U.S. Army Dept., Somalia After Action Report, p. 203; Baumann and Yates, with Washington, “My Clan against the World,” p.
102; Casper, Falcon Brigade, p. 104.
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preparation for redeployment.”62 The chain of command flowed from General Hoar at
Central Command through General Montgomery as commander of all U.S. forces in
Somalia, and on to General Ernst as commander of JTF Somalia. But Montgomery
had only tactical control of JTF Somalia, whereas operational control of Ernst’s force
remained with General Hoar at Central Command, causing some confusion about
command relations.63 This basic structure would remain in place until mid-January
1994, at which time General Hoar combined USFORSOM with JTF Somalia under
Montgomery’s command.64 Although Ernst departed Somalia at that point, his staff
remained in place to serve Montgomery in his command of U.S. forces.65
In building a staff to support the new joint headquarters, General Ernst drew from a
variety of sources. About half of its members came from the headquarters of 10th
Mountain Division, the remainder consisting of individual augmentees from all ser-
vices.66 Among the more prominent officers were Brigadier General Peter Pace, who
served as deputy commander for JTF Somalia, and Colonel Emil R. “Buck” Bedard,
who became the J-3 (operations) officer. Assigning these key positions to Marine offi-
cers underscored the joint nature of the JTF Somalia staff.67 It also allowed Ernst to
draw upon the experience that Pace and Bedard had acquired while serving with
UNITAF during RESTORE HOPE.68 Both officers would remain in Somalia under Mont-
gomery after the departure of Ernst in January 1994. On 17 October, in the midst of all
this activity, Task Force RANGER quietly departed Somalia with all its equipment on
board U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy aircraft.69
Regrettably, with the establishment of JTF Somalia a certain amount of tension devel-
oped over command relations. Montgomery and Ernst had somewhat different views
of the U.S. tasking, and lines of authority were even less clear than they had been.70
Although both held the rank of major general (Ernst was actually a promotable briga-
dier general, “frocked” to the two-star level for this assignment), Montgomery
remained the senior American commander in Somalia. But both Ernst and JTF Somalia
were under the operational command of Central Command.71 Additionally, Ernst
tended to embrace the Oakley and Zinni criticism of UNOSOM II, thereby creating
resentment in Montgomery, who believed that the mission and circumstances had
changed significantly since the days of RESTORE HOPE.72 Having been in the middle of a
very difficult and bloody situation in Mogadishu for a several months, Montgomery
did not appreciate criticism from individuals who had not been there during that
time.73 Ernst felt he received a cold reception from Montgomery, who wanted most of
the JTF Somalia forces (especially engineers and infantry) placed under USFORSOM
for construction and security duty. Ernst refused to do so and insisted on keeping all
his forces integral to JTF Somalia. Since JTF Somalia was under the operational control
of Central Command, only General Hoar could order Ernst to reassign his troops.74
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Another area of contention between the two commanders involved the clearing of the
21 October Road.75 Named for a significant victory of the Somali civil war, the road had
been the site of numerous incidents between the SNA and UN during UNOSOM II,
and it held great symbolic value.76 Montgomery built a bypass road to avoid the strain
and conflict associated with that main corridor and to permit movement in support of
humanitarian and UNOSOM II operations.77 But Ernst believed he had direction to
open the old road and keep it clear of roadblocks and factional control. Additionally,
he considered the bypass road longer and more time consuming for moving supplies or
reinforcements into the hinterland or outlying posts.78 Montgomery viewed the bypass
as an appropriate solution to a sticky problem, one that was consistent with his guid-
ance from Central Command.79 After Oakley and Zinni visited JTF Somalia during
their October trip to Mogadishu, Ernst developed a joint and combined plan to
retake the 21 October Road using Pakistani forces with an armored overwatch from
elements of the 64th Armor. The armor and other U.S. forces would be prepositioned
where they could take over the mission if the Pakistani force ran into trouble.80 Mont-
gomery suspected that Oakley and Zinni’s visit to JTF Somalia reinforced Ernst’s intent
to reopen the 21 October Road by force if necessary.81 The fact that he did not know
about the operational plan until Ernst presented it to him did not please the
USFORSOM commander.82
Ernst and his staff worked diligently to put together a detailed and comprehensive plan
for clearing the 21 October Road and then rehearsed it extensively in live-fire and
maneuver exercises.83 But Montgomery did not intend to approve the plan, believing
that UNOSOM II no longer needed the 21 October Road and abhorring the idea of send-
ing Pakistani troops back up that road after the casualties they had suffered on 5 June
1993. Additionally, UN opposition from Generals Bir and Montgomery (in his role as
deputy UN commander), coupled with verbal direction coming out of the White
House to avoid offensive actions and American casualties, eliminated any prospect of
this action, or any other risky operation, being carried out except in self-defense.84
Montgomery had originally been scheduled for rotation back to the United States dur-
ing October 1993. Had that occurred, Ernst would have become the senior U.S. com-
mander in Somalia. But when the president decided to withdraw the United States
from UNOSOM II, officials in Washington chose to keep Montgomery in place to rede-
ploy American forces.85 This undoubtedly disappointed Ernst, as did the restrictions
placed on use of JTF Somalia.86 Ernst did conduct several major humanitarian opera-
tions during November and December, which also served to exercise his force, along
with the MEU(SOC)s from offshore ARGs, but he undertook no offensive military
actions.87 Additionally, JTF Somalia escorted convoys, conducted some patrols, and
secured the U.S. cantonment areas and other fixed sites.88 Ernst believed he and his staff
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had accomplished all the planning necessary for the existing missions, including the
amphibious withdrawal scheduled for 31 March 1994. They had created a four-phase
campaign plan: phase I (Tactical Offense and Operational Defense), phase II (Tactical
Defense and Operational Offense), phase III (Tactical and Operational Defense), and
phase IV (Withdrawal). In the event, JTF Somalia went to phase III much earlier than
expected due to the risk-adverse policy of the White House.89 The JTF staff had also
developed a complex execution matrix that addressed every contingency the JTF would
likely have to deal with while in Somalia. Although Ernst would like to have remained
in Somalia as JTF commander, even he agreed that it made sense to keep Montgomery
in place, given his experience and relationship with the UN, which would become more
important as U.S. forces drew down.90 On 17 January 1994, General Hoar combined the
two commands (USFORSOM and JTF Somalia) under Montgomery, at which time
Ernst returned to the United States.91 Thereafter, Montgomery removed himself from
his role as the deputy commander of UNOSOM II under General Bir and focused
exclusively on his duties as commander of U.S. forces.92 During February and March,
elements of USFORSOM/JTF Somalia began the redeployment of its units to the
United States through strategic airlift in preparation for the tactical amphibious
withdrawal of its last remaining units.93
As part of the flow of ground troops into Somalia during October and November, pow-
erful naval forces sailed into its coastal waters, arriving only days after the president’s 7
October speech.94 The USS New Orleans ARG, with Captain Brian F. Boyce as commo-
dore, arrived on 10 October bearing 13th MEU (SOC), commanded by Colonel Larry
D. Outlaw.95 The New Orleans ARG and 13th MEU (SOC) remained in Somalia waters
until mid-February conducting a variety of operations ashore under the direction of
Ernst and Montgomery. About the same time, Rear Admiral Joseph J. Dantone, Jr.,
brought major elements of the USS Abraham Lincoln battle group to Somalia from the
Arabian Gulf, where they had been supporting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH by
enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq.96 The USS Guadalcanal ARG, under
Commodore Guy E. Myslivy, with 22nd MEU (SOC), commanded by Colonel Jan C.
Huly, arrived on the scene about the same time as Abraham Lincoln and New Orleans.97
Collectively, these naval forces constituted a formidable presence to support
USFORSOM and JTF Somalia ashore.98 Ernst and Dantone established a tone of coop-
eration very early in the deployment, developing a gentlemen’s agreement to work as a
team and to keep each other well informed of their plans and issues.99 When the Amer-
ica group relieved Abraham Lincoln, Rear Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski continued the
relationship established by his predecessor. Both naval commanders viewed their role
in Somalia waters as providing support to Ernst and JTF Somalia.100
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Having two MEUs in the operational area with a subtle and sensitive mission to per-
form, Marine Corps leaders decided to assign a senior officer to oversee composite
operations, at least during the initial stages of the deployment.101 Brigadier General
Richard F. Vercauteren—who also commanded the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade
in Hawaii—was a logical choice, because of his extensive experience on the African
continent and particularly in Somalia. In previous assignments, before the chaos of the
1990s had set in, he had traveled the length and breadth of the country. Vercauteren
collected an ad hoc staff from various sources and joined Admiral Dantone on board
Abraham Lincoln, from where he helped coordinate Marine activities ashore and
afloat.102 One of Vercauteren’s immediate problems involved the organization of the
Marine forces then assembling off the coast of Mogadishu. At that time, the Marine
Corps had decided to phase out Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) such as Gen-
eral Jenkins had commanded during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. For this rea-
son, and because ARGs and MEUs would rotate in and out of Somalia station at
irregular times, Vercauteren decided not to restructure the two Marine expeditionary
units into a MEB configuration. They would continue to function as separate organiza-
tions; Vercauteren would closely coordinate and integrate their activities under the
rubric “Marine Forces Somalia.”103
Rear Admiral James Perkins—who commanded Amphibious Group 3 in San Diego—
returned to Somalia in mid-October to coordinate the naval elements of the amphibi-
ous force, in a role similar to that Vercauteren played for the Marines.104 Perkins, of
course, had provided critical service during RESTORE HOPE, and he would contribute
in an equally important, if different, role during this phase of the incursion.105 Despite
the fact that the two ARG/MEUs—New Orleans with 13th MEU (SOC) and
Guadalcanal with 22nd MEU (SOC)—remained separate entities, Perkins performed
the function of commander, amphibious task force, while Vercauteren served as com-
mander, landing force, although these roles were somewhat ad hoc in nature. Captain
John Peterson—who had been commodore of the Tripoli ARG during the initial inser-
tion of Colonel Newbold’s special-purpose Marine air-ground task force in December
1992—accompanied Perkins as his chief of staff.106 Vercauteren would depart after
about six weeks, returning in March to assist during the final evacuation of U.S. forces
from Somalia.107 Perkins and Peterson remained on station and facilitated the final
evacuation of American forces during March 1994.108 During the closing months of
American involvement in Somalia, a close personal and professional relationship devel-
oped between Montgomery and Perkins, contributing to the efficiency and effective-
ness of operations.109
An interesting aspect of the naval expeditionary forces deployed off Somalia during
this period was the integration of the carrier battle group with the amphibious ready
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groups. This resulted
from the exploration of
new concepts character-
istic of America’s sea
services of the 1990s.110
Admiral Dantone and
his Abraham Lincoln
battle group had teamed
with the New Orleans
ARG and 13th MEU
(SOC) during pre-
deployment training off
the California coast
prior to departing for the Indian Ocean. Their innovative approach had combined a
carrier battle group with an amphibious ready group as a means to enhance combat
power and power projection.111 For example, at San Clemente Island, off the California
coast, Abraham Lincoln and the New Orleans ARG conducted a series of complex exer-
cises.112 Use of this concept of naval power in the Somalia situation clearly constituted
an application of . . . From the Sea, in that it focused naval expeditionary forces, cou-
pled with naval aviation assets, toward the littorals while they acted in concert with
joint forces (Army and Air Force) ashore.113 It also anticipated the publication one year
later of Forward . . . From the Sea, which emphasized tailoring naval expeditionary
forces around fleet operational forces, using a building-block approach.114
The USS America battle group under Rear Admiral Cebrowski had undertaken a simi-
lar integration effort with the USS Guadalcanal ARG and 22nd MEU (SOC) prior to
their deployment into the Mediterranean.115 Essentially a form of adaptive force pack-
aging, this approach proposed to do more with smaller naval forces in the resource-
scarce aftermath of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. But once the Guadalcanal
ARG reported into the Sixth Fleet, the amphibious element tended to revert to a
traditional ARG/MEU configuration.116 America would participate in Somalia opera-
tions as a replacement for Abraham Lincoln, conducting a direct handoff later in the
deployment.117 Its earlier training with the Guadalcanal ARG and 22nd MEU (SOC)
proved a valuable asset during subsequent operations on the littoral of Somalia,
because its officers had gained a keen understanding of the ARG/MEU capability.
During their time on station, Colonel Huly and 22nd MEU (SOC) assumed the QRF
mission for a period, sent security forces ashore, and flew helicopter missions over
Mogadishu as part of the show of force then under way.118 After two weeks on station,
the Guadalcanal ARG and 22nd MEU (SOC) departed Somalia waters to participate in
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Operation BRIGHT STAR in Egypt.119 Despite the intense focus on Somalia, General
Hoar and other American leaders believed that BRIGHT STAR played an important role
in maintaining American influence and cooperation in that part of the world. Egypt
had supported the United States during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and
American leaders believed that participation in BRIGHT STAR would help bond that
relationship and serve as an indicator of America’s good relations with Arab countries.120
Additionally, events had calmed down in Somalia to a point that one ARG/MEU off the
coast of Mogadishu, coupled with the other ground and naval forces arriving in Somalia,
could provide adequate security for American and UN personnel.121
Several weeks after
the departure of
the Guadalcanal
ARG/MEU,
Cebrowski brought
the America battle
group into Somalia
waters to replace
Abraham Lincoln.
The two battle
group command-
ers and their staffs
conducted a face-
to-face turnover, in
the interest of maintaining close and continuous support of JTF Somalia during this
critical time.122 Having worked with 22nd MEU (SOC) and conducted its own workups
similar to those of Abraham Lincoln and 13th MEU (SOC), the America group’s
assumption of responsibility proved seamless with respect to naval operations off the
shore of Somalia.123 The America battle group and New Orleans ARG with 13th MEU
(SOC) could function together very effectively in subsequent operations because all
elements had trained to perform that mission. In other words, Cebrowski and the
America battle group understood MEU operations and could work well with amphibi-
ous forces.124 Additionally, the two carrier battle groups represented a strong show of
force, using both their ships and aircraft. The ships could get very near to the shoreline,
due to the steepness of the coast and the deep water close in, making them highly vis-
ible ashore. Also, of course, they put numerous high-performance jets overhead at
fairly low altitudes, reminding all parties of the power available to support U.S. forces
and interests.125
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From the end of October until mid-February 1994, the New Orleans ARG and 13th
MEU (SOC) provided the only amphibious force in the Somalia area of operations.
During that period, elements of 13th MEU (SOC) conducted various actions in sup-
port of JTF Somalia, as a quick-reaction force and as a reinforcing element for opera-
tions ashore.126 Additionally, 13th MEU (SOC) augmented the intelligence and
surveillance capability of Ernst, using its sophisticated collection equipment. Outlaw
also placed the aviation assets of the Marine expeditionary unit, primarily a variety of
helicopters, in the service of the forces ashore.127 Snipers from both the MEU and SEAL
units assisted in the protection of facilities and individuals ashore, keeping hostile ele-
ments at a proper distance, while operating within the rules of engagement.
Like the previous ARG/MEUs that had visited Somalia littorals since American involve-
ment, 13th MEU (SOC) conducted frequent humanitarian assistance missions and fre-
quently operated medical and dental clinics for needy Somalis ashore. Like Colonel
Newbold’s SPMAGTF and Broderick’s 24th MEU (SOC), Marines and Navy medical
personnel of 13th MEU (SOC) provided extensive, desperately needed health care ser-
vices during excursions ashore, often for several days at a time.128 In some cases, such as
Operation SHOW CARE and Operation MORE CARE, they operated in conjunction with
Army and coalition elements.129 In other cases, they operated more independently,
although always under JTF Somalia command when ashore.
On 2 February 1994, 24th MEU (SOC) returned to Somalia waters to relieve 13th MEU
(SOC). Colonel Broderick still commanded 24th MEU (SOC), which had now
deployed on board the USS Inchon amphibious ready group, with Captain Steven Reis
serving as commodore.130 When relieved by the Inchon ARG, the New Orleans group
proceeded to Singapore, where it conducted a face-to-face turnover with the Peleliu
ARG and 11th MEU (SOC) and cross-decked some special equipment for use in Soma-
lia by 11th MEU (SOC).131 Captain Warren Ide, Jr., was the commodore of the Peleliu
ARG, and Colonel William C. McMullen III commanded 11th MEU (SOC).132 The
Peleliu ARG and 11th MEU (SOC) proceeded to Somalia, where they joined the
Inchon ARG and 24th MEU (SOC) for duty in the last critical weeks of Operation
CONTINUE HOPE.133
Ide and McMullen had known they would deploy to Somalia as they conducted their
MEU (SOC) workup training in California during the latter half of 1993. In addition to
the standard and special training objectives required for the deployment of a MEU
(SOC), the two commanders concentrated much of their training on raids and long-
range noncombatant evacuation operations. Many American leaders feared that the
U.S. withdrawal from Somalia would precipitate another social and political collapse.
Should that occur, large numbers of American and third-nation citizens would be at
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risk and require evacuation. By focusing on raids and long-range evacuation training—
similar to what Moser and Doyle executed during EASTERN EXIT—the Peleliu ARG and
11th MEU (SOC) could save many lives if Somalia fell back into chaos.134 Upon arriving
in Somalia waters, 11th MEU (SOC) assumed primary responsibility as an evacuation
force in readiness, as well as a reserve force to support Broderick’s 24th MEU (SOC)
ashore.135 Broderick’s troops would provide security during the withdrawal of
USFORSOM/JTF Somalia units, while McMullen, primarily at sea, would support
those operations and maintain a ready-response capability for any emergencies ashore
during or after the withdrawal.136
Once 11th MEU (SOC) arrived on the scene in Somalia, McMullen and his staff needed
to develop a set of plans appropriate for the local circumstances. During this planning
process they identified some 2,300–2,600 people, primarily in central and southern
Somalia, who would require evacuation. They established four collection sites
(Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, and Bardera), where the evacuees would assemble. In
addition to his organic assets, the Marine Corps provided McMullen with a detach-
ment of four C-130 Hercules airplanes based in Mombasa to assist in evacuation oper-
ations. After developing operational plans, 11th MEU (SOC) conducted a series of
rehearsals that included flights to the assembly areas and reviews of extraction sites and
routes.137
On 14 March, Peleliu received orders to steam south and conduct search and rescue
operations in response to the loss of an AC-130 Spectre aircraft off the coast of
Malindi, Kenya, killing over half of the fourteen-man crew.138 McMullen sent a CH-53E
Super Stallion helicopter ahead with key personnel and equipment; it arrived shortly
after the crash. The aircraft had gone down in about fifteen feet of water in Malindi
Lagoon. McMullen’s divers removed all the ordnance and critical equipment prior to
the arrival of the Air Force recovery team. They also recovered all the bodies except
one, who had been last seen by his fellow crew members in a parachute over water.
Search and rescue efforts by a variety of organizations over a two-week period could
not find that missing airman.139
As things turned out in Somalia, McMullen did not need to conduct an emergency
evacuation in Somalia after the U.S. pullout. Although some firefights occurred among
the various factions, the situation in Somalia did not unravel as many expected it to.
But 11th MEU (SOC) remained a ready force offshore, “spring-loaded” and ready for
immediate launching. Moreover, the training and skills obtained in preparing for these
Somalia evacuations did not go to waste. They proved of great service to the United
States a few weeks later, when it became necessary to evacuate American citizens from
another chaotic situation, in Rwanda.140
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The actual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia occurred over more than two
months.141 The buildup of JTF Somalia occurred primarily in October and November,
and by January 1994 Central Command had consolidated the force under Montgom-
ery’s command. One of the major milestones of the withdrawal occurred in January,
when logistical support to UNOSOM II was farmed out to a contractor (Brown &
Root), after having been under U.S. Army cognizance throughout the Somalia incur-
sions.142 In February, the gradual redeployment of units back to the United States had
begun.143 Most of Montgomery’s soldiers and much of their equipment actually flew
out of Mogadishu airport on U.S. Air Force C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy aircraft or
on contracted 747s and DC-10 planes prior to the amphibious withdrawal that
occurred in late March 1994.144 But flying large airplanes out of Mogadishu airport
loaded with American troops and equipment created considerable risks; for one to be
shot down would have been a disaster.145
It is unlikely that SNA fighters using RPGs would have attacked American aircraft in
flight; that weapon is inadequate for such a task beyond about eight hundred yards,
and the security zone around the runways exceeded that distance. Besides, Aideed
wanted foreign forces out of his country and would certainly avoid interference with
their departure.146 But in Somalia it was always possible that some rogue element would
acquire shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles capable of bringing down a slow-
flying American plane at low altitude. To avoid this nightmare scenario, Montgomery
assigned helicopter gunships and observers to control the areas around the airfield and
to escort the U.S. aircraft as they made their approaches and departures from
Mogadishu.147 Montgomery’s efforts proved adequate since no real threat to flight oper-
ations developed during the redeployment period.
The final step in the U.S. withdrawal, including removal of most heavy combat power,
occurred by means of a classical amphibious withdrawal named Operation QUICK
DRAW.148 Broderick’s 24th MEU (SOC) served as the primary instrument to accomplish
that mission, with substantial support from all amphibious forces afloat. The Inchon
ARG with 24th MEU (SOC) returned to Somalia on 2 February 1994. Broderick’s force
immediately went ashore and came under control of General Montgomery.149 On 4
March, 24th MEU (SOC) conducted a relief in place with Montgomery’s Army security
forces, thereby permitting the subsequent redeployment of all U.S. Army forces.
Broderick’s force provided a secure perimeter for the loading of Army forces on two
contract ships for transportation to Mombasa, from where they would return to the
United States. The ships, provided by Military Sealift Command, included the Greek
motor vessel Mediterranean Sky and the SS Empire State, of U.S. registry.150 (Empire
State is the school training ship for the State University of New York Maritime College,
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at Fort Schuyler, New York, and is part of the U.S. Maritime Administration’s Ready
Reserve Force.)151
Essentially, 24th MEU (SOC) established a perimeter ashore that encompassed the port
area, the airfield, and other contiguous areas necessary to protect American and coali-
tion forces. Montgomery placed his Army units (ground, air, armor, and logistical)
under Broderick’s command, so that he could use them as assets for defense, if neces-
sary, and control their egress from land onto their ships.152 This also permitted Mont-
gomery to relieve his brigade headquarters earlier so it could fly to its home station and
oversee the transition of their forces back into the United States.153 The 24th MEU (SOC),
supported by 11th MEU (SOC) and other naval forces afloat, maintained control over
the secured areas while the U.S. forces loaded on ships and departed Somalia.154 Despite
the presence of Admiral Perkins and General Vercauteren in the operational area,
amphibious forces off Somalia served under General Montgomery’s command once
ashore.155 The process of relieving Army units of their security responsibilities and pre-
paring for their withdrawal occurred over several weeks, but the actual amphibious
withdrawal took only one day—25 March 1994.156
During the loading of Army units and equipment, Montgomery and Broderick loaded
their tanks and heavy weapons last, so they would remain available for use should the
need arise.157 Once the Army units were loaded on their ships and Montgomery had
departed for Peleliu, Broderick’s Marines boarded their amphibious assault vehicles and
returned to their ships.158 During the withdrawal of the Marines, a picket line of AH-1
Cobra gunships from 11th and 24th MEU(SOC)s hovered at the perimeter, facing out-
board and ready to engage any element attempting to interfere. Once the last amphibi-
ous vehicle splashed into the water, Broderick got aboard Vercauteren’s UH-1 Huey
helicopter and the two men returned to their ships.159 The United States was once again
free from foreign entanglements. It had been a clean, smooth, and textbook-quality
amphibious withdrawal, but it would not be the last one the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps would undertake from the shores of Somalia.
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Operation UNITED SHIELD
When the United States announced its intention to withdraw from Somalia in October
1993, a number of other nations also decided to pull out their forces as well. As a result,
UNOSOM II lost some of its most capable and best-equipped contingents.1 The UN
could not replace all the units lost and had to consider how to function under substan-
tially altered circumstances. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali continued to believe that
the strategy laid out for UNOSOM II under Resolution 814 and its supporting docu-
ments was the correct approach to the problems of Somalia. This strategy embraced
the options of coercive disarmament and military reprisals for attacks on UN forces by
clan-based factions.2 But he also realized that the approach was no longer possible,
because it had become “evident that Member States were not prepared to commit the
troops needed to replace those being withdrawn by the United States and several Euro-
pean and other countries.”3
Boutros-Ghali reluctantly proposed a more limited mission for UNOSOM II, which
the Security Council passed as Resolution 897 on 4 February 1994.4 This resolution
reduced the size of the UN contingent and curtailed its powers of enforcement, return-
ing UNOSOM II to a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VI authority, as had been
the case during UNOSOM (I). In short, soldiers could now use their weapons only in
self-defense, when directly threatened. There would be no more attacks against Somali
factions for preemption or reprisal purposes, and no more discussion of forcible disar-
mament. Additionally, all UN measures to assist the Somali people in rebuilding their
country and achieving reconciliation would depend strictly on cooperation.5
Numerous changes in UN leadership accompanied this transition. On 12 January 1994,
Lieutenant General Aboo Samah Aboo Bakar of Malaysia succeeded Lieutenant Gen-
eral Cevik Bir of Turkey as the UNOSOM II force commander. By all accounts, General
Bir had served the UN very well; he had been a highly competent and effective general
officer, respected by his peers and associates. The U.S. commander, General Thomas
Montgomery, had developed a close relationship with Bir, for whom he had been—
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along with other American officers serving on Bir’s staff—a rock of support during the
UN mission.6 Yet the Turkish contingent to UNOSOM II was only a company-sized unit,
and this somewhat undercut Bir’s effectiveness. When he wanted to carry out serious
combat operations, he often had trouble convincing coalition members to support
them, since many believed the small force from his own nation could not carry its fair
share of the burden.7 This factor, coupled with the independent-mindedness of the var-
ious international partners, had made Bir’s job very challenging, despite strong support
and cooperation from the U.S. contingent.
On 8 March 1994, Admiral Jonathan Howe stepped down as the Secretary-General’s
special representative in Somalia. His deputy, Lansana Kouyate of Guinea, became the
acting special representative until 1 July, when James Victor Gbeho of Ghana assumed
the post.8 Howe’s service to UNOSOM II received high praise from Boutros-Ghali and
formal recognition in Security Council Resolution 897.9 Yet Howe had been subjected
to considerable criticism within the United States for the UN decision to pursue Aideed
after the 5 June ambush of Pakistani soldiers. In fact, Howe had become the person
most directly identified with the “get Aideed” strategy and the decision to go to war
against the SNA.10 These critics had conveniently forgotten the role that key members
of the Clinton administration played in creating and sustaining that strategy.11 In seek-
ing to find fault, it is always easier to focus on one individual than a complex process or
a group of people with varying degrees of culpability. In any case, Admiral Howe—who
had had a highly successful career in the U.S. Navy, and as deputy national security
adviser—said of his year in Somalia, “I’ve never had a harder job.”12
No immediate descent into chaos occurred in Somalia after the U.S. withdrawal, but as
many feared, violence increased. There was fighting between clan-based factions (those
of Aideed and Ali Mahdi), and there were renewed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel.13
From May through July 1994, five Nepalese, two Malaysian, and ten Indian soldiers
died in attacks and ambushes from various Somali groups. This deterioration in the
security situation had a negative impact on humanitarian activity. Once again convoys
came under attack, food started stacking up in the port of Mogadishu, and relief orga-
nizations began closing down operations.14 Nonetheless, Somali factions continued to
hold peace conferences and sign reconciliation agreements; there were meetings at
Addis Ababa, Cairo, Nairobi, Bardera, and even Dhoobley. Peace conferences between
Somali leaders were very common but unproductive in the 1990s, before, during, and
after the American incursions.15
Even Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suspected, referring to the participation of fac-
tion leaders in these reconciliation conferences, that “there remained grave misgivings
about the seriousness of their commitment.”16 Yet the Secretary-General found positive
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elements within the Somalia situation and remained hopeful about a peaceful accom-
modation. Boutros-Ghali and Howe always tended to emphasize the political and eco-
nomic stability achieved outside Mogadishu when evaluating progress in Somalia. They
believed that improved agricultural productivity, rebounding markets, and the reopen-
ing of numerous schools indicated what dedicated efforts could achieve.17 This is a
point often overlooked by analysts, pundits, and historians, and it is absolutely correct.
The international commitment and the efforts of local Somalis had accomplished
much. Only in areas where Aideed had control or exercised strong influence did orga-
nized violence and strife consistently prevail.18
One development that Boutros-Ghali and others viewed as hopeful was an effort of the
imam of Hirab to bring about reconciliation within the important Hawiye clan. Since
Aideed’s Habr Gidr element and Ali Mahdi’s Abgal group were subclans within it, this
effort promised to go a long way toward restoring stability to Somalia.19 But the imam’s
initiative ultimately proved ineffective, and its failure exposed the illusoriness of the
conviction—held by many American and UN officials—that religious and clan elders
possessed great authority within Somali society. That may have been true in certain
parts of Somalia, where traditional forms of leadership remained strong, but not in
areas controlled by the major warlords.20 The faction leaders and their armed militias
wielded the real power in those zones during the period of American involvement. In
fact, this seemingly positive move by the imam of Hirab had an effect opposite to what
UN leaders expected: some clans and subclans feared that any agreement resulting
from it would lead to a new UN-supported coalition, which would operate to their
detriment.21
Still believing that hope existed for peace in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali recommended in an
August report to the Security Council that the UN continue its efforts there a little lon-
ger.22 But when by October there had been no progress and the political stalemate
showed no signs of abating, even Boutros-Ghali began to question the efficacy of the
UNOSOM II mission, recognizing that “a viable and acceptable peace could only come
from the Somalis themselves.”23 Beginning to perceive the UN mission as futile, the
Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council a final extension of the
UNOSOM II mandate, to expire no later than 31 March 1995. In the interim he pro-
posed a gradual and sequential reduction of UN presence, culminating in a final tacti-
cal withdrawal, supported by member states capable of ensuring security and success.24
On 4 November 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 954, which embodied
Boutros-Ghali’s recommendation and extended the UNOSOM II mandate for a final
time. It also requested member states to provide military assistance in conducting the
evacuation.25
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The withdrawal of UN personnel and materiel occurred incrementally, starting in early
February 1995. Most troops departed on contract flights, typically on 747 and L1011
jumbo jets.26 In some ways, the evacuation process mirrored the American departure of
a year earlier. The important difference, of course, was that it involved the tactical
extraction of the final UN forces; this time there would be no friendly UN troops
remaining behind. Since Somali leaders could not control all factions and gangs, the
final phase of the evolution posed a much higher risk than the Americans had faced. By
the end of February only a rear guard of about 2,500 Pakistani and Bangladeshi sol-
diers, with their weapons and equipment (much of it on loan from the United States),
remained of the UNOSOM II force.27 On 28 February a combined task force—named
CTF UNITED SHIELD, and under U.S. leadership—conducted an amphibious landing at
Mogadishu and established a protected enclave for the removal of remaining UN
forces.28 Once CTF UNITED SHIELD had established its secure perimeter, the Pakistani
and Bangladeshi troops passed through its lines, entered the protected area, and loaded
on ships for departure. By 3 March, Operation UNITED SHIELD had completed all its
objectives and the last American Marines had returned to their ships.29 The evacuation
force consisted of elements from seven nations, but like much of the UN involvement
in Somalia, it had been primarily an American show.30 The operation proved efficient,
effective, and professional, but it nonetheless represented a failure by the UN to create
peace and stability within Somalia.
Yet despite shortcomings and failures, the various incursions of the 1990s were not
the abject disasters that many have portrayed—in fact, quite the contrary. The famine
had been broken, and many thousands of people (hundreds of thousands, by some
estimates) survived who would otherwise have perished.31 Additionally, the ineffec-
tiveness of military action (particularly during CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II)
resulted more from confusion about the mission and tenuous commitments by polit-
ical leaders than from military incompetence.32 It did not help, of course, that
CONTINUE HOPE occurred during the transition between the Bush and Clinton
administrations.33
As top leaders within the UN and United States began considering the withdrawal of
UN personnel from Somalia during the summer of 1994, several points became obvi-
ous. First, a military force could not accomplish this evacuation operation exclusively
with aviation or a combination of air and commercial shipping. There would be no
way to protect the last departing echelons from surface-to-air missiles, in the case of
aircraft, or from RPGs, mortars, artillery, or even small-arms fire, in the case of com-
mercial ships.34 Even if the major warlords agreed not to interfere, there remained
numerous, well-armed elements outside their control willing (even pleased) to strike a
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parting blow against UN forces.35 The only way to accomplish this evacuation was from
the sea, using a classical amphibious withdrawal. Any other option left open the possi-
bility of disaster during the final extraction.36
Another point of concern involved the ambivalent attitude of many American leaders.
There existed no enthusiasm for returning to Somalia, particularly since the mission
might involve a withdrawal under fire.37 More American casualties were the last thing
political and military leaders wanted, especially in a failed state having no strategic
value to the United States.38 Yet in the final analysis, the Clinton administration felt
responsible for the safety of the international forces remaining in Somalia and recog-
nized that only the United States could ensure a successful extraction.39 In the opinion
of Rear Admiral Lee F. Gunn, who attended a number of meetings with key advisers of
the Clinton administration, pressure from General Zinni helped sway opinion in favor
of the operation.40
The I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), headquartered at Camp Pendleton, Califor-
nia, was a logical choice to conduct the evacuation of Somalia.41 In addition to the rea-
sons that had made I MEF the appropriate force to lead Operation RESTORE HOPE back
in 1992–93, several other factors now contributed to that decision. For one thing, per-
sistent reports of surface-to-air missiles within Somalia virtually dictated an amphibi-
ous withdrawal. An amphibious power-projection capability makes it possible to
establish a secure area to protect all extractions (air and sea). After all elements have
departed, the landing force systematically collapses its defenses and, if necessary, fights
its way off the beach in amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs), with the support of tacti-
cal airpower and naval gunfire. AAVs can even continue fighting after entering the
water.42 Another advantage in using I MEF to lead Operation UNITED SHIELD was that
many of its officers and Marines had served in Somalia and understood the situation
on the ground. Not the least of these individuals was the newly assigned I MEF com-
mander, Anthony C. Zinni, now wearing the three stars of a lieutenant general.43 Not
only was I MEF the correct organization to execute Operation UNITED SHIELD, but
Zinni was the ideal general officer to command it.
This study has already addressed Zinni’s experience in humanitarian operations—
particularly in Somalia and Kurdistan. But Zinni also had broad experience beyond
operations other than war, including two combat tours in Vietnam.44 An additional
area of Zinni’s interest and expertise (and more directly relevant to the mission at
hand) involved the Marine Corps stock in trade, amphibious operations. Throughout
his career Zinni had served in numerous deployments at sea with Fleet Marine Force
units. In the process he had become fascinated with the complexity and challenge of
amphibious warfare. Additionally, he had taught amphibious warfare at the Command
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and Staff College, further building his knowledge and understanding of amphibious
operations.45 For UNITED SHIELD, the alignment of commander, organization, and mis-
sion could not have been better.
As Zinni and his staff began to analyze the UNITED SHIELD mission and the forces
available for its execution, one thing became immediately apparent—that this opera-
tion fit Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine exactly.46 Zinni had always been
the antithesis of a doctrine-driven officer.47 Yet he was willing to use any appropriate
means to get the job done, and he believed that I MEF should “run this [operation]
right by the book.”48 The circumstances not only fit the time-tested amphibious doc-
trine developed over several hundred years but lent themselves to the new operational
and strategic concepts expressed in . . . From the Sea and other papers and studies of
the 1990s. Zinni also leveraged the strong relationship that existed between the Navy
and Marine Corps organizations within U.S. Pacific Command (which provided the
forces used in Central Command operations), by making the commander of Amphibi-
ous Group 3, Rear Admiral Gunn, his deputy task force commander as well as the naval
component commander.49 By so combining their staffs Zinni and Gunn gained syner-
gism while solving the problem of finding adequate working space for command and
control of the operation.50 Under the leadership of Zinni and Gunn, the focus of sea-
based naval expeditionary forces on littoral power projection was as complete as it
could have been.
Another positive aspect of Operation UNITED SHIELD involved that rarest of luxuries in
expeditionary warfare and amphibious operations—adequate time for planning. The
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued the UNITED SHIELD warning order
in August 1994, for execution prior to the end of March 1995.51 This provided roughly
six months to plan, rehearse, critique, and execute. Yet having so much preparation
time did not keep the operation from being difficult, especially since it involved coali-
tion forces and an uncertain situation ashore.52 UNITED SHIELD would be the largest
amphibious withdrawal under hostile conditions since the 1st Marine Division and
several ancillary U.S. and coalition forces withdrew from North Korea at Hungnam in
December 1950.53 During August and September the Joint Staff and Central Command
considered various high-level options for the Somalia evacuation; on 25 September
1994 the secretary of defense approved a general course of action.54 Central Command
eventually assigned UNITED SHIELD, in a preliminary planning order, a basic mission
“to deploy to the area of operation, provide planning support and conduct military
operation in support of the UNOSOM II withdrawal and retrograde of U.S. Govern-
ment equipment.”55 Finally, CJCS issued an alert order directing execution planning.
The I MEF staff ’s work intensified.56
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The plan that resulted involved a five-phase operation: Phase I (Pre-Deployment),
Phase II (Deployment), Phase III (Support to UNOSOM), Phase IV (Execution), and
Phase V (Redeployment).57 The key officers associated with the UNITED SHIELD planning
process were Army colonel John C. Latimer of Central Command and the I MEF/CTF
Marine staff officers Colonel John W. Moffett (chief of staff), Colonel Harry W.
“Bucky” Peterson III (director of operations), and Lieutenant Colonel William R.
Norton III (director of plans). Admiral Gunn also played an important role in the
preparation for UNITED SHIELD, but he and other key leaders experienced a significant
distraction shortly after they began planning.58
During early October 1994, Saddam Hussein again moved Iraqi forces toward Kuwait,
with the lead elements reaching to within fifteen miles from the border. This mobiliza-
tion and deployment, coupled with other defense preparations and bellicose rhetoric,
captured the attention of commanders and planners at Central Command and I MEF.
Under the name of Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, Central Command dispatched
numerous forces of all services, including the forward-deployed Tripoli ARG and ele-
ments of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) from Diego Garcia to Saudi Arabia.
Gunn and other naval and Marine officers flew to Oman, where they joined the MPF
squadron and then moved on to Saudi Arabia to begin an off-load in preparation for
the fly-in combat elements. In many ways, VIGILANT WARRIOR constituted a quicker
and more efficient replay of the DESERT SHIELD deployment of 1990. The impressive
American response caused the Iraqis to back off, allowing the focus to return to
UNITED SHIELD.59
As planning intensified at I MEF, Zinni feared that his staff could become excessively
attached to its plan, after the hard work and creativity put into it. He therefore
requested that a team from Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico,
Virginia, review the detailed plan, including its “branches and sequels.”60 Among other
things, the team conducted war games on the plan to ensure its efficacy and offered
recommendations that contributed to the success of the operation.61 From the final
detailed plan, the I MEF/CTF staff created a “playbook,” a simplified version of all the
contingencies. Copies of this playbook remained with key staff officers as a quick
source of information and insight as the operation played out.62 The UN also created a
military planning cell—which included officers from both Central Command and I
MEF—to conduct parallel planning during the months leading up to the operation.
This cell provided a critical function—to “translate the UN political and diplomatic
goals into language understandable by military forces.”63
One of the key decisions made by General James Henry Binford Peay III—who
replaced General Hoar as commander in chief of Central Command in August 1994—
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involved the high-level command relations for UNITED SHIELD. Normally, a JTF or CTF
commander would report directly to the commander in chief of Central Command.
But Peay believed he could provide better support if the CTF commander reported to
the Central Command naval component (NAVCENT) commander, Vice Admiral John
Scott Redd.64 Peay’s rationale was that his headquarters in Tampa would be five thou-
sand miles from the scene of action; NAVCENT headquarters, located in Bahrain,
would be much closer and more responsive.65 Additionally, UNITED SHIELD had a dis-
tinctly maritime flavor, utilizing as it did a preponderance of naval expeditionary
forces. Placing it under naval oversight was a logical decision, one that tailored the
command structure to fit the mission.66 This decision caused some controversy because
of its unusual nature and because both Redd and Zinni held three-star rank, leading
some to wonder who would actually run the combined task force, Redd or Zinni.67 Nev-
ertheless, Zinni considered it a good idea and had no objections to operating under
Redd and NAVCENT headquarters. In fact, he considered it an advantage to have both
Redd and Lee Gunn, his deputy CTF commander, available to look after Navy and sea-
oriented issues, allowing him to focus more on actions ashore. In the final analysis, the
arrangement worked effectively, because both commanders understood their roles and
focused on accomplishing the mission.68
Another unique element of the UNITED SHIELD operation was the use of nonlethal
weapons.69 American leaders were keenly aware that Somali fighters often mingled with
unarmed women and children. The SNA had frequently used this technique during
CONTINUE HOPE. In the 5 June 1993 attack on UN troops it had led to the brutal
deaths of several Pakistani soldiers; reluctant to shoot into the mixed mob at a Mogadi-
shu feeding center, the Pakistanis allowed hostile individuals to get close enough to
assail them. American troops going ashore during UNITED SHIELD had no desire to use
deadly force against unarmed civilians if avoidable. A nonlethal option—in addition to
conventional combat capability—offered flexibility. The ability to handle mobs with-
out immediately crossing the threshold to deadly force was not only more humane but
also broadened the range of tactical situations in which the Marines could engage. This
clearly enhanced the ability of the landing force to maintain the initiative and control
events on the ground.70
The program to arm an element of the Marine landing force with nonlethal weapons
came into focus during December 1994, when General Zinni requested the assistance of
Colonel Gary W. Anderson of the Marine Corps Combat Development Center in devel-
oping such a capability for UNITED SHIELD. Anderson and a team from the I MEF staff
undertook an intensive effort to identify appropriate weapons, equipment, and training
options. Anderson also led the effort to get fast-track approval from the office of the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy Department for use of these new and exotic systems.
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The I MEF team also met
with officials of the Los
Angeles Sheriff ’s Depart-
ment, authorities at key
national laboratories, and
representatives of several
commercial vendors of
nonlethal systems.71
Law enforcement
departments and prison
guards throughout the
United States had been
developing and using
nonlethal weapons for many years, but the U.S. military had never before used them
in foreign lands.72 Yet within a matter of weeks, the I MEF staff built such a capability,
procured the necessary weapons and equipment, and deployed a mobile training team
to the Indian Ocean to work with components of 13th MEU (SOC), which would use
this technology in the upcoming operation. The MEU commander designated one
infantry company to serve as the operation’s primary nonlethal-reaction force.73 This
special unit proved effective while ashore, primarily as a deterrent against mob action
by clans, factions, and freelancing thugs. The Marines did not actually fire any of the
nonlethal weapons during operations ashore, but they did use a substance known as
“sticky foam,” along with four-pronged caltrops for purposes of area denial.74
Once the press learned of it, I MEF’s intent to take nonlethal weapons into Somalia
became a media event of the first order. It also became somewhat controversial, some
observers supporting the concept and others expressing alarm. The primary objection
seemed to be that the United States would be placing Marines in harm’s way while at the
same time disarming them.75 The idea that nonlethal weapons simply provided an addi-
tional capability on the force continuum did not register with many analysts. But the
Marines involved in the operation had no problem understanding the concept and its
value.76 Beyond the controversy, media coverage had the effect of informing hostile ele-
ments within Somalia of the new weapons and tactics they might confront.77 Yet this
proved more of an advantage than disadvantage, since it demonstrated to Somali war-
lords that some of their favorite tactics—unleashing mobs and mixing armed fighters
with unarmed women and children—might no longer be available to them. Additionally,
media images of Marines in black bullet-resistant vests, plastic face masks, riot shields,
and riot batons, carrying exotic weapons and conducting precision maneuvers, made
them appear like some latter-day Spartan phalanx, ready and eager to meet any threat.
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The fact that there
were no mob incidents
during the UNITED
SHIELD incursion
demonstrates the
deterrent value of this
concept, and the pub-
licity actually helped
achieve that goal.78
The psychological
operations team that
supported UNITED
SHIELD specifically
exploited the publicity
about nonlethal weapons, in an attempt to influence the actions of Somalis.79 Of
course, assessments of the success of nonlethal weapons in UNITED SHIELD should take
into account also the facts that Somali leaders did not have time to develop counter-
measures before the landing, and that the Marines always had a lethal option available
should nonlethal tactics fail.80
UNITED SHIELD was predominantly an American operation, but it also involved forces
from six other nations. Figure 5 demonstrates how UNITED SHIELD integrated the
coalition forces and lays out the organizational structure for the operation. Next to the
United States, Italy provided the largest contingent, a five-ship task force and the San
Marco Battalion of Marines. The San Marco Battalion accounted for about 350 troops
of the 2,675 total in the Italian contingent.81 Rear Admiral Elio Bolongaro was the
senior Italian officer with UNITED SHIELD and acted as Zinni’s Deputy Commander for
Coalition Forces.82 The operation plan for UNITED SHIELD integrated the San Marco
Battalion into the landing force, which would establish the secure enclave for the
amphibious withdrawal.83 This proved very effective, due to the combined amphibious
training of U.S. Marines with the San Marco Battalion and amphibious shipping of
both countries over a number of years.84 In addition to the Italian force, France sup-
plied three ships to the operation, Pakistan three, Malaysia two, and the United King-
dom one.85 The total number of vessels participating in UNITED SHIELD would
ultimately reach twenty-three, once all logistical and fire-support ships arrived on sta-
tion.86 The Pakistani and Bangladeshi forces that had remained in Somalia as the rear
guard for UNOSOM II constituted the final elements of the CTF UNITED SHIELD coali-
tion. These two units performed their duty in Mogadishu to the very last, having pro-
vided courageous service throughout their time in Somalia. This is particularly true of
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General Zinni addresses Marines and sailors during Operation UNITED SHIELD.
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the Pakistani troops, who were the first to go into Somalia during UNOSOM (I),
were among the last to leave under UNOSOM II, and had suffered the greatest num-
ber of casualties.87
Regrettably, the ships that the UN contracted to evacuate the Bangladeshi and Paki-
stani troops from Mogadishu proved poorly maintained, inadequately supplied, and
generally unworthy of these fine troops. When the final ship (MV Vergina) arrived to
transport the last Pakistani element, the ship’s master damaged his vessel while
approaching the pier.88 There was a strong suspicion that he had been drunk. Admiral
Gunn feared Vergina was no longer seaworthy, and to make matters worse, it had no
capability to repair the damage. Gunn dispatched a U.S. Navy hull technician team
from Essex, which rapidly repaired the damage and permitted the vessel to get under
way. Generally disgusted with the lack of professionalism on board Vergina, Gunn
assigned the vessel a command-qualified Navy commander and several officers, with
orders to take charge if necessary, regardless of what its owners might think.89
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FIGURE 5
UNITED SHIELD Organization Chart and Command Relations
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The core element of CTF UNITED SHIELD consisted of the Essex ARG and 13th MEU
(SOC), which had deployed to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean area during October
1994.90 Captain Gary W. Stubbs served as commodore of the ARG, and Colonel John C.
Garrett commanded 13th MEU (SOC).91 Before departing California, Garrett had real-
ized that his MEU would likely have a mission in Somalia sometime during its deploy-
ment. He had a good turnover with his predecessor as 13th MEU (SOC) commander,
Colonel Larry Outlaw, including a general orientation to the Somalia situation. He also
had an intelligence officer who had served in Somalia under General Johnston during
RESTORE HOPE. Additionally, when Garrett had a question about Somalia his staff
could not answer, he contacted Colonel Broderick and tapped into his wealth of experi-
ence. As helpful as this all was, Garrett’s mission would be different from those of the
past and many of his problems unique.92
Garrett’s 13th MEU (SOC) would be augmented by an SPMAGTF organized around an
infantry company and heavily reinforced by a platoon of thirteen AAVs and a section
of six Light Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles (LAVs).93 The SPMAGTF came from ele-
ments of III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) on Okinawa and deployed on USS
Belleau Wood (LHA 3), based in Sasebo, Japan. Belleau Wood also served as flagship for
the CTF UNITED SHIELD command element, which flew from California to Singapore
to board the ship.94 Colonel Carl C. Herdering commanded the SPMAGTF, and Cap-
tain John W. Townes III was commanding officer of Belleau Wood.95 Most of the ele-
ments that constituted UNITED SHIELD—both American and coalition—assembled
during February off the coast of Kenya, where they conducted a series of exercises and
rehearsals addressing interoperability issues, integration of forces, and synchronization
of air support.96
The aviation support for UNITED SHIELD was substantial, with assets stationed on
board amphibious ships and at joint support bases in Mombasa and Nairobi, Kenya.97
In addition to a normal complement of helicopters, 13th MEU (SOC) had six AV-8B
Harriers based on Essex to support the mission.98 Before the landing, the Harriers
cross-decked to Belleau Wood, from where they conducted flight operations during
UNITED SHIELD. This allowed more space on Essex for helicopter operations, thereby
increasing the responsiveness of the aerial quick-reaction force and facilitating other
helicopter-borne activity.99 The SPMAGTF included a composite air squadron of four
AH-1W Cobra gunships, four UH-1U Hueys, and four CH-53E Super Stallions, all on
Belleau Wood. The support base in Mombasa supported four Marine Corps KC-130
aircraft, additional CH-53E helicopters, and P-3 Reef Point reconnaissance aircraft pro-
vided by the Navy, along with Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunships. The base in Nairobi
supported Air Force KC-135 tankers and additional Reef Point airplanes.100
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In the weeks leading up to the actual withdrawal, Zinni and key members of his staff
conducted a series of meetings to ensure its success. In addition to final planning ses-
sions at Central Command in Tampa and with NAVCENT in Bahrain, Zinni visited
Kenya and Pakistan to coordinate with top defense officials and ensure their full coop-
eration. He also wanted to reach an understanding with each coalition government
regarding the tasking of its forces while under his command.101 Most important of these
trips involved several visits to Mogadishu, where Zinni and key State Department rep-
resentatives met with the Secretary-General’s special representative, Ambassador James
Victor Gbeho, and the new UNOSOM II commander, General Aboo. They also met
with Aideed, who agreed not to interfere with the operation. Somewhat ominously,
however, Aideed pointed out that he did not control all the militias or gangs operating
near the airfield and indicated that some would likely fight the landing force.102 Zinni
and his team also talked with other major leaders in Mogadishu, including members of
Ali Mahdi’s SSA, to ensure they understood UNITED SHIELD’s mission and to elicit their
support.103 In Admiral Gunn’s words, Zinni “was very frank and direct with them, as
only General Zinni can be.”104
During the final weeks before the amphibious withdrawal, two incidents occurred in
Somalia that could have distracted attention. The first was the “kidnapping” of a popular
Italian journalist, Carmen La Sorella, and the murder of her cameraman, Mirko
Hrovatin. As is often the case, the journalists had ventured outside of protected areas, and
their Range Rover had come under attack.105 Essentially, the vehicle was caught up in a
firefight between two Somali factions. La Sorella ran from the car to a place of relative
safety, but Hrovatin died in the exchange of gunfire. Before leaving her car, however, La
Sorella phoned her station in Italy, which prompted the Italian government to take action
to rescue her. Inevitably, Admiral Bolongaro received a call from Rome directing him to
“go get her.”106 This situation introduced a conflict between national interests and the task
force mission, because leaders of UNITED SHIELD wanted to avoid overt aggressive actions
that might suggest a return to the tactics of UNOSOM II.107 Such conflict between
national interests and task force missions had been a serious problem in previous Soma-
lia operations but had been refreshingly absent during UNITED SHIELD.108 Fortunately,
operatives ashore confirmed that La Sorella was in a safe location and not in immediate
danger. Meanwhile, the CTF operations officer, Colonel Bucky Peterson, and other Amer-
ican and Italian officers of UNITED SHIELD worked out an arrangement (a sort of tactical
cover) that gave the appearance of action that satisfied the Italian government in Rome
without seeming unduly aggressive to militia leaders in Mogadishu. The next day a com-
bined special operations team went ashore and effected the “rescue.”109
The second incident involved the prospect of a noncombatant evacuation operation
in Burundi—in the middle of Africa, between Tanzania and the Congo—where
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conditions were again deteriorating and the U.S. embassy was under threat. During the
planning for UNITED SHIELD, Zinni’s staff had developed a sequel for just such a con-
tingency.110 When this possibility arose, between 16 and 24 February, the CTF staff pre-
pared a detailed plan relatively quickly and with minimal impact on their main activity.
Colonel Peterson later believed that the Burundi tasking distracted the CTF staff for
twenty-four to thirty-six hours.111 Had it been necessary to execute the noncombatant
evacuation in Burundi, however, the impact on UNITED SHIELD could have been very
great, particularly if it had conflicted with the planned landing dates in Somalia. The
timing for UNITED SHIELD resulted from conditions of the moon and tides, the weather
forecasts, and the hydrographic situation, such as the strength and direction of ocean
currents. Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi and the location of the prospective evacu-
ation, is over six hundred miles inland, and the demands of such an operation on
UNITED SHIELD assets would have been substantial.112 Additionally, this NEO would
have occurred within the geographical purview (as then aligned) of European Com-
mand, not Central Command. Such operations at the seam of responsibility can be
particularly difficult, due to conflicting priorities and perspectives of the respective
commanders in chief, as Colonel McMullen and his 11th MEU (SOC) had learned one
year earlier.113 Certainly, the UNITED SHIELD team believed that it could carry out both
missions if the situation demanded.114 Yet the diversion of forces, equipment, and lead-
ership attention would likely have degraded the Somalia operation and perhaps
encouraged greater resistance ashore. In the event, the evacuation from Bujumbura did
not occur, but had conditions in Burundi so dictated, only the forces of CTF UNITED
SHIELD would have been available for its execution.115
The execution phase of UNITED SHIELD began at 1000 on 26 February 1995, with the
establishment of a small command element ashore, collocated with the UNOSOM II
headquarters. This for-
ward command element
actually “fell in” on a
liaison team under Colo-
nel Latimer, which had
provided critical coordi-
nation with UNOSOM II
elements ashore.116 The
following day, Zinni
came ashore and
assumed command of
the UNOSOM II force
(that is, the Pakistani
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General Zinni assuming command of UNOSOM II forces; Colonel Moffett is standing
on the extreme right.
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and Bangladeshi rear guard) from General Aboo.117 During the darkness of the early
morning hours of 28 February, the UNITED SHIELD landing force—consisting of Battal-
ion Landing Team 3/1, the SPMAGTF, and the San Marco Battalion—conducted a land-
ing under leadership of the 13th MEU (SOC) commander, Colonel Garrett.118 By early
light, the entire landing force had got ashore and had established a continuous perime-
ter running from GREEN Beach (the key location for beach operations), in the south
and on the left flank of the landing force, to New Port, farther north on the right.119
Engineers had previously prepared berms to enhance the defensive positions the land-
ing force would occupy. Additionally, Zinni had already inserted Army psychological
warfare units and special operations teams.120
The landing force immediately envel-
oped the Bangladeshi battalion in its
positions at New Port, permitting it to
begin evacuation. But “retrograding”
the Pakistani brigade would be some-
what more difficult, since it was outside
the lines of the landing force, in key
positions at the airport.121 The center of
gravity during the early stages of the
operation was the port area, since all
UNOSOM II troops and some of the
UNITED SHIELD landing force would
depart from that point. After all ele-
ments had departed the port area, the
center of gravity would shift to GREEN
Beach, where the last element of the
landing force would conduct a tactical
withdrawal.122
At about 0830 on 28 February, General
Aboo and his staff departed
Mogadishu, and the Bangladeshi battalion began loading on contract ships. At about
midnight, the Pakistani brigade began a sequential withdrawal from the airport and a
passage of lines through the landing force. This movement put it within the secure
enclave, where it could prepare for departure from New Port.123 Night movements, pas-
sages of lines, and interoperability among multinational forces generally, are difficult
enough when done singly under normal conditions. To do all three in combination
requires great skill and professionalism, which the forces of UNITED SHIELD
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demonstrated ashore at Mogadishu. In this case the passage of lines included the move-
ment of tanks and armored personnel carriers, which added a certain element of dan-
ger and complexity during hours of darkness.124 By about 0630 on 1 March, the passage
of lines was complete and the Pakistani troops had begun preparing their equipment
for loading and departure. Simultaneously, the San Marco Battalion prepared for with-
drawal across GREEN Beach later that night.125
During the early hours of darkness on 2 March, the landing force initiated a systematic
contraction of its defensive line and a tactical amphibious withdrawal from GREEN
Beach. Throughout the evolution Marines exchanged gunfire with various Somali
gangs that chose to contest the activity. On several occasions it became intense, but the
vastly superior firepower of the Marines discouraged any determined effort against
their positions.126 Additionally, Zinni had Cobra gunships, Harriers, and AC-130 Spec-
tre aircraft overhead, ready to engage targets should the situation require. Sniper teams
also proved effective in controlling the actions of rogue militias and often discouraged
threatening moves before they got started.127 The final amphibious vehicles departed
GREEN Beach at about 0100 on 3 March, and among their passengers were the CTF
commander, General Zinni, and his chief of staff, Colonel John Moffett. By 0505 the
amphibious ships had recovered all forces and vehicles. In the words of the 13th MEU
(SOC) commander, John Garrett, “I think it was probably the closest to a perfect oper-
ation that I’ve ever been on.”128 Admiral Gunn stated, “I rate the UNITED SHIELD piece
as one hundred percent effective.”129 Many others had similar comments, but the best
news after the reembarkation of all UNITED SHIELD forces was the report that no
American, coalition, or UNOSOM II lives had been lost during this complex and diffi-
cult operation.130
The story of UNITED SHIELD had not yet played out, however, when the final vehicle
departed GREEN Beach in the darkness of 3 March. During the trip back to Belleau
Wood, the amphibious tractor carrying Zinni and Moffett lost power when its engine
overheated. This undoubtedly resulted from the vehicle’s heavy load and the strong
current off the Somalia coast that it was fighting.131 The bilge pumps were still working,
and a companion tractor passed a towrope, so everything seemed under control. Now,
however, the towing vehicle, under an incredibly heavy load, “flamed out” too. Both
amphibious tractors had now lost communications with the ships and other landing
craft, and the tide and strong current were pushing the tractors back toward the beach.
Moffett—observing the Belleau Wood getting smaller and technicals, lined up on the
beach with their headlights on, getting bigger—realized the seriousness of the situa-
tion. Several times before drifting too far from Belleau Wood he heard a voice call out
from the ship, “Who’s got the Godfather?” He shouted back, “I’ve got the Godfather!”
but no one could hear his reply.132
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Although Zinni could figure out the situation for himself, Moffett had the tractor com-
mander, Corporal Deskins, brief him on the situation. After a long litany of all that had
gone wrong (the tractor had lost power and was drifting toward the beach, the tow
vehicle was in the same situation, they were unable to raise anyone on the radio, there
was no response to their flares, and hostile Somalis waited on the beach), the corporal
assured his CTF commander that everything was under control: “Our machine guns
work better on the beach.”133 At last, they spotted a safety boat—a utility landing
craft—and Moffett fired the tractor’s last flare, which attracted the attention of the
LCU’s crew. Eventually two boats arrived, came alongside each of the AAVs, and used
the power of their engines to arrest their drift toward the shore while taking off the
crewmen and passengers. Upon arriving within the well deck of Belleau Wood and
climbing out of the tractor into knee-deep water, Zinni observed waiting officers and
journalists looking down from the deck above. Zinni looked to Moffett and said,
“You’re going to make me wade up to those cameras, aren’t you?” Moffett smiled and
replied, “Just like MacArthur.”134
The landing force had been in Somalia only about seventy-two hours, and during that
time it had operated strictly from sea bases, with no buildup ashore. The UNITED
SHIELD force had come from the sea, been sustained from the sea, and returned to the
sea.135 Colonel Peterson had departed Somalia from New Port for USS Dubuque and
then cross-decked back to Belleau Wood on an air-cushion landing craft. During that
final leg, he had one final look at Mogadishu from the sea. In the rush to withdraw, his
team had forgotten to turn off the generator that powered an operational site it had
used while ashore, and a light was still burning. It was the only thing visible in an
ancient city of a million people. That sight saddened Peterson. He reflected, “We left
them with nothing except for that one light bulb in the old UN compound.”136
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Operational and Strategic Observations
What can we hope to learn from the American experience in Somalia during the 1990s?
Is Colonel Peterson’s dour assessment correct, that “we left them with nothing except
for that one light bulb in the old UN compound”? Many individuals involved in
UNITED SHIELD and the earlier operations would undoubtedly agree. It has become
commonplace to refer to our Somalia involvement as a failure; some even call it a disas-
ter. But not all agree, and even in 1995 many leaders saw value in the incursions and
held hope for improvement in Somalia.1 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
tried to remain optimistic about the future, assuring the world that the UN would not
abandon Somalia.2 But despite the Secretary-General’s earnest intention, it is difficult
to square his assertions with the amphibious withdrawal of March 1995. In the final
assessment, the UN goal of establishing a peaceful society, a stable economy, and legiti-
mate elected government failed. The UN departed with little more than the hope that
Somalis would solve their problems on their own. Yet the incursions into Somalia had
saved many lives, and the famine had been broken. Additionally, the large-scale civil
war had ended, although clan-based fighting continued, on a reduced level.3
Regrettably, the Somali people thereafter did no better at nation building or peacemak-
ing than had the UN and its coalition. Although the country did not immediately
return to chaos, neither did it achieve stability. In the absence of progress, conditions
trended downward toward more violence and despair. Nearly fourteen years after
UNITED SHIELD, conditions in Somalia have returned to anarchy: rampant fighting,
widespread criminal activity, and another famine looming on the horizon.4 Although
conditions now resemble those of 1992, the political and military landscape within
Somalia has changed, notably with the death of Aideed during factional fighting in
1996 and diminished power of Ali Mahdi.5 From the perspective of Western nations,
the situation has actually become much worse. The rise of a movement known as
Islamic Courts—a Taliban-like group with links to al Qaeda—has gained considerable
following in southern and central Somalia.6
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Although American leaders knew of radical Islamic groups within Somalia during the
1990s, they did not figure prominently in U.S. operations. But the issue took on an
entirely different significance after the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington.7 The
Islamic Courts came close to taking control of the entire country in 2006, and they
actually controlled Mogadishu and much of south and central Somalia for nearly six
months. Only the intervention of U.S.-backed Ethiopian forces prevented them from
defeating the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which the UN and United States
recognized as the legitimate government of the country.8 After suffering a series of mil-
itary defeats, the Islamic Courts reverted to guerrilla warfare, achieving some success,
including the capture of Kismayo in August 2008.9 If the Islamic Courts should gain
control of Somalia, they will likely take it into the orbit of the international Islamic ter-
rorist network. Somalia—which had little or no strategic value to the United States
during the incursions of the 1990s—would then become a strategic problem compara-
ble to that posed by Afghanistan in 2001.10
Predictably, the United States is widely blamed, both locally and internationally, for
most of the problems of Somalia, including failure of the UN mission of the 1990s, the
current calamity within the country, and the rise of the Islamic Courts.11 The logic goes
something like this. The UN mission to Somalia failed because of a lack of sufficient
American support, especially during UNOSOM II. The current calamity exists due to
lack of American attention and support after the withdrawal of UN forces. The rise of
Islamic terrorist groups resulted from the ineffectiveness of the American interventions
of the 1990s. The Islamic Courts movement remains popular in Somalia primarily
because of American support for the Ethiopian invasion and occupation of parts of the
country.12
Whatever truth there may be in these assertions, they hardly explain the chaos that has
visited Somalia over the past two decades. However inadequate the UN and American
efforts of the 1990s (and there is a wide range of opinions), ultimate responsibility for
the anarchy in Somalia must rest with its own leaders. The dictatorial rule of Siad Barre
created the conditions for civil war and the subsequent instability of his nation. The
self-interest of the clan-based faction leaders—who brought about Siad Barre’s
demise—encouraged and sustained the chaos, from which they expected to benefit.
The most powerful leaders within Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre put their quests
for power and wealth ahead of any genuine concern for the Somali nation and people.
Even so, the problems of Somalia continue to reach out to the United States, and they
are likely to do so into the future.
What further should we say for the U.S. involvement in Somalia? Simply stated, the
United States went into Somalia in 1992 to break the famine and save Somali lives.
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PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE accomplished those results. Beyond that, pressure
from the UN and American internationalists to take on a broader mission, ambigu-
ously known as nation building, resulted in a confused U.S. policy. Very few Ameri-
cans—and none with real power—wanted an extended commitment to Somalia during
the dying days of the George H. W. Bush administration. But that changed with the
arrival of a new presidential administration in January 1993.13 Initially, President Bush’s
concept of a “New World Order” meshed nicely with Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” in addressing the crisis in Somalia. But the Bush administra-
tion did not see either as committing the United States to a complex nation-building
mission using American troops. Ironically, the price of getting out of Somalia (ending
Operation RESTORE HOPE and returning General Johnston’s large force to the United
States) was an agreement to remain in Somalia, albeit with fewer U.S. troops. The
applicability of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine for committing troops—with its corol-
lary of using overwhelming force—was completely lost sight of in the transition.14 This
resulted in an operational overreach, whereby UNOSOM II received a broad mandate
without adequate means for its execution. Additionally, UNOSOM II (unlike UNITAF)
did not have a finite set of objectives to undertake or a specific time frame in which to
achieve them.15 After the departure of UNITAF, the mission to Somalia became con-
fused in part because the presidential transition in Washington coincided with the mis-
sion transition in Mogadishu.16
With the arrival of the administration of President Clinton, the doctrines of “asser-
tive multilateralism” and “engagement and enlargement”—primarily sponsored by
Madeleine Albright and Anthony Lake—seemed to fit exactly the situation within
Somalia.17 This occurred as the UN was pressing the United States to remain involved as
a major player within the UNOSOM II coalition. The facts that the UN leader for
UNOSOM II (Admiral Jonathan Howe) was actually an American and that the Ameri-
can military commander (Major General Thomas Montgomery) was also the deputy
UN commander further confused the situation. It is true, as many have pointed out,
that only American officers commanded U.S. troops during the Somalia incursions.
Nevertheless, the operations they executed were part of a UN strategy, driven from
both New York and Mogadishu and with enthusiastic support from the new adminis-
tration in Washington. The crosscurrents resulting from the UN and American rela-
tionship allowed conditions in Somalia to slide from one crisis to another, drawing in
U.S. forces through a process described, somewhat derisively, as mission creep.
Concerned with the drift toward conflict during the middle of 1993, certain members
of the Clinton administration—including the president himself—began to reconsider
the situation and ponder a change of policy.18 Many key military leaders had already
come to doubt the efficacy of the mission, and some had opposed it from the
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beginning. With the Battle of Mogadishu and desecration of the bodies of American
soldiers in the streets of Mogadishu, the American people became shocked and
enraged. This event—like Tet 1968 in Vietnam—became a defining moment; it resulted
in a curtailment of the U.S. commitment to Somalia and its people.19 In short, it
revealed the lack of American will for this mission and brought to light the confused
manner in which leaders had created and executed the policy.20 As Chester Crocker has
declared, “The Somalia ‘failure’ was less a failure of either humanitarian intervention
or muscular peacekeeping than a failure to apply them steadily and wisely. The failure
was of another order: strategic confusion followed by collapse of political will when the
confusion led to combat casualties.”21 There had been enough political will for RESTORE
HOPE/UNITAF, because that operation had been well coordinated, remained “on mis-
sion,” and proved successful. But support for CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II lacked
these prerequisites and quickly dissolved once the casualties began to mount.22
President Clinton further confused the issue by announcing that the United States
would not abandon the mission to Somalia but also that it would pull out all forces
within six months. The president represented this declaration as an effort to see the
mission through, but Somali and UN leaders recognized it for what it was—a face-saving
way to withdraw from what was by then perceived as a failed policy. In fairness to the
decision makers, they believed this six-month deadline would provide time for
UNOSOM II to build up strength from other UN members.23 They were also under
pressure from several congressional leaders for an immediate withdrawal. The six-
month commitment was probably the best that could have been achieved under the cir-
cumstances, and only if casualties remained low. In the meantime, the U.S. military
would build up large and powerful forces in Somalia for defensive purposes and as a
show of force. This new and more capable American force—known as JTF Somalia—
would not undertake offensive action, as the smaller and less powerful American ele-
ment had done from June through October 1993.24 But its presence in Somalia pro-
vided a diplomatic tool, one that was skillfully utilized by Ambassador Oakley and
others during the final months of the American incursion.25 It proved effective in part
because Aideed—the UN’s number-one villain in Somalia—did not want or need any
more shoot-outs with U.S. forces.
At that point in Somalia, the higher-level policy to reconstruct the nation had not yet
failed. The tactical effort to capture Aideed had failed, and Americans had been
shocked to lose eighteen soldiers in a Mogadishu firefight. But even the results of the
Battle of Mogadishu were somewhat murky. In a strict military sense, one could con-
sider it a tactical victory for U.S. forces—the American task force captured the SNA
lieutenants it had set out to get, and it had certainly inflicted far greater casualties than
it received. But it became a political and public relations defeat for the United States,
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because of the shock factor.26 Even so, the overall Somalia operation had been more
successful than not at this point, despite the disastrous “get Aideed” operation and the
shock of the Battle of Mogadishu. Many leaders remained hopeful that progress was
still possible. Certainly Generals Montgomery and Ernst believed that the conditions
existed, and that they had the capability, to make an impact as JTF Somalia began to
build up. Admiral Howe too believed the time was ripe for real progress. But much of
that optimism evaporated with the decision of the Clinton administration to suspend
offensive operations, avoid additional casualties, and withdraw from UNOSOM II.27
The United States certainly made a mistake in Somalia by supporting the so-called war
on Aideed and his SNA, as many have pointed out. That caused the UN and the United
States to lose any claim to neutrality and to be marked as participants in the internal
conflict.28 To some extent, this situation resulted from a lack of communications
between UNOSOM II and the Somali factional leaders, particularly Aideed.29 But the
more fundamental mistake involved expanding the initial UN mandate without provid-
ing the military means to ensure its success.30 This failure substantially resulted from
lack of a thorough and open debate within the United States over the mandate, mis-
sion, force levels, and budget for the Somalia effort.31 Had such deliberation occurred,
American leaders would have either scaled back the mission or provided adequate
resources.32 But in its absence, top American leaders simply acquiesced to the UN’s vague
concept of nation building and hoped for the best. In the opinion of Chester Crocker,
“Support for an initially popular undertaking collapsed amid confusion about Ameri-
can purposes. Was this a humanitarian mission, a manhunt for a wily warlord, or a
nation-building program?”33
In the opinion of Walter Clarke, the Somalia incursion was a failure but not a military
failure. He has stated, “In my view Somalia was not a military failure, it was a well-run
military operation, but which had no political focus. It was a failed political military
operation.”34 Clarke’s point is very Clausewitzian and one with which few people would
argue. If nothing else, the Somalia incursions demonstrate that the primacy of politics
should apply to humanitarian and peace operations as much as to regular warfare.35
But it is not enough that political leaders provide policy and strategic direction; they
must also ensure that the direction is sufficient to the task. Equally important, the
political objectives must be in harmony with the operational level of action as much as
with the strategic.36 Otherwise, no degree of military competence can ensure success, as
we learned to our regret in Vietnam. Operational excellence is rarely sufficient to make
up for inadequate strategy or policy. As Alberto Coll has argued, “In the Somalia inter-
vention, good intentions were mixed with miscalculation in roughly equal proportions to
produce an outcome that was as full of ambiguities and failures as it was of undeniable
achievement.”37
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Perhaps the greatest miscalculation involved the failure of American and UN leaders to
keep an appropriate balance and relationship among policy, strategy, operations, and
tactics. It is through the application of operational art and the definition of clear objec-
tives that these elements are properly harmonized. But that is possible only if there is
clear and consistent direction from the policy and strategic levels. The lack of such
guidance, coupled with a failure to clearly define objectives during CONTINUE HOPE/
UNOSOM II, resulted in that operational drift that typified military actions during the
May–October 1993 period.38 This contrasted with the focused effort of Aideed and the
SNA, who attacked America’s center of gravity—that is, its unwillingness to suffer high
casualties where no vital national interests existed.39
The Somalia experience caused the Clinton administration to recognize the need for a
more orderly process for making decisions and commitments to peace operations. On
3 May 1994, the White House issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which
purported to ensure a more collaborative approach and “to impose discipline on both
the UN and the United States to make peace operations a more effective instrument of
collective security.”40 PDD 25 also signaled a change from the initial Clinton policy of
assertive multilateralism to a much more cautious approach for committing U.S. forces
to humanitarian and peace operations.41 The provisions of PDD 25, against the back-
ground of the Somalia experience, inhibited American involvement in humanitarian
operations for some time, as exhibited by the reluctance of President Clinton to inter-
vene in the Rwanda genocide.42 Interestingly, the crisis in Rwanda and Burundi
occurred at the very time the Clinton administration was developing and issuing
PDD 25.43 Many observers contend that the “ghosts of Somalia” (as described by
Walter Clarke) also influenced the manner in which the United States involved itself
in the Balkans and in Haiti during the latter half of the 1990s.44 When the United States
did eventually intervene in those areas, the preparation and subsequent operations
clearly benefited from the experience in Somalia.45
The U.S. military in Somalia generally receives better marks than does the political side.
Of course, it is difficult to separate political decision from military execution. What is
the point of a well executed military operation if accomplished as part of a flawed pol-
icy? For example, the 12 July 1993 attack on Abdi House was clearly a well executed
operation, but it ended any prospect of a peaceful accommodation with Aideed and the
SNA.46 It also had a negative impact on many U.S. allies and weakened the UN coalition
in Somalia.47 Tactical and operational excellence are necessary but not sufficient for
success, and they produce effectiveness only when complementary elements of a sound
strategic plan. The fact that tactical or operational events often influence strategic think-
ing further underscores the need to synchronize all levels of political and military activ-
ity.48 The attack on Abdi House is an example of failure to do so, and the 3–4 October
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1993 Battle of Mogadishu is another. These tactical events undercut much of the sup-
port that existed for the larger policy and its strategic mission. Americans had reso-
lutely committed themselves to the humanitarian objectives in Somalia, but support for
combat action was very thin and consequently susceptible to shock, such as occurred
during the Battle of Mogadishu.49
As previously mentioned, the experience in Somalia made the United States shy of
humanitarian and peace operations for some time. Yet in a broader sense, support
remained for international involvement among most Americans, so long as they
perceived a need, had a clear understanding of what the mission would entail, and
felt adequately informed of the strategy for success.50 As Walter Clarke stated in 1997,
“If the U.S. role is properly articulated by national leaders, the public is willing to pay
the price of global leadership. The U.S. Public intuitively appreciated that the ability to
project power for humanitarian purposes over long distances is the singular mark of a
world power.”51
American leaders had the issue of world leadership in mind before, during, and after
the Somalia incursions. As the Cold War morphed into the new world order, leaving
the United States as the world’s only superpower, most observers expected America to
assume greater responsibility in international affairs. The U.S. sea services, which
played a leading role in the Somalia incursions, had ensured their place in the new
global environment through the energetic production of operational and strategic con-
cept papers, along with new doctrine where appropriate. The number of documents
issued during the decade of the 1990s, including . . . From the Sea and Operational
Maneuver from the Sea, certainly illustrates that point. Such concept papers—combined
with service and joint doctrine, and adjusted to fit new conditions—proved very
important in providing military professionals frameworks for thinking about, discuss-
ing, and adjusting to changed environments. This framework played an important role
in the effectiveness of naval expeditionary forces during the Somalia incursions.52 It
also helped to minimize the effects of policy mistakes and strategic discontinuities. Yet
at the more fundamental level, it was the esprit de corps of the Navy and Marine Corps
team (developed between the two services over two centuries, and not always happily)
that underlay its success during the Somalia involvement, despite a lack of cogent
strategic guidance.
Traditional Navy–Marine Corps relationships developed primarily for use in conven-
tional warfare, but they translated well to the expeditionary environment of the post–
Cold War era.53 The new challenges of the 1990s required only fine-tuning, as provided
in . . . From the Sea, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and other documents from
that era. Of course, this had been true throughout American history. The ability to
S O M A L I A . . . F R O M T H E S E A 2 0 1
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:13:08 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
adjust directives, doctrine, and concepts to deal with new and unexpected contingen-
cies is the hallmark of American naval expeditionary forces. The manner in which Navy
and Marine Corps commanders exercised the operational art during the Somalia
involvement clearly demonstrated the efficacy of this system.
Making things work effectively was no easier for Esek Hopkins and Samuel Nicholas at
New Providence in the Bahamas during 1776 than it was for Anthony Zinni and Lee
Gunn in Somalia during 1995. But the logic of naval expeditionary forces, the compe-
tence and professionalism of leaders, and the commitment of sailors and Marines were
the essential ingredients that have ensured effectiveness in differing eras, under differ-
ing conditions, and in the face of differing requirements and expectations. Doctrine
written over many years from the hard experience of battle, and concept papers written
by creative minds that recognize new strategic and operational realities, is good and
necessary. But the expeditionary culture, coupled with strong traditions forged by the
Navy and Marine Corps team over many years and through many experiences, pro-
vided a capable force, able to operate in a variety of conditions, no matter how ineffec-
tively political leaders utilized it. One of the high points of the Somalia incursions is
that those experiences tended to revalidate the efficacy of the Navy and Marine Corps
team and the related doctrine and concepts it had spawned.54 But however important
concept papers and doctrine may be, it is the expeditionary mind-set, combined with a
confident spirit of proficiency in uncertain circumstances, that undergirds martial
strength. These Somalia operations are vivid illustrations of Napoleon’s maxim that “in
war, the morale is to the physical as three to one.”55
Notes
1. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the Future
of Humanitarian Intervention,” pp. 84–85.
2. United Nations and Somalia, p. 78.
3. Oakley PBS Frontline interview; “Somalia:
Not a Total Failure,” New York Times, 2
March 1995.
4. David Axe, “Cries in the Dark,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings (April 2008); Jeffrey
Gettleman, “With Spotlight on Pirates, So-
malis on Land Waste Away in the Shadows,”
New York Times, 11 October 2008; Oakley
interview.
5. Clarke and Gosende, “Somalia,” p. 129;
Lewis, Modern History of the Somali, p. 281.
6. The Islamic Courts grew out of local efforts
to establish order in parts of Somalia where
none had existed. The movement spawned a
militia initially known as the Union of Is-
lamic Courts, and then the Council of Is-
lamic Courts (CIC). Its more radical
element hijacked the movement during 2006
with the election of Hassan Dahir Aweys
(recognized as a terrorist by both the UN
and the United States) as chairman of the
CIC Consultative Council and with the in-
creased influence from the radical al
Shabaab component. James Swan, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for African Af-
fairs, Remarks to the Baltimore Council Relat-
ing to Foreign Affairs in Somalia, 7 March
2007, available at www.proquest.com.
7. Lewis, Modern History of the Somali, pp.
304–305.
2 0 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:13:08 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
8. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somali Islamists’ No. 2
Leader Surrenders in Kenya Capital,” New
York Times, 23 January 2007.
9. Associated Press, “Militants Patrol Captured
Somali City,” New York Times, 24 August 2008.
10. In December 2006, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 1725, authorizing a
peacekeeping force (mostly from the African
Union) to deploy to Somalia under the com-
mand of the Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD). Whether or not
these troops will be more successful than
previous efforts is uncertain. The length of
time Ethiopian forces will remain in Somalia
is also open to question, although most ob-
servers believe they will depart as soon as
possible. John R. Bolton, Surrender Is Not an
Option: Defending America at the United Na-
tions and Abroad (New York: Threshold,
2007), p. 366.
11. Axe, “Cries in the Dark.”
12. Ibid.
13. Oakley interview.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Crocker, “Lessons of Somalia,” p. 6; Seybolt,
Humanitarian Military Intervention, pp. 154–
59.
17. Haass, Reluctant Sheriff, pp. 61, 90–91; Rich-
ard J. Norton, “Somalia II,” in Case Studies in
Policy Making & Process, ed. Shawn W.
Burns, 9th ed. (Newport, R.I.: National Secu-
rity Decision Making Department, Naval
War College, 2005), p. 65; Lauren Ploch, Af-
rica Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and
the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Report
for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressio-
nal Research Service, 16 May 2007), p. 25.
18. Carla Ann Robbins, “Clinton Rethinks U.S.
Global Peacekeeping Role, Draws New Crite-
ria for Joining U.N.-Led Missions,” Wall
Street Journal, 27 September 1993.
19. Coll, Problems of Doing Good, p. 12.
20. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.
21. Chester A. Crocker has served as Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chair-
man of the Board of the United States Insti-
tute of Peace, and Distinguished Research
Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign
Service, Georgetown University. Crocker,
“Lessons of Somalia,” p. 5.
22. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical
Strategic Thought (London: Routledge,
2001), p. 326.
23. Oakley interview.
24. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the Future
of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 244.
25. Hoar interview.
26. Coll, Problems of Doing Good, p. 12.
27. Oakley interview.
28. Press, “Retreat from Somalia”; Zinni
interview.
29. Hoar interview; Zinni interview.
30. Oakley interview.
31. Hoar interview; Oakley interview.
32. Crocker, “Lessons of Somalia,” pp. 5–6.
33. Ibid., p. 7.
34. Walter Clarke served as Deputy Chief of
Mission, U.S. Embassy, Somalia, during 1993
and as adjunct professor of peace operations
at the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping Institute.
Clarke PBS Frontline interview.
35. Crocker, “Lessons of Somalia,” p. 8; Fox,
“Approaching Humanitarian Intervention
Strategically,” pp. 147, 158.
36. Oakley interview; Milan Vego, Joint Opera-
tional Warfare: Theory and Practice (New-
port, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, 10
September 2007), p. I-44.
37. Coll, Problems of Doing Good, p. 15.
38. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, pp. I-49
to I-50.
39. Handel, Masters of War, p. 323; Vego, Joint
Operational Warfare, p. VII-16.
40. Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming
Multilateral Peace Operations, Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (Washington,
D.C.: White House, May 1994), available at
www.fas.org.
41. Farrell, “United States Marine Corps Opera-
tions in Somalia,” p. 43; Weiss, “Rekindling
Hope in UN Humanitarian Interventions,”
p. 223.
42. Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, War-
fare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today
(New York: Gotham Books, 2006), p. 350;
Handel, Masters of War, p. 324.
43. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the Future
of Humanitarian Intervention,” pp. 70, 82.
S O M A L I A . . . F R O M T H E S E A 2 0 3
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:13:08 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
44. Clarke PBS Frontline interview.
45. Donald Hornbeck, “Operation Shining Hope
Owes Somalia,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (December 1999), pp. 69–71;
Ismat Kittani and Ian Johnstone, “The Les-
sons from Somalia,” UN Chronicle, no. 3
(1996), pp. 80–81.
46. Oakley interview.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the Future
of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 252.
51. Clarke, “Failed Missions and Uncertain
Mandates in Somalia,” p. 17.
52. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, pp. XII-27
to XII-36.
53. Zinni interview.
54. Ibid.
55. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, p. III-33.
2 0 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
NP_34_Ohls.ps
C:\_WIP\_NP34-Ohls\_Ventura\NP_34_Ohls.vp
Friday, July 17, 2009 3:13:08 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Appendix A: The Weinberger Doctrine
Six tests governing the commitment of forces to combat:
1. Our vital interests must be at stake.
2. The issues involved are so important for the future of the United States and our
allies that we are prepared to commit enough forces to win.
3. We have clearly defined political and military objectives, which we must secure.
4. We have sized our forces to achieve our objectives.
5. We have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people.
6. U.S. forces are committed to combat only as a last resort.
Note: This “doctrine” has been published numerous places, including Caspar W.
Weinberger’s book cited here.
Sources: Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon
(New York: Warner Books, 1990); Earl E. K. Abonadi, Weinberger-Powell and Transfor-
mation: Perceptions of American Power from the Fall of Saigon to the Fall of Baghdad
(Monterey, Calif.: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006).
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Appendix B: The Powell Doctrine
Questions to be answered affirmatively before applying military action:
1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine broad international support?
Note: The Powell doctrine is based principally on the “Weinberger doctrine,” created by
former secretary of defense (1981–87) Caspar W. Weinberger. General Colin L. Powell,
as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1989 to 1993, endorsed and advocated
Weinberger’s set of principles so strongly that many observers began calling it the
“Weinberger-Powell doctrine”; some even started referring to the general’s interpreta-
tion as the “Powell doctrine.” Powell also emphasized the use of overwhelming force
once American troops are committed to an action and that constitutes the essence of
his corollary to the “Weinberger doctrine.”
Source: Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995); Earl
E. K. Abonadi, Weinberger-Powell and Transformation: Perceptions of American Power
from the Fall of Saigon to the Fall of Baghdad (Monterey, Calif.: U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School, June 2006).
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Appendix C: UNITAF Component Commanders
Air Force Component
• Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik, USAF, 9 December 1992 to 29 March 1993
• Colonel Wirthe, USAF, 29 March 1993 to 4 May 1993
Army Component
• Brigadier General William Magruder III, USA, 9–22 December 1992
• Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA, 22 December 1992 to 16 March 1993
• Brigadier General Greg L. Gile, USA, 16 March 1993 to 4 May 1993
Marine Corps Component
• Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, 9 December 1992 to 23 March 1993
• Colonel Jack W. Klimp, USMC, 23 March 1993 to 9 April 1993
• Colonel Emil R. Bedard, USMC, 9–23 April 1993
• Colonel Kenneth W. Hillman, USMC, 23 April 1993 to 4 May 1993
Navy Component
• Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN, 19–23 December 1992
• Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, USN, 19–28 December 1992
• Rear Admiral James B. Perkins III, USN, 28 December 1992 to 15 January 1993
• Captain John W. Peterson, USN, 15 January 1993 to 1 February 1993
• Captain Terry R. Sheffield, USN, 1 February 1993 to 5 March 1993
• Captain Nathan H. Beason, USN, 5–23 March 1993
• Captain Kenneth Pyle, USN, 23 March 1993 to 4 May 1993
Sources: U.S. Army Dept., Resource Guide, Unified Task Force Somalia, December 1992–
May 1993, Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History,
1994); Dennis P. Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force,
1992–1993 (Washington, D.C.: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2005).
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Appendix D: UN Security Council Resolutions
UNSC Resolution 733 (23 January 1992)
Calls for total arms embargo.
Calls for cease-fire and reconciliation.
Calls for increased humanitarian aid to Somalia.
Establishes special aid coordinator (David Bassiouni).
Worked from Nairobi and (in March) Mogadishu.
Success for resolution questionable due to looting, extortion, lack of support.
UNSC Resolution 746 (17 March 1992)
Deplores human suffering and failure to implement cease-fire.
Urges Somali factions to abide with cease-fire agreement.
Urges Somali factions to cooperate with humanitarian efforts.
Urgently dispatches team to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Calls for a conference of reconciliation and unity in Somalia.
UNSC Resolution 751 (24 April 1992)
Establishes United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM).
Dispatches fifty unarmed UN observers to monitor Aideed–Ali Mahdi cease-fire.
Allows future deployment of five hundred peacekeepers.
Boutros-Ghali assigns Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun to fact-finding
mission.
Authorizes appointment of special representative in Somalia (Mohamed Sahnoun).
UNSC Resolution 767 (27 July 1992)
Endorses emergency airlift of food and medical supplies to “Triangle of Death.”
President Bush responds with emergency airlift called Operation PROVIDE RELIEF.
Establishes four UNOSOM operational zones in Somalia.
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UNSC Resolution 775 (28 August 1992)
UNSC alarmed by continued sporadic outbreaks of hostilities and loss of life.
UNSC deeply disturbed by the magnitude of human suffering.
UNSC gravely concerned at the deterioration of humanitarian situation.
Authorizes the increase in strength of UNOSOM to 3,500 (including 550
Pakistanis).
Allows for 750 U.S. soldiers in each UNOSOM operational zone.
UNSC Resolution 794 (3 December 1992)
Establishes UNITAF (Unified Task Force).
The United States establishes Operation RESTORE HOPE.
Calls for use of all means to create a secure environment for delivery of aid.
Authorizes Chapter VII (enforcement) operations to create secure environment.
UNSC Resolution 814 (26 March 1993)
Establishes expanded UNOSOM (i.e., UNOSOM II).
Directs a prompt, smooth, and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.
Calls for effective program of disarming Somali parties, movements, and factions.
Calls for rehabilitation of political institutions and economy of Somalia.
Provides for establishment of impartial national police force.
Authorizes enforcement of Addis Ababa peace accords, including cease-fire.
Authorizes Chapter VII (enforcement) operations to create secure environment.
UNSC Resolution 837 (6 June 1993)
Issued in response to the killing of twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers in ambush.
Directs UNOSOM to take all necessary steps to bring perpetrators to justice.
UNSC Resolution 885 (16 November 1993)
Authorizes establishment of Commission of Inquiry.
Investigates 5 June 1993 attacks on Pakistani peacekeepers.
Suspends arrest actions against implicated individuals.
Addresses individuals already detained under UNSC Resolution 837.
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UNSC Resolution 897 (4 September 1994)
Reduces size of UNOSOM II force.
Revises mandate without enforcement powers.
UNSC Resolution 946 (30 September 1994)
Extends UNOSOM II mandate to 31 October 1994.
Requests intensified preparations for possible withdrawal.
UNSC Resolution 954 (4 November 1994)
Extends UNOSOM II mandate for final period until 31 March 1995.
Requests member states to provide military assistance for withdrawal.
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Appendix E: Seven-Point Agreement (reached among principal leaders in Mogadishu
on 11 December 1992)
1. Immediate and total cessation of hostilities and restoration of unity of the U.S.C.
2. Immediate and total cessation of all negative propaganda.
3. To break the artificial lines in the capital city of Mogadishu.
4. All the forces and their technicals should report to their respective designated
locations outside the city within the next 48 hours, and be controlled by the joint
committee.
5. The already established reconciliation committee of the U.S.C. should convene their
meetings within the next 24 hours.
6. We call upon all Somalis throughout the country to seriously engage on cessation of
all hostilities and join with us for peace and unity of Somalia.
7. We express our deep appreciation to the international community for its efforts to
assist Somalia and appeal to it to extend and expand its assistance including not
only humanitarian relief aid but also reconstruction and rehabilitation as well as a
national reconciliation conference.
Source: John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope:
Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute
of Peace Press, 1995).
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Appendix F: Somali Clans and Political Factions
Clans are the equivalent of tribes in most other societies, with their own codes and cul-
tures. Somalis typically divide each clan into five or more smaller clans, which are fur-
ther divided into subclans.
Principal Clans and Subclans Involved in the Somali Civil War
Hawiye clan
• Abgal subclan—Ali Mahdi Mohamed
• Habr Gidr subclan—Mohamed Farah Aideed
Darod clan
• Marehan subclan—Mohamed Siad Barre
• Majerteen subclan—Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi (Morgan)
• Ogaden subclan—Ahmed Omar Jess
Isaaq clan
Dir clan—northwestern element
Dir clan—southern element
Rahanwein clan
Major Clan-Based Political and Military Organizations Active in the Somali Civil War
Somali Democratic Association (SDA)
Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
Somali National Alliance (SNA) (Mohamed Farah Aideed’s branch of the USC)
Somali National Front (SNF)
Somali National Movement (SNM)
Somali Patriotic Front (SPF)
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) (Ali Mahdi Mohamed’s branch of the USC)
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Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
Somali Salvation Front (SSF)
Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)
United Somali Congress (USC)
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Appendix G: Participating Nations
EASTERN EXIT
Amphibious NEO from U.S. embassy in Mogadishu
United States only.
PROVIDE RELIEF
U.S. support operations during UNOSOM I
Primarily United States; small participation by Canada, France, and Germany.
RESTORE HOPE/UNITAF
About thirty-seven thousand personnel from twenty-two coalition nations
Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Italy, Kuwait,
Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Zimbabwe.
CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II
About thirty thousand personnel from twenty-nine coalition nations
Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece,
India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, United States, and Zimbabwe.
UNITED SHIELD
About 16,500 personnel from seven coalition nations
Bangladesh, France, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and United States.
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Sources: U.S. Army Dept., Resource Guide, Unified Task Force Somalia, December 1992–
May 1993, Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History,
1994); U.S. Army Dept., United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Histori-
cal Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994 (Washington, D.C.: Cen-
ter of Military History, 2003); The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996, with
Introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations, United
Nations Blue Book Series, vol. 8 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996);
Chief of Staff, I Marine Expeditionary Force, FMF, Information for Secretarial Corre-
spondence Related to Operation United Shield, 7 April 1995 (copy in possession of the
author).
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Appendix H: General Zinni’s Considerations for Humanitarian and Peace Operations
One of the United States military’s most experienced leaders in the field of MOOTW,
General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Retired), has developed the following considerations
for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations:
• Each operation is unique. We must be careful what lessons we learn from a single
experience.
• Each operation has two key aspects: (1) the degree of complexity of the operation,
and (2) the degree of consent of the involved parties and the international
community for the operation.
• The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for success.
• Start planning as early as possible, including everyone in the planning process.
• Make as thorough an assessment as possible before deployment.
• Conduct a thorough mission analysis, determining the centers of gravity, end state,
commander’s intent, measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, and the estimated
duration of the operation.
• Stay focused on the mission. Line up military tasks with political objectives. Avoid
mission creep and allow for mission shifts. A mission shift is a conscious decision,
made by the political leadership in consultation with the military commander,
responding to a changing situation.
• Centralize planning and decentralize execution of the operation. This allows
subordinate commanders to make appropriate adjustments to meet their individual
situation or rapidly changing conditions.
• Coordinate everything with everybody. Establish coordination mechanisms that
include political, military, nongovernmental organizations, international
organizations, and the interested parties.
• Know the culture and the issues. We must know who the decisionmakers are. We
must know how the involved parties think. We cannot impose our cultural values on
people with their own culture.
• Start or restore key institutions as early as possible.
• Don’t lose the initiative and momentum.
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• Don’t make unnecessary enemies. If you do, don’t treat them gently. Avoid mindsets
or use words that might come back to haunt you.
• Seek unity of effort and unity of command. Create the fewest possible seams
between organizations and involved parties.
• Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for each of the involved parties.
• Encourage innovation and nontraditional responses.
• Personalities often are more important than processes. You need the right people in
the right places.
• Be careful whom you empower. Think carefully about who you invite to participate,
use as a go-between, or enter into contracts with since you are giving them influence
in the process.
• Decide on the image you want to portray and keep focused on it. Whatever the
image, humanitarian or as firm but well-intentioned agent of change, ensure your
troops are aware of it so they can conduct themselves accordingly.
• Centralize information management. Ensure that your public affairs and
psychological operations are coordinated, accurate, and consistent.
• Seek compatibility in all operations; cultural and political compatibility and
military interoperability are crucial to success. The interests, cultures, capabilities,
and motivations of all the parties may not be uniform, but they cannot be allowed
to work against each other.
• Senior commanders and their staffs need the most education and training in
nontraditional roles. The troops need awareness and understanding of their roles.
The commander and the staff need to develop and apply new skills, such as
negotiating, supporting humanitarian organizations effectively and appropriately,
and building coordinating agencies with humanitarian goals.
Source: U.S. Navy Dept., Marine Corps Operations, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication
[MCDP] 1-0 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 27 September
2001), app. E, p. 5. (Quoted verbatim.)
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Appendix I: Major Events Chronology
1960 Somalia gains independence from Italy and Great Britain; forms Somali Republic.
1969 Military coup by Mohamed Siad Barre, who establishes Supreme Revolutionary
Council.
1988 Revolution begins in earnest against Siad Barre, brutally resisted. Army and air force
bombard Hargeisa and Burao, creating three hundred thousand refugees.
1989 Hawiye clan forms the United Somali Congress (USC).
1990 Manifesto Group in Mogadishu calls for Siad Barre’s resignation and national
reconciliation.
1991 Somalian civil war flares up; Mogadishu in chaos, social and political collapse. U.S.
Navy and Marines evacuate U.S. embassy under fire, in Operation EASTERN EXIT. Siad
Barre suffers defeat and flees from Mogadishu and then from Somalia. Clan-based
factions begin struggle for control of Somalia.
1992 (May) Last effort to recapture Mogadishu by Siad Barre’s militia is defeated. (August)
President H. W. Bush orders airlift of supplies into Somalia, in Operation PROVIDE
RELIEF. (December) Naval expeditionary force lands in Mogadishu (Operation RESTORE
HOPE). U.S. forces under UNITAF build up in Somalia to protect humanitarian relief
operations.
1993 (May) Operation CONTINUE HOPE/UNOSOM II begins operations in relief of UNITAF.
(June) Pakistani troops under UNOSOM II are ambushed, twenty-four killed. UN and
United States respond with operations to capture Aideed and minimize his SNA
faction. (3–4 October) Battle of Mogadishu (“Black Hawk Down” incident) occurs.
President Clinton announces U.S. intent to evacuate Somalia no later than 31 March
1994. U.S. builds up forces under JTF SOMALIA, primarily for defensive purposes.
1994 U.S. forces under JTF SOMALIA complete buildup, then prepare to redeploy. Last U.S.
elements depart Somalia, in a tactical amphibious withdrawal. U.S. naval
expeditionary forces conduct withdrawal (Operation QUICK DRAW).
1995 UN announces intention to withdraw all forces and personnel from Somalia. U.S.
naval expeditionary forces conduct amphibious evacuation of UN troops and
personnel. (28 February–3 March 1995) Last of UNOSOM II forces conduct tactical
withdrawal, under Operation UNITED SHIELD.
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Appendix J: Acronyms and Abbreviations
A AAAV Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle [now Expeditionary
Assault Vehicle]
AAV amphibious assault vehicle
AFB Air Force Base
AFOE assault follow-on echelon
AMC Air Mobility Command
APC armored personnel carrier
APS Army Prepositioned Stocks
ARG amphibious readiness group
ATF amphibious task force
ATU amphibious task unit
AWSS authorized weapons storage site [cantonment areas]
C CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.
CATF Commander, Amphibious Task Force
CEF Command Element Forward
CENTCOM [U.S.] Central Command
CIC Council of Islamic Courts
CINC Commander in Chief
CISE CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element
CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force; Combined Joint Task Force
CLF Commander, Landing Force
CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center
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CMOT civil-military operations team
CMPF Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CRAF Civilian Reserve Air Fleet
CSSE Combat Service Support Element
CTF combined task force; Commander, Task Force
CVBG carrier battle group
D DART disaster assistance response team
E ECC evacuation control center
F FAST Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team [Marine Corps]
FIE fly-in echelon
FIST Fleet Imagery Support Terminal
FMF Fleet Marine Force
FSS fast sealift ship
FSSG Force Service Support Group
G GCA ground-controlled approach
GCE ground combat element
H HAST humanitarian assistance survey team
HOC Humanitarian Operations Center
HRO humanitarian relief organization
HRS Humanitarian Relief Sector
I ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies
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IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
J JOC Joint Operations Center
JOPES Joint Operations Planning and Execution System
JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JSB Joint Support Base
JSOTF joint special operations task force
JTF joint task force
L LAS League of Arab States
LASH lighter aboard ship
LAV Light Armored Vehicle
LCAC Landing Craft, Air Cushion
LHA amphibious assault ship (general purpose, multipurpose)
LHD amphibious assault ship (dock)
LKA attack cargo ship
LNO liaison officer
LPD amphibious transport dock
LPH amphibious assault ship (helicopter)
LSC Logistics Support Command
LSD landing ship dock
LST landing ship tank
M MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MARAD Maritime Administration
MARFOR Marine Corps forces
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication
MCM mine countermeasures
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MEB Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF Marine expeditionary force
MEU Marine expeditionary unit
MEU (SOC) Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)
MFA Marine Forces Afloat
MOOTW military operations other than war
MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPS maritime prepositioning ship
MPSRon Maritime Prepositioned Ships squadron
MSC Military Sealift Command
MTMC Military Traffic Management Command
MV motor vessel
N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCENT [U.S.] Naval Forces, Central Command
NCA National Command Authority
NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO nongovernmental organization
NSC National Security Council
O OAU Organization of African Unity
OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance [element of USAID]
OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OMFTS Operational Maneuver from the Sea
OPP offload preparation party
P PhibGru amphibious group
PhibRon amphibious squadron
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POTF Psychological Operations Task Force
PSYOPS psychological operations
PVO private voluntary organization
Q QRF quick-reaction force
R RLT Regimental Landing Team
ROE rule(s) of engagement
ROWPU reverse osmosis water purification unit
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
RRF Ready Reserve Force
S SACB Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation
SDA Somali Democratic Alliance
SDM Somali Democratic Movement
SEAL Sea-Air-Land [Navy special operations]
SLRP Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party
SNA Somali National Alliance
SNDU Somali National Democratic Union
SNF Somali National Front
SNM Somali National Movement
SNU Somali National Union
SPF Somali Patriotic Front
SPM Somali Patriotic Movement
SPMAGTF special-purpose Marine air-ground task force
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General [United
Nations]
SSA Somali Salvation Alliance
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SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSF Somali Salvation Front
SSNM Southern Somali National Movement
STOM Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
T T-AK cargo ship [MSC operated]
TALCE tanker airlift control element
TARPS Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Photo System
TFG Transitional Federal Government
TOW Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided [M-220 anti-
tank missile]
TPFDD time-phased force deployment data
U UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITAF Unified Task Force [UN authorized, US led]
UNLSC UN Logistics Support Command
UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USA U.S. Army
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USC United Somali Congress
USF United Somali Front
USFORSOM U.S. Forces in Somalia
USLO U.S. Liaison Office
USMC U.S. Marine Corps
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USP United Somali Party
V V/STOL vertical/short takeoff and landing
W WFP World Food Programme [UN Agency]
WHO World Health Organization [UN Agency]
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